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ABSTRACT 
With intensifying pressure to not only solve public problems by collaborating with actors 
situated outside the confines of city hall but also to address complex, long-term challenges like 
climate change adaptation and sustainability, local government public managers find themselves 
working in increasingly difficult public management environments.  Currently, public 
management theory fails to fully prescribe management strategies and behaviors that enable 
managers to best achieve their goals in these situations.  This dissertation addresses this gap 
between theory and practice by tracing the public management processes that lead to outcomes in 
a set of municipality-led brownfield remediation and redevelopment projects. 
Utilizing an integration of public management, policy tool, and network theories, this 
research compares four project-level case studies in Rochester and Buffalo, New York, to 
address two primary questions.  First, in what ways do brownfield projects function as public 
management networks?  Second, to what extent do network management behaviors by city-level 
public managers impact project outcomes?    
Contrary to prior research, my findings revealed that neither relationship management nor 
policy tool strategies alone sufficiently explained project outcomes.  Instead, effective public 
management occurred when high levels of political legitimacy were coupled with an integration 
of policy tool and relationship management strategies, either through network-centric public 
managers themselves or through the actions of political champions operating in partnership with 
them.  These findings imply that public management researchers focusing solely upon 
relationship management or policy tool explanations separate from political influences are not 
fully capturing the true public management story. 
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Thanks Mom and Dad . . . 
 
And Chip, here’s to our next steps. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
 
I moved in in 97 and I moved in knowing about the contaminated property.  The mess 
that was back there. I walked around the neighborhood with the dogs and got to meet 
some of the neighbors and they talked about how it was this catastrophe back there . . . 
You'd be sitting here and next thing you know a stick of dynamite would go off or 
somebody would be out back at 2 or 3 in the morning and you'd see a backhoe start up 
and they are digging and burying and hiding stuff and illegally bringing trucks in from 
main street down through the street that was there and dump in the middle of the night 
and we'd call 911 and say "look!  Somebody is back there and they are dumping or 
whatever" and nobody would ever come and investigate it.  – Neighbor, Rochester, NY 
 
This story is one of many involving the problems put upon communities by the presence 
of environmentally contaminated properties, or brownfields, in their neighborhoods and 
downtown districts.  Symbols of neglect, brownfields create health hazards and serve as magnets 
for illicit activities by both property owners and trespassers alike.  As implied by the quote 
above, brownfield problems involve multiple stakeholders competing over limited resources to 
address a diverse array of environmental, social, and public policy problems.  Addressing a 
brownfield problem requires more resources than any single government agency is able to put 
together and more expertise than any single government agency is able to maintain.  
In the early 1970’s Rittel and Webber (1973) described such public policy problems that 
defied traditional bureaucratic solutions as “wicked” problems (Rittel and Webber 1973). 
Grounded in the planning profession, the authors wrote that wicked problems could not be 
addressed by one entity accumulating all of the necessary knowledge to determine, and then 
implement, the best solution. “We shall want to suggest that the social professions were misled 
somewhere along the line into assuming they could be applied scientists – that they could solve 
problems in the ways scientists can solve their sorts of problems.” (160) Instead these problems 
require multiple iterations of imperfect policy solutions generated through interactions of 
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multiple actors and organizations acting as a network – a complex and messy process for public 
managers to untangle.   
In recent years, research suggests that addressing complex problems with cross-sector 
networks is more efficient and effective than the alternative of internalizing the problem within a 
government bureaucracy (Andrews and Entwistle 2010).  However, many questions remain 
unanswered as to the mechanisms that increase the efficiency and effectiveness of these 
networks, including the impacts of public policy tools and the extent to which the strategic use of 
these tools by public managers shapes network actor behaviors (Mandell and Keast 2007; 
Hicklin, O'Toole Jr., and Meier 2007; O'Toole Jr. and Meier 2006). To what extent can a single 
public manager steer multiple organizations towards a common goal? Is it more effective to 
influence network actors through policy incentives or by appealing to relational trust and 
reciprocity?  What factors moderate the effectiveness of these strategies? One school of thought 
suggests that public managers operating in task-specific networks should focus their attention on 
the former, shaping the rules and norms, or institutions, which guide network actor behaviors 
(Edelenbos and Klijn 2006; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004).  This dissertation adds to this 
knowledge base by examining network management practice within a new context – that of 
brownfield remediation and redevelopment.  
The Brownfield Problem.  In the face of today’s economic crisis, many municipalities 
in the United States with industrial pasts face difficult challenges in maintaining the delivery of 
government services and ensuring the quality of life expected by their citizens.  Once heralded as 
prominent centers of production and manufacturing up through the 1950s, these municipalities 
carry the burdens of decaying water, sewer, and street infrastructures, aging housing stock, and 
inadequate space for new commercial and industrial employers (Vey 2007; Goldman 2007).  
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Embedded within the economic struggle of these cities is extensive soil and water contamination 
resulting from decades of underregulated commercial and production activity.  From steel 
milling to chemical refining to food processing, companies large and small polluted the air and 
water around them, often directly impacting the very neighborhoods in which their employees 
resided (Yount 2003; Heberle and Wernstedt 2006).  As property owners left for greener areas 
and local governments tried to resell what they acquired through tax foreclosure, the extent of 
this contamination became known.  Yet, while environmental clean up costs posed new barriers 
to redevelopment, these properties presented new opportunities for new construction amongst 
limited land supply (Greenberg et al. 2001; Nijkamp, Rodenburg, and Wagtendonk 2002).  
Formally, brownfields are real properties lying underused because of fears, real or 
perceived, that they are contaminated with pollutants1. Some brownfields exist in highly 
marketable locations where private investors willingly acquire and transform them into more 
productive spaces.  Others qualify for state and federal hazardous waste cleanup programs such 
as Superfund due to the extent of their contamination.  A third category of properties exists in a 
sort of “twilight zone” where market forces alone do not compel their cleanup but the regulatory 
hammers of Superfund laws do not apply.  It is these properties that brownfield public policy 
programs primarily target.   
Over the past fifteen years, federal, state, and local governments have innovated a wide 
array of brownfield policy programs, or policy tool packages, intended to incentivize the 
assessment and remediation of contaminated properties by shaping the rules and norms 
                                                
1 http://www.epa.gov/brownfields accessed December 13, 2010 
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governing the interactions of public and private actors engaged in brownfield processes2.  
Examples of these tools include liability waivers, tax credits, planning and remediation grants, 
revolving loan funds, and technical assistance. Most of these tools exist at the state and local 
levels, creating a wide variation in tool availability across state and local contexts (DeSousa 
2005).  However, simply remediating a brownfield property only addresses half of the problem. 
To be considered successful, projects also need to improve property usage by addressing 
housing, employment, aesthetic, and infrastructure challenges (Lange and McNeil 2004).   
Because brownfield remediation and redevelopment projects link the environmental, 
economic, and social policy arenas and bring together three distinct expert areas (environmental 
science and engineering, planning, and construction) and groups of stakeholders, the 
effectiveness of brownfield policy tools relies upon adequate integration of environmental, 
economic and social domains over the life of the project (Meyer 2003; Greenberg et al. 2001; 
Heberle and Wernstedt 2006; Hula 2001; Lafferty and Hovden 2003). Achieving this integration 
requires a great deal of information diffusion to a range of stakeholders operating within and 
around the project network (Thomas 2003; O'Toole Jr. 2004).  Private investors need to 
understand project risks and uncertainties, local government officials need to be aware of 
available policy tools, and elected officials, regulators, interest groups, and citizens need to 
understand remediation and redevelopment processes to create a political process for moving the 
project forward (Thomas 2003; Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; DeSousa 2006).  Together, these 
characteristics of brownfield projects require that understanding the extent to which public 
                                                
2 For a more detailed discussion of policy tools, see Chapter Three, p.46.  However, throughout 
this dissertation, the term “policy tools” and “policy instruments” are used based upon the 
definition presented by Salamon (2002) in which he writes that a policy tool is a mechanism used 
by government actors to address public problems.  While this is a broad definition, it 
encompasses the range of policy mechanisms commonly used in brownfield projects. 
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managers play a role in shaping outcomes involve an examination of network, policy tool, and 
public management processes and how, when overlapping, outcomes occur (Figure 1-1).  
Figure 1-1: Theories for Explaining Brownfield Project Outcomes 
 
Research Questions.  This study therefore addresses two primary research questions. 
1. How do brownfield projects function as networks? 
2. To what extent do management behaviors by city-level public managers within these 
networks impact project outcomes?  
This first question requires an exploration of the multi-actor nature of brownfield remediation 
and redevelopment projects to determine the extent to which these projects conform to existing 
public management network theory.  The second question subsequently requires the deductive 
use of theories about interorganizational networks, the selection and implementation of policy 
tools, and public management to explain why different brownfield project outcomes occur across 
multiple projects.  
Two motivations drive this research.   First, local governments play a key role in 
brownfield remediation and redevelopment processes (Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; DeSousa 
2006) but research has primarily focused upon the policy tools employed during implementation 
Outcomes	  
Policy	  Tools	  
Public	  
Management	  Networks	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processes rather than actual management practice.  Practitioners need a greater understanding of 
the organizational and managerial capacities behind successful project implementation.  The 
second motivation is to fill in existing gaps between network, public management, and policy 
tool theories by examining the interactions of network structures, public managers, and policy 
tools over time.  Existing literature fails to account for the complete context in which public 
managers influencing network outcomes operate. If theory is to inform practice, it is important to 
examine the details of these network functions over time. 
Theoretical Implications.  This dissertation carries theoretical implications for 
brownfield researchers and public management theorists alike.  First, for brownfield researchers, 
the study describes brownfield projects in a manner not yet seen in the brownfield literature.  By 
viewing these projects through a network lens, the study produces insights into the nature of 
multiple relationships occurring simultaneously, not just the relationship between local 
government and a private developer.  Second, in their original discussion of problem 
“wickedness”, Rittel and Webber (1973) describe how natural science problems “are definable 
and separable and may have solutions that are findable” while social problems “are ill-defined 
and they rely upon elusive political judgment for resolution” (160). Analyzing network structures 
and management strategies within the brownfield remediation and redevelopment arena provides 
a window through which the convergence of natural and social science knowledge areas in 
public management practice may be further understood. 
For public management theorists, current research lacks focus on how networks evolve 
during their life spans (Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009), particularly in the area of short-term, 
temporary networks.  The application of social network analysis to brownfield projects helps to 
fill this gap.  In addition, as described above, the study builds theory regarding the interactions 
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between network structures, policy tools, and public management when explaining outcomes of 
management activity.  Simultaneously integrating these theories better matches the complex 
management environments they are intended to explain. 
Practical Implications.  By contributing to theory, this dissertation simultaneously 
contributes to practice.  The findings provide practical insights to public managers engaged in 
projects spanning the arenas of environmental regulation and economic development.  A stronger 
understanding of which actors occupy what network positions across multiple project phases 
enhances the abilities of public managers to identify and target project actors at the appropriate 
times.  In addition, this research informs policy makers at the state and federal levels about how 
different sets of policy tools become used at the project level.  As many brownfield policies face 
reauthorization at these levels, smart redesign relies upon more a complete understanding of how 
tools impact processes.  Finally, this work explains the inner workings of local governments 
during brownfield projects for private firms engaged or interested in engaging with their 
governments on these projects.  A greater understanding of the constraints and opportunities 
facing their public counterparts enables private partners to make more informed decisions about 
project selection and public-private partnership development.     
Summary.  As more municipalities struggle with increasingly complex wicked policy 
problems like brownfields, the need to understand cross-disciplinary, cross-sector public 
management networks becomes imperative.  Public managers must understand how to leverage 
policy tools in order to leverage project partners, policy makers must understand the extent to 
which public policies constrain or enhance public managers, and researchers must fully 
comprehend the dynamic nature of networks unfolding over time. Without these understandings, 
the prospect of governments solving wicked problems diminishes, for, as one public manager 
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interviewed for this study commented, addressing a brownfield problem “was like two octopuses 
making love, it was hard to figure out where the beginning of one was and the end of the other 
was.” Through careful study, we may be able to untangle the tentacles of network management 
and organize our cross-sector public management networks with greater efficiency, ultimately 
realizing greater effectiveness. 
Organization of Dissertation.  The dissertation contains five substantive chapters in 
addition to this introduction and the conclusion.  Chapter Two provides a thorough background 
of the size and scope of the brownfield problem and the policies put in place to address the 
problem in the United States today as well as the state of New York.  Chapter Three provides an 
overview of network, public management, and policy tool theories and constructs a theoretical 
framework for explaining brownfield project outcomes.  Chapter Four describes the research 
design and methodologies used to select project level cases, to collect necessary data, and to 
perform data analysis.  Chapters Five, Six, and Seven present analytical case studies that 
examine how network characteristics and policy tool use interact with public management 
behaviors to shape individual project outcomes. Chapter Eight summarizes the extent to which 
key findings across these cases address the propositions and Chapter Nine summarizes the 
theoretical and practical contributions of the study.  As a special addendum, Chapter Ten 
presents an example of how complex network research may be used to train practitioners. 
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CHAPTER TWO BACKGROUND ON BROWNFIELD PROPERTIES AND THEIR 
REMEDIATION AND REDEVELOPMENT 
 
Overview. When the first federal legislation addressing the brownfield problem occurred 
in 1995, policy makers and academics viewed it as a remediation challenge for environmental 
engineers.  This point of view quickly shifted when policymakers realized the potential for 
private redevelopment investment to help pay for remediation costs.  This integrated the 
environmental aspects of brownfield properties with existing local community and economic 
development strategies (Hula 2001).  Over the past twenty-five years, the brownfield arena has 
evolved to produce a rich public management phenomenon about which research has just started 
to scratch the surface. 
This chapter presents an overview of the brownfield problem in the United States and, 
more specifically, the state of New York, as well as a summary of brownfield research.  The first 
part of the chapter covers the history of the term “brownfield”, the scope of the problem, the 
causes and contaminants, phases of brownfield remediation and redevelopment processes, types 
of property reuse, and theories about project stakeholders.  The second section examines the 
barriers to remediation and redevelopment, particularly as they relate to the issue of 
marketability, and describes the evolution of federal and state brownfield policy tools designed 
to address these barriers.  The final section overviews the measurement of brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment success. 
Definition and Policy Background. Contaminated properties reached the national 
consciousness in the late 1970s when numerous toxic waste fires occurred and the extent of 
contamination at Love Canal in New York and Times Beach in Missouri became known.  These 
events and the resulting public outcry led President Carter and the U.S.  Congress to pass the 
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Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), funding 
remediation of the most contaminated sites and setting liability rules regarding responsibility for 
past, present and future damages.  However, while this legislation addressed a serious 
environmental problem, it also erected significant liability barriers for those who might 
voluntarily redevelop properties containing far less severe contamination (Yount 2003; Heberle 
and Wernstedt 2006; Page and Rabinowitz 1994).  By erecting elaborate joint and several 
liability structures to hold multiple parties responsible for remediation, policy makers effectively 
created disincentives for the transfer of titles of contaminated properties to those who might 
willingly clean them up (McGregor 2003). 
Recognizing this negative side-effect of CERCLA, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA) enacted its Brownfields Action Agenda in 1995 to clarify liability 
issues and to support efforts underway in various states that incentivized voluntary clean up of 
brownfield properties (Yount 2003; Heberle and Wernstedt 2006).  The resulting revisions of 
federal laws freed states to innovate policy instruments intended to lessen market constraints on 
brownfield redevelopment for private firms.  These laws had the additional effect of empowering 
local governments to pool existing resources and proactively address their own brownfield 
problems in anticipation of attracting private investment.  It is at this point that “brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment” emerged first as a subsector of the environmental engineering 
profession and then as part of the economic development sector. 
The official definition for “brownfield” in the United States comes from Public Law 107-
118 and states that “brownfields are real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of 
which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, 
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pollutant, or contaminant3.”  The law excludes properties whose contamination is so extensive 
that they qualify for the National Priorities List of hazardous waste sites and properties that have 
binding legal agreements regarding their remediation.  Key components of this definition are the 
phrases “presence or potential presence” and “may be complicated”, signifying that the 
brownfield status of a property is based both on perceptions of contamination as well as actual 
contamination (Schoenbaum 2002). This ambiguity led to the development of a diversity of 
brownfield policy tools as well as multiple calls for more specific definitions (Yount 2003). 
Extent and Nature of Problem.  The lack of a clear definition and the diversity of 
public policiy at the state level make it difficult to nail down the extent of the brownfield 
problem in the United States (Coffin and Meyer 2002; Yount 2003).  For example, the USEPA 
estimates that 450,000 brownfield properties sit underused in the United States4.  Yet, in a series 
of surveys conducted by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, city managers from over 500 of the 
nation’s largest municipalities estimated only 40,000 brownfield properties in their communities 
(Table 2-1) (Mayors 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010). 
                                                
3 http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/ accessed August 1, 2010 
4 http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/about.htm accessed August 1, 2010 
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Table 2-1: Brownfields Data – U.S. Conference of Mayors 
City Population Less than 
100,000 
100,000 to 
249,999 
250,000 to 
499,999 
500,000+ 
# Respondents 351 97 31 25 
Total # Sites 9397 9586 8961 11314 
Total # Acres 54921 44261 29584 450227 
Ave Acres 5.84 4.62 3.30 4.44 
Est Tax Revenue $241,758,110 $59,336,000 $69,170,556 $260,010,000 
Sites 
Redeveloped* 
868 603 282 575 
Data compiled from responses across 2001, 2003, 2006, 2008 and 2010 U.S. Conference of 
Mayors brownfield surveys using most recent year containing total # sites and total # acres data 
for each unique case.  Survey questions and format differ for each year.  All responses are 
estimates made by the respondent. Not all responses complete. 
* Excludes cities whose only data comes from 2000 survey. 
 
 At the same time, it is difficult to designate and count privately owned brownfield 
properties as brownfield designation lowers the value of the property and adjacent parcels, 
particularly in commercial and residential areas and property owners lack reporting incentives 
(Ihlanfeldt and Taylor 2004; Leigh and Coffin 2005; Longo and Alberini 2006; Meyer 2003). 
Therefore, public inventories that do exist usually only contain those properties that are likely to 
be or become owned by the local government through foreclosure or purchase. 
Strong evidence exists linking brownfield properties to economically struggling 
communities.  A report by the Brookings Institution (2006) empirically identifies 139 cities in 24 
states with populations of at least 30,000 that have been underperforming economically the past 
ten years and highlights how most of these cities are those with industrial pasts and have left “a 
tremendous environmental legacy” (Vey 2007).  Superimposing these data on the Conference of 
Mayors data shows how properties in Brookings' “Weak Market” communities in the American 
northeast and midwest report a disproportion of Conference of Mayors brownfield properties 
(Table 2-2), a relationship confirmed by existing research (XLEnvironmental 2002; Heberle and 
Wernstedt 2006; Page and Berger 2005). 
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Table 2-2: Older Industrial Cities and Brownfields 
 All Cities in U.S. 
Conference of Mayors 
(COM) Data 
Brookings Older 
Industrial Cities in 
COM Data 
Proportion of 
Brookings Data to 
COM Data 
cities 430 40 9% 
est # brownfield 
sites 
34,819 7,101 20% 
est # brownfield 
acres 
214,477 30,484 14% 
est average acres 33.88 5.61 - 
Derived from Brookings (2006) and U.S. Conference of Mayors (2001, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2010)  
 
Causes and Contaminants. Brownfield properties occur due to a wide range of land 
uses across urban, suburban and rural landscapes.  However, research indicates a majority of 
brownfields derive from industrial and commercial activity in areas of high population densities 
(Bjelland 2004) and persist due to liability, uncertainty, and the availability of uncontaminated 
land, or “greenfields”, in suburban areas drawing development activity away from brownfield 
properties (Brachman 2004). 
Brownfield contamination comes from a variety of sources through a variety of means 
and includes a wide range of contaminants.  Many of the large industrial site contaminations in 
the northeast and midwest stem from the manufacturing and processing of glass, chemicals, 
plastic, paint and construction materials (Bjelland 2004; Gorman 2003; Page and Berger 2005).  
A host of smaller businesses such as dry cleaners and fuel service stations also contribute to the 
problem, particularly in smaller communities (Page and Berger 2005).  Contamination may occur 
through intentional or accidental waste dumping, surface runoff, and contaminant migration by 
means of both groundwater and air (Greenberg et al. 2001; Howland 2003).  Contaminants are 
hazardous substances posing health risks via air, soil, and water pathways and include substances 
such as petroleum derivatives, PCBs, lead, and dioxins (DeSousa 2001; NADO 2006). 
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Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Processes.  Individual brownfield 
projects vary along multiple characteristics including time to completion, size, extent of 
contamination, number of project partners, and political support for the project (Yousefi et al. 
2007; Lange and McNeil 2004; Meyer and Lyons 2000).  However, remediation and 
redevelopment processes remain largely the same across the board (Schilling and Logan 2008; 
Sagalyn 2007; Mayors 2007; Dixon 2007; NADO 2006; Heberle and Wernstedt 2006; DeSousa 
2006; NADO 2004; Davis 2002; Wood 2000, 1998; Blair, Govan, and Atkinson 1995; Dennison 
1998).  This suggests a reliable theory-based model of brownfield project processes (Table 2-3).   
The process generally begins with site selection and assembly and a Phase I assessment 
for contamination.  Site selection occurs via a mix of political and economic development 
priorities, land use planning, citizen preferences, end use, and voluntary action.  Phase I 
assessments provide a quick overview of contamination.  Concurrently, project initiators use 
Phase I data to determine the economic feasibility of site redevelopment and select the best end 
use for a remediated property.  If the Phase I assessment reveals levels of contamination 
requiring remediation, property owners conduct a much more detailed Phase II assessment to 
determine contamination details, quantify contamination concentrations, and evaluate the surface 
and subsurface conditions.  Remediation soon follows and redevelopment occurs.   
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Table 2-3: Phases of Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment 
Phase Stage Description 
 
 
 
 
 
Remediation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site Identification 
and Assembly 
Potential developers (public and private) identify 
contaminated sties of interest with assistance from 
public brownfield directories or through marketing 
by current property owners. 
Initial Site 
Assessment – Phase 
I Investigation 
Assessing to determine whether contamination is 
present through historical records and examination of 
neighboring sites. 
Detailed Site 
Assessment – Phase 
II Investigation 
Remedial 
Assessment 
Environmental engineers sample and analyze 
chemical parameters of site if Phase I Investigation 
suggests potential for contamination. 
Economic 
Assessment and 
Planning 
Assessing for potential economic return vs. cost of 
restoring site to productive use.  Sites categorized 
into viable, threshold, and nonviable groups 
according to this potential/cost ratio.  End use plans 
generated. 
Redevelopment 
 
(Overlap) 
 
Remediation 
Project 
Development and 
Financing 
Assuming financial feasibility studies are complete, 
developers arrange financing for clean up and 
redevelopment.  This is a likely stage for meetings 
between multiple stakeholders. 
Remediation 
Planning and 
Execution 
Selecting and implementing a clean up plan in 
compliance with regulations. 
Redevelopment Redevelopment of 
Site 
Altering the site for suitability to its new use. 
Derived from Dennison (1998, pp. 142-147) 
For the most part, property owners initiate and drive project processes. In situations 
where private owners do not voluntarily begin assessment, municipalities will occasionally 
acquire the properties through tax foreclosure, direct purchase agreements and eminent domain 
and initiate assessment and remediation processes (Brachman 2003; Wernstedt and Hersh 2003).  
When local governments are the property owners, redevelopment phases often occur through a 
public-private partnership where both partners strive to leverage financial resources from the 
other (Sagalyn 2007; Bartsch 2006; ICMA 2005).  In certain instances, municipalities themselves 
serve as both the remediation facilitator and the redeveloper. 
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End Use.  The end uses of brownfield properties range across the industrial, commercial, 
and residential spectrum of economic and community development.  Once project drivers select 
end uses, the stakeholders likely to be involved in remediation and redevelopment processes 
become clear.  In addition, the levels to which remediation must occur under the appropriate 
regulatory framework becomes known.  For example, residential end uses typically engage more 
citizens in planning processes and require higher standards of remediation (Kirkwood 2001).  
The location of the brownfield and the enthusiasm for its proposed end use can drastically 
shape the marketability and demand for the property (Lange and McNeil 2004).  For example, 
properties on waterfronts, near downtown areas, and lying at key intersections of urban 
infrastructure often “rise to the top” of project priority lists. Meanwhile, properties lying in areas 
outside the public interest often remain unaddressed for long periods of time.  Studies of end use 
indicate that industrial and commercial reuse prevail when private firms drive project processes 
while parks, public buildings and housing projects dominate municipality-led projects (DeSousa 
2004; Page and Berger 2005; Silverstein 2003).   
Stakeholders.  Stakeholders and actors in brownfield remediation and redevelopment 
projects (Table 2-4) range across environmental, economic development, and urban planning 
professions and include elected representatives, public and private developers, landowners, 
investors, citizens, activists, regulators, and clients of developers (Dair and Williams 2006; 
Greenberg et al. 2001; Silverstein 2003; Alker et al. 2000).  
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Table 2-4: Brownfield Stakeholders 
Stakeholder Group Stakeholder Type Example 
Those involved in land-use 
planning and regulation 
Regulators, service 
providers, elected officials 
 
 
Interest groups, private 
consultants, individuals 
Environmental regulators, zoning 
and planning regulators, city 
council members, city officials, 
health and safety regulators 
 
Business interests, community 
activists, individual citizens 
Those involved in 
development and construction 
Property developers and 
developer interests 
 
 
Professional advisors 
Public and private developers, 
investors, landowners, 
shareholders, construction 
workers, suppliers 
 
Lawyers, architects, engineers, 
surveyors, conservationists, 
archaeologists, insurers 
Those involved in end use Consumers 
Clients of developers, residents 
of new homes, proprietors of 
commercial business, 
manufacturers, adjacent 
landowners 
Derived from Dair & Williams (2006) 
 
Actor composition varies by project based upon property ownership, remediation 
requirements, the policy tools used, and the proposed end use (Dair and Williams 2006).  The 
degree to which actors engage in the project also varies across project phases and the tasks at 
hand. For example, remediation largely occurs through a set of contracted and sub-contracted 
relationships where the property owner, or a private consultant acting on behalf of the property 
owner, formally contracts with firms that specialize in different pieces of the site-specific 
remediation plan. Table 2-5 provides an illustration of how stakeholder composition may vary 
over the course of the project. 
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Table 2-5: Public and Private Actors in Remediation and Redevelopment Processes 
Phase Stage Stakeholders 
 
 
 
 
 
Remediation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site Identification citizens 
elected officials 
public managers (planners, 
engineers) 
private property owners 
insurers 
Initial Site Assessment – 
Phase I Investigation 
public managers 
environmental engineers 
Detailed Site Assessment 
– Phase II Investigation 
environmental engineers 
public managers 
 
Economic Assessment 
and Planning 
citizens 
elected officials 
economic development officials 
developers 
lawyers 
public managers 
insurers 
Redevelopment 
 
 
Remediation 
Project Development and 
Financing 
lenders 
developers 
clients 
Remediation Planning 
and Execution 
environmental engineers 
consultants and contractors 
Redevelopment Redevelopment of Site developers 
consultants and contractors 
clients 
public managers 
 
Barriers to Brownfield Remediation and Remediation. The challenges facing 
successful implementation of an individual brownfield project largely depend upon the 
marketability of the property and the extent to which public or private leaders are willing to incur 
financial risks (McCarthy 2002).  Public and private actors have different needs, goals, 
motivations, and accountability structures and have varying perceptions in these situations. 
Private sector actors seek positive returns on investment and list remediation uncertainty, 
liability concerns, the time required for regulatory compliance, and funding availability for 
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remediation as primary reasons for avoiding brownfield properties (Meyer and Lyons 2000).  On 
the other hand, political forces drive public actors to pursue public health, economic 
development, and sustainability goals through brownfield redevelopment (Greenberg and 
Schneider 1995).  However, the cost of these efforts provide strong incentives for local 
governments to focus their efforts on diminishing barriers to potential private investors (Page 
and Rabinowitz 1994).  
Marketability.  Like the “brownfield” concept itself, “marketability” is perceptual and 
influences the extent to which public subsidy plays a role in remediation (Howland 2003).  
However, there is debate as to whether or not environmental liabilities challenge brownfield 
redevelopment more than fundamental real estate problems (Wernstedt et al. 2004).  Since many 
contaminated properties exist in already struggling real estate markets, discerning between the 
two factors is difficult. Figure 2-1 exhibits how this function impacts drivers of brownfield 
processes.  Area A contains viable sites where sufficient market demand drives voluntary 
remediation and redevelopment by private investors. Area B contains threshold sites where, with 
public subsidization, private investment occurs.  Area C contains unviable sites where private 
actors not invest no matter how extensive the public subsidies (Davis 2002; Howland 2003; 
Silverstein 2003).  This study focuses upon those properties in Area B, which receive a moderate 
to high levels of public subsidy.  
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Figure 2-1: Property Marketability and Brownfield Redevelopment 
 
Surveys of developers indicate that many factors shape private actor interest in 
brownfield properties.  Property acreage, proximity to existing infrastructure, availability of 
government funding and liability protections, access to insurance products, and potential return 
on investment all impact private actor behavior (Alberini et al. 2005; Alberini, Meyer, and 
Wernstedt 2004; Wernstedt et al. 2006).  Large properties tend to attract large investors (Meyer 
and Lyons 2000) and, as perceived marketability increases, it becomes more likely a private 
property owner will initiate remediation (Alberini, Meyer, and Wernstedt 2004).  While the study 
of public actors initiating brownfield projects remains limited, the literature suggests that costs, 
liability, time, information, and political support are factors mediating the involvement of both 
public and private actors. 
Costs. Remediation costs pose the greatest barrier to actors from both sectors (Page and 
Rabinowitz 1994; Stephenson 2005; Alberini et al. 2005; Wernstedt and Hersh 2003; Davis 
2002).  For some properties, remediation costs may be greater than the redevelopment costs.  
While uncertainty regarding the extent of contamination amplifies the financial risks to private 
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investors, public actors face financial barriers made more complex by the public accountability 
issues tied to using tax dollars.  
 Liability.  Private actors acquiring brownfield properties also weigh the threat of liability 
for future contamination problems brought on by property ownership (McGregor 2003; Alberini 
et al. 2005; Wernstedt et al. 2006).  This liability was the original barrier created by CERCLA 
that federal and state brownfield laws subsequently addressed by exempting remediation 
initiators from lawsuits if they fulfilled remediation due diligence (Sigman 2005; Wernstedt et al. 
2006).  
 Time.  Another major barrier to private investment is the time required for the 
implementation of public policy instruments, particularly when interest groups intervene to 
pursue additional agendas (Sigman 2001).  Not only does regulatory compliance add time to the 
redevelopment project, but so do requirements for citizen engagement and collaborative planning 
(Wernstedt et al. 2006).  As the old adage goes, “time is money”, especially for private actors 
operating within a competitive market.   Therefore, the anticipated time between Phase I 
assessments and completed redevelopment of the site factors into project initiation decisions 
(Lange and McNeil 2004). 
 Information.  The contamination component of brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment projects creates greater demand for information by public managers, citizens, 
elected officials from developers, environmental engineers, and lawyers (Thomas 2003).  The 
uncertainty surrounding actual contamination and the potential for lawsuits if remediation is not 
carried out sufficiently places the burden for generating accurate information on the property 
developer themselves (Wernstedt et al. 2006). Another information barrier creating uncertainty is 
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the lack of sophisticated or consistent data collection techniques by governments (Coffin and 
Meyer 2002; Thomas 2003).  
 Political Support.  Finally, many brownfields remain underused and unaddressed because 
the political will and leadership required for remediation and redevelopment remains insufficient 
(Brachman 2004).  Many threshold properties that prevailing market forces do not address 
require individuals with political power willing to champion them and push them through 
political and bureaucratic processes. 
 Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Policies.  The primary means by which 
governments address these barriers is through the development and application of public policies 
that, over the past fifteen years, have successfully created artificial brownfield markets 
(Wernstedt et al. 2006; Meyer and Lyons 2000).  At the federal level, the USEPA serves as the 
primary agency administering brownfield policy programs with the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD) playing a role for those projects with residential end uses.  The 
primary incentives and programs currently offered by these agencies for local-level brownfield 
redevelopment include assessment and remediation grants, revolving loans, technical assistance, 
temporary assignment of federal employees with states and municipalities, and designation of 
areas with large densities of contaminated properties as brownfield showcase communities that 
qualify them for additional support. 
 At the state level, most governments provide what are known as voluntary cleanup 
programs (VCPs) which offer an array of policy tools designed to meet private property owner 
needs (Alberini, Meyer, and Wernstedt 2004; Blair et al. 1995).  These tools address property-
specific issues of liability, uncertainty, and risk in order to lower remediation costs and increase 
potential investment returns.  In addition, many states have additional programs tailored to public 
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and nonprofit developers that reimburse assessment and remediation costs.  Table 2-6 lists the 
major categories of state level policy tools used in brownfield redevelopment. 
Table 2-6: Common Brownfields Policy Tools 
Tools Barrier Addressed Target Actor Mechanism 
Environmental 
insurance 
Risk of future liability Public, private, 
nonprofit 
developers 
Protect developers 
from third party 
liability and provide 
cost cap protection 
Tax relief 
Tax increment 
financing 
Cost of assessment, 
remediation and 
redevelopment 
Private developers Financial incentive to 
commit to specific 
property 
Low-interest loans Cost of assessment, 
remediation and 
redevelopment 
Private, nonprofit 
developers 
Revolving loan fund 
enabling more 
affordable clean up 
Technical assistance Cost of assessment and 
remediation 
Citizen outreach 
Public, private, 
nonprofit 
developers 
Provide information 
enabling more 
efficient processes 
Liability waiver Risk of future liability Public, private, 
nonprofit 
developers 
Statutory protection 
Assessment and 
remediation grants 
Cost of assessment and 
remediation 
Public, nonprofit 
developers 
Project-specific block 
grant 
Redevelopment 
authority 
Timeliness of 
government service 
delivery 
Public, private, 
nonprofit 
developers 
Administrative entity 
with greater flexibility 
 
 Studies of brownfield tools primarily examine the effectiveness of individual tools.  For 
example, Carroll and Eger (2006) investigate the performance of tax-increment financing (TIF) 
and determine that, when applied on an area-wide basis, aggressive TIF increases brownfield 
property marketability (Carroll and Eger III 2006).  However, this tool-by-tool approach to 
performance measurement does not fully capture the reality of how public managers apply 
packages of instruments to meet developer needs (Wernstedt et al. 2006). 
Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Policy in the State of New York. 
Brownfield policy development in the State of New York has followed a path unique to all other 
states in the U.S. due to the impact of its most famous contaminated property, Love Canal.  This 
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case involved the siting of a neighborhood and elementary school on top of a poorly designed 
hazardous waste dump in North Tonawanda, NY just south of the city of Buffalo, NY.  When 
toxic mud began bubbling up around playgrounds and backyards during a particularly rainy 
spring, the news took the media by storm, placing the environmental regulatory schemes in the 
state of New York under intense political scrutiny5.  Ultimately leading to a federal policy 
change regarding hazardous waste clean up with the U.S. Congress approving the Superfund 
program in 1980, Love Canal also triggered New York policy makers to establish high levels of 
redundancy in the contamination and redevelopment rules for local governments to prevent such 
an incident from occurring again.  As a result, New York State, according to one brownfield 
expert, maintains a regulatory framework and bureaucracy more extensive than the remaining 
forty-nine states6.  It is therefore important to consider this regulatory context for New York-
based brownfield projects when applying findings from their analysis to governmental 
jurisdictions outside New York State. 
The three brownfield policy programs currently offered in New York State are the New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) Brownfield Remediation 
Program (BCP), the Environmental Restoration Program (ERP), and the Brownfield Opportunity 
Area (BOA) Program.  Originally established as the Voluntary Remediation Program (VCP) in 
1994, the BCP supports private developers.  The NYSDEC subsequently established the ERP in 
1996 to assist in remediation activities initiated by municipalities and the BOA program 
appeared in 2003 to encourage municipalities to develop area-wide plans with the input of 
various community-based actors. The NYSDEC initially operated the BOA program in 
                                                
5 http://www.justice.gov/enrd/Anniversary/2412.htm  
6 Conversation with Preston Gilbert, SUNY-ESF, April 26, 2011 
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partnership with the New York State Department of State (DOS) but the DOS now implements 
the entire program.  Together, these programs offer a mix of policy tools that address 
remediation and redevelopment barriers.  These tools include a Certificate of Completion 
limiting owner liability, tax credits, planning and remediation grants, a revolving loan fund, 
status in economic development zones, and technical assistance (Table 2-7). Participation in the 
VCP/BCP and ERP occurs on a site-by-site basis and certain projects do not qualify if the 
contamination is too high and there is pending litigation.  In addition, the BCP and the ERP 
require certain types of citizen participation such as public notices, comment periods, and public 
forums.  
Table 2-7: New York State Brownfield-related Policy Tools and Participation Requirements, by 
Program 
Tool BCP ERP BOA 
Liability Relief to Innocent Parties x x  
Environmental Liability Limitation x x  
Covenant Not to Sue x   
Tax Credits1 x   
Technical Assistance Grants ($50,000) x   
Remediation Grants (90% onsite; 100% offsite) x   
Revolving Loan Fund x x x 
Empire Zone/Environmental Zone Designation2 x x x 
Planning Grants (90%)   x 
Citizen Participation Required at Various 
Milestones 
x x x 
1 Tax credits offset costs associated with real property taxes, site preparation, groundwater 
remediation, property improvements, environmental insurance premiums. 
2 Enhances existing tax credits if property lies in designated zone. 
 
In addition, fifty-three municipalities have entered the BOA program, which takes an area-wide 
approach that is different than the site-based approaches of the VCP, BCP, and ERP.  Table 2-8 
summarizes total program participation. 
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Table 2-8: New York State Brownfield Program Participation (August, 2010) 
 VCP  
(1994-2003) 
BCP  
(2003-
present) 
ERP  
(1996-
present) 
TOTAL 
PROPERTIES 
BOA 
(2003-present) 
Total 
properties 414 287 185 886 
Total 
municipalities: 
53 
Properties 
accepted  
(A-Class) 
237 218 141 596 
Step 1 (33) 
Step 2 (15) 
Step 3 (5) 
Properties 
cleaned up 
(C-Class) 
177 69 44 290 
 
  
 
Additional NYSDEC programs available for addressing contaminated properties include 
the Inactive Hazardous Waste Disposal Site Program, the Corrective Action Program for 
Hazardous Waste Facilities, the Bulk Storage Program for chemicals and petroleum with its Spill 
Response Program, and the New York Environmental Protection and Spill Compensation and 
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Funds.  Together, these programs utilize reporting 
requirements, liability tools, certification, technical support, and compensation payments (when 
responsible parties are not identifiable) to achieve remediation goals7.  The New York State 
Departments of Education, Health, Agriculture, and the Division of Housing all offer various 
grant programs that, while not directly related to property assessment or remediation, may be 
applied to specific aspects of contaminated property redevelopment. 
Measuring and Explaining Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Success.  
Measuring brownfield project outcomes and assessing the success of these outcomes is a 
complex affair.  Outcomes range from the municipality to the microscopic levels of analysis and 
                                                
7 http://www.dec.ny.gov/25.html (accessed June 8, 2010) 
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consideration of each outcome for a measure of success depends upon stakeholder preferences.  
As a result, brownfield project performances and successes become measured in multiple ways.  
Brownfield Project Outcomes. Brownfield outcomes and their relative importance 
generally fall into two categories; those related to remediation and those related to 
redevelopment. Remediation outcomes include the reduction in liability for future property 
owners, the diminishing of health risks, and the removal of unusable structures.  Redevelopment 
outcomes include increased property values, the addition of new jobs, and the triggering of 
additional private development (Wernstedt, Meyer, and Alberini 2006; Wedding and Crawford-
Brown 2007; Bacot and O'Dell 2006).  Additional measures include the actual time required 
from initial assessment to reuse, total remediation and development costs, community and 
political support and satisfaction, and ratio of private to public investment (Lange and McNeil 
2004; DeSousa 2005; Bacot and O'Dell 2006).  However few of these are easily reducible to 
quantifiable terms, creating performance measurement challenges (Bacot and O’Dell 2007).  For 
example, simply recording changes in property values, as many municipalities are prone to do, 
does not necessarily measure the full impacts of the project nor does it isolate brownfield project 
effects from changes in broader market forces (Alberini 2007; Meyer 1998).  
Wedding and Crawford-Brown (2007) provide the most extensive tool for assessing 
brownfield project performance.  Adopting an “indicator” strategy used to measure advances in 
sustainable development, they list forty measurable outcomes broken down between 
environment and health, financial, social and economic, and livability categories.  They then 
transform these individual outcomes into measures of success by assigning weights derived from 
stakeholder surveys about indicator preferences. Table 2-9 lists the indicator categories and the 
top two indicators for each category.  
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Table 2-9: Brownfield Project Outcome Indicators 
Categories and Indicators Weights (1-10) 
Categories and 
Indicators 
Weights (1-
10) 
Environment and health indicators  
Social and economic 
indicators 
 
1 Probability of health risks* 8.56 1 
Increase in tax 
revenue for the site* 7.78 
2 Reduction in energy use 8.55 2 
Net jobs created per 
acre* 7.11 
Financial indicators  Livability indicators  
1 Reduction in liability* 8.89 1 
Improved 
community*  8.56 
2 Internal rate of return 8.78 2 
Reduction in crime 
rate 8.33 
From Wedding and Crawford-Brown (2008). 
* Also determined to be “very important” or “important” by DeSousa (2005). 
Brownfield Project Success.  The key challenge to accurately measuring brownfield 
project success is capturing stakeholder perceptions and goals (Wedding and Crawford-Brown 
2007).  As a result, empirical work examining brownfield project outcomes and success must 
include both tangible outcomes such as time required or money spent as well as perceptual ones 
such as satisfaction with outcomes and processes.  Even if this level of data collection is feasible, 
the researcher must also be able to aggregate these measures into a meaningful score enabling 
project comparisons.  The measurement of brownfield success requires more thought and 
development (DeSousa 2005; Lange and McNeil 2004; Wedding and Crawford-Brown 2007). 
Determinants of Outcomes and Success.  Existing research clearly indicates that multiple 
factors influence the project outcomes summarized above.  In general, these factors fall into 
environmental, economic, and managerial categories (Table 2-10).  Environmental variables 
affecting outcomes include the type and extent of contamination, the technology available for 
proposed remedies, and the flexibility of regulatory agencies (Wernstedt and Hersh 2003).  
Economic variables shaping outcomes range from prevailing market strengths to the ability of 
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policy instruments to impact marketability and provide financial resources (DeSousa 2005; 
Wernstedt et al. 2006).  The most cited managerial variables are the effective use of partnerships 
(Wernstedt 2001; Silverstein 2003; Bartsch 2006; Dair and Williams 2006), the entrepreneurial 
abilities of public and private actors to leverage marketability factors, the capacity of municipal 
governments to compete for public grants (Greenberg and Issa 2005), and the abilities of 
managers to effectively communicate data to appropriate stakeholders (Nijkamp, Rodenburg, and 
Wagtendonk 2002).   
Table 2-10: Major Determinants of Brownfield Project Outcomes 
Environmental Economic Managerial 
Degree of contamination Market strength Strength of partnership 
Available technology Policy instrument availability Entrepreneurial capacity 
Regulatory flexibility Financial resource availability Intergovernmental relations 
 
The fact that multiple factors may explain each outcome measure and that these factors 
are, in turn, explained by a second level of variables further complicates the explanations for 
brownfield project success.  As exemplified in Table 2-11, the ratio of private to public 
investment depends upon the degree and extent of environmental contamination, the availability 
of public and private resources (financial, informational, technical), the level of liability 
protection for the end-use owner, and the comparative difference of project costs and benefits all 
drive private investment (Silverstein 2003; Alberini et al. 2005; McCarthy 2002). 
Table 2-11: Layers of Causal Variables 
Outcome: Public-private investment ratio 
Primary 
Causal 
Factors: 
Environmental 
contamination 
 
Resource availability 
 
Liability protection 
 
Underlying 
Causal 
Factors: 
Past property use 
Soil, groundwater flow 
Climate 
Tax policies 
Real estate market 
Negotiation behaviors 
Policy tools selected 
Remediation processes 
End use 
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Public Management of Brownfield Projects. Public managers seeking to steer 
brownfield project processes need to diffuse a great deal of interdisciplinary information across 
the project network (Thomas 2003).  Private investors need to understand project risks and 
uncertainties, local government officials need to be aware of available policy tools, and elected 
officials, regulators, interest groups, and citizens need to understand remediation and 
redevelopment processes to create a political process for moving the project forward (Thomas 
2003; Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; DeSousa 2006).  Evidence of the interdisciplinary nature of 
brownfield projects may be seen in the placement of brownfield managers in economic 
development, planning, community development, and environmental quality departments, as 
well as within quasi-independent development corporations8.  However, while these managers 
may carry the title “brownfield coordinator”, few local governments employ managers for whom 
steering brownfield project processes is their only job and few local governments contain single 
agencies whose mission is to address brownfield problem.   
True to the title of “coordinator”, the professional best practice literature overwhelmingly 
suggests that developing public-private partnerships, engaging with citizens and organizations at 
the community level, and maintaining positive relationships with a wide variety of stakeholders 
may all help overcome remediation and redevelopment challenges (Mayors 2007; NADO 2004; 
Simons and El Jaouhari 2001; Elliott and Bourne 2005).  However, other than an examination of 
negotiation strategies in forming cooperative partnerships (Yousefi et al. 2007), very little 
systematic research has focused on actual management practice, particularly as it applies to 
managing interorganizational relationships and coordinating networks of actors.  
                                                
8 Evidence gathered from extensive internet searches of municipality websites for brownfield 
programs (2009). 
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Modeling Brownfield Project Processes.  Currently, the literature presents two primary 
models of brownfield remediation and redevelopment projects.  The first is normative and 
describes brownfield processes as rational and linear (refer back to Table 2 in this chapter).  This 
model assumes rational behaviors by project actors, near perfect information, and is most often 
found in practitioner reports and best practice guides (Mayors 2000; Davis 2002; Brachman 
2004).  The second model draws more heavily upon existing brownfield theory and articulates a 
dynamic system of multiple forces acting upon a continuum of outcomes.  This model depicts 
complex systems whose outcomes result from arrays of stakeholders impacting key variables at 
different decision points in the process (Dixon 2007; Nijkamp, Rodenburg, and Wagtendonk 
2002; BenDor and Metcalf 2003; Healey 1992).  Variables common to this model include 
property marketability, area-wide economic conditions, liability assignment, redevelopment 
demand, uncertainties surrounding information and financial resources, extent of contamination, 
the push of available policy instruments, and the pull of developer preferences (Figure 2-2). 
Figure 2-2: Forces Influencing Brownfield Outcomes  
 
Derived from Dixon 2007; Nijkamp et al 2002; BenDor and Metcalf 2003 
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While both the rational linear and dynamic system models contribute to understanding 
the context in which brownfield remediation and redevelopment occurs, neither one directly 
addresses the need for theory-based guidance for public managers.  How should public managers 
tasked with steering brownfield projects utilize policy tools to activate the involvement of key 
project actors?  The next chapter mends this gap by reviewing the literatures addressing cross-
sector public management networks, the strategic management of these networks, and the policy 
tools used by network managers in order to develop propositions regarding the extent to which 
these three qualities of brownfield projects interact to shape project outcomes and, ultimately, 
project success. 
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CHAPTER THREE LITERATURE REVIEW AND PROPOSITIONS 
 
Introduction. Understanding how brownfield projects function as cross-sector public 
management networks and how public managers influence these networks to produce outcomes 
requires a careful understanding of how public policy tools, network structures, and the 
interpersonal behaviors of network actors interact over time.  Fortunately, the increase in the 
reliance on non-governmental actors for government service delivery over the past thirty years 
has led to increased analytical focus on these networks (Rittel and Webber 1973; Agranoff and 
McGuire 2001; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Weber and Khademian 2008).  At the same time, 
studies of how policy tools aid managers in leveraging these networks have also increased 
(Clingermayer and Feiock 1990; Peters 2002; Salamon 2002; Howlett 2005; Feiock, Jeong, and 
Kim 2003; Sandfort, Selden, and Sowa 2008), as has research examining network management 
strategies at the individual and interpersonal levels (Ansell and Gash 2008; McGuire 2006; 
Agranoff and McGuire 2003).   
Woven together, these theories suggest that policy outcomes in brownfield networks stem 
from neither the proper arrangement of network actors nor the correct design of policy tools nor 
the appropriate application of management strategies.  Rather, outcomes are best explained by a 
combination of all three.  But what does this combination look like at the project level? Are the 
structures of policy tools more influential than public management behaviors, or vice versa? 
How do evolving structures at the network level impact public management behaviors at the 
individual level?  How can this combination be used to explain varying levels of brownfield 
project success across multiple projects? 
 Integrating these literatures with the brownfield research summarized in Chapter Two 
provides the basis for five propositions about the influence of public managers on the outcomes 
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of municipality-initiated brownfield projects.  First, all brownfield projects, as networks of 
actors, will display different network characteristics and will exhibit the use of different policy 
tools across project phases.  Second, successful projects will distinguish themselves with high 
levels of network stability and consistent occupation of network centers by skilled public 
managers across project phases.  These public managers will, in turn, obtain influence over 
network actors by using policy tools to secure network actor commitments.  Finally, relationship 
management will augment these strategies when new uncertainties present themselves. 
Telling management stories embedded in a context of network structures and rules 
requires navigation of the tensions between the primacy of agency (the strategic actions of 
individuals) and structure (broader institutional and market forces) in explaining outcomes.  
Therefore, the first section of this review overviews these tensions and addresses why they 
matter when examining cross-sector public management network performance.  The second 
section describes what is known about network structures, network management, and their 
relationships to network outcomes.  The following section describes how the introduction of 
policy tool research has influenced institutional theories of network management.  The final 
section summarizes these research strands and restates the propositions described above 
regarding the successful public management of brownfield projects. 
Bridging the Structure-Agency Divide.  Existing research that addresses questions like 
“does management matter in public management networks?” tends to assume either that 
outcomes are best explained by “structure” or “agency”.  In public administration research, 
structuralists view government action as the result of a range of norms, rules, and patterns 
shaping human action and would therefore suggest that outcomes and policy success or failure is 
due to success or failure in policy design (Borgatti and Foster 2003).  On the other hand, agency-
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oriented researchers see network outcomes as a result of individuals exercising the opportunity to 
act freely in decision-making (Hitlin and Elder 2007).  Under this assumption, policy success or 
failure subsequently occurs due to strong or weak decision-making on behalf of leaders and 
managers.  Most public management research suggests a strong agency perspective, or at least an 
assumption that, in certain situations, individual actors weigh heavily on organizational 
performance.  However when explaining network outcomes it is important to not over determine 
agency over structure because structure and agency are not mutually exclusive and, instead, 
impact one another (Giddens 1979).  Therefore, viewing structure as either the mechanism for or 
the outcome of action only tells one piece of the story.  Instead, theoretical frameworks that 
model network processes should allow for simultaneous relationships between agency and 
structure (Healey and Barrett 1990; Guy and Henneberry 2000; Doak and Karadimitriou 2007; 
Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Kickert, Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997).  Failure to do so would 
misrepresent network realities.  Koppenjan and Klijn (2004) underscore the challenge of doing 
so in these processes . . .   
. . . where many factors and actors influence each other, and actors consciously respond 
to events in their environment, causal relations are highly complex, dynamic and 
reciprocal.  They can hardly be captured in causal schemes that create a static idea of the 
relation between dependent and independent variables.  In reality, the relations are 
constantly in flux, and we can see a continuous interchange between factors and process. 
(Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004: 12) 
 
It is for these reasons that this review examines both the structuralist and the agency-focused 
public management literatures to formulate the research propositions. 
Cross-Sector Public Management Networks.  Much research over the past ten years 
examines the phenomena of government agencies working with private, non-profit, and citizen 
partners.  These cross-sector public management networks occur in issue areas such as 
watersheds and natural resources (Imperial 2005; Clark, Burkardt, and King 2005), health and 
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human services (Sowa 2008; Bardach and Lesser 1996; Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009) and 
economic development (McGuire 2000; Agranoff and McGuire 2003, 1998; Teisman and Klijn 
2002).  Aggregated together, this research spans multiple levels of analysis while addressing a 
variety of questions.  It also consists of four perspectives defined by the core questions; how 
organizational characteristics impact a single organization’s ability to work with a partner, how 
network structures impact the performance of individual organizations, how an individual 
organization impacts network structures, and how multi-level actions and structures shape 
network level outcomes (Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007; Galaskiewicz 2007).  With a state 
interest in management impacts on brownfield outcomes, this dissertation concentrates upon this 
last perspective in the literature. 
Network Structures.  In organizational networks, “structure” refers to the ties between a 
defined set of actors (Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979; Wasserman and Faust 1994).  These 
relationships are normally measured as information and resource exchanges but may also 
represent other linkages such as memberships, affiliations, and personal commitments (Milward 
and Provan 1998). Generally, different patterns of network ties correlate with different patterns 
of information dissemination and resource exchange which, in turn, impact decision making and 
network outcomes (Dawes, Cresswell, and Pardo 2009; Droege, Anderson, and Bowler 2003).  
Network ties may be quantified to produce measurements of centrality, density, multiplexity, 
brokers, and cliques.  These measures may, in turn, be viewed as variables that differentiate 
networks and their relative performances (Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007; Wasserman and Faust 
1994; Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979). 
Centrality refers to the number of direct links an organization or an actor maintains with 
all other members of the network.  The greater the number of these direct links, the more the 
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actor is positioned to influence information and resource exchanges (Berardo 2008; Schalk, 
Torenvlied, and Allen 2010; Provan and Milward 1995).  For example, high degrees of centrality 
exhibited by an actor have been shown to be related to the actor’s trustworthiness, reputation, 
and influence in mental health service networks (Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009). 
Density is the degree to which the entire network experiences interconnectivity.  
Research indicates that the greater the density, the more the network experiences communication 
saturation and group cohesion (Pryke 2005; Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000).  While this 
may seem like a positive network attribute for performance, high network densities are also 
associated with high coordination costs for managing these integrated ties (Milward et al. 2010).  
Therefore, higher performing networks likely maintain enough density to ensure adequate cross-
actor communication but not so much that the network becomes bogged down with the costs of 
maintaining those ties. 
Multiplexity is the strength of ties in a network measured by the number of different 
kinds of relationships, or roles, between two actors (LeRoux, Brandenburger, and Pandey 2010).  
Should one type of relationship be discontinued, additional ties still remain between those actors 
(Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979).  Multiplexity tends to increase over time as actors learn 
which relationships provide the greatest benefits to them in the network and form multiple layers 
in the relationships.  Relationships characterized by actors with high values of multiplexity, or 
relationship strength, indicate greater maturity and are more likely to endure exogenous shocks 
to the network (Provan and Milward 1991, 2001).   
Gaps between network actors, or “structural holes”, also provide opportunities for 
network actors to gain influence by acting as brokers filling these holes, or gaps, between sub-
groups, or cliques, in a network (Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979; Rowley, Behrens, and 
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Krackhardt 2000).  By occupying these positions, brokers control information and resource flows 
between cliques (Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007).  Brokers maximize their position by 
negotiating with actors within their home organization to gain appropriate authority for 
managing actors outside their organization (Balogun et al. 2005; Honig 2006).  Generally, central 
actors and brokers maintain network influence by gathering large amounts of information and/or 
resources to create dependencies in other network actors (Tsai 2001).  Networks experiencing 
high levels of network stability over long periods of time may therefore develop similar 
structural attributes to that of a hierarchy with the centralized actor enjoying the control benefits 
afforded by hierarchal rules and norms (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998; Tenbensel 2005). 
Recent research indicates that, in public management situations, these measurements of 
network structure are not static and instead evolve over time. Comparing two social service 
provision networks, Provan et al (2009) found that actor-level characteristics like trust, 
reputation, and influence, mature over time the more the actor becomes embedded in the 
network, particularly in terms of their central positioning for information diffusion.  It is 
important to note, however, that different networks have different life spans based upon their 
stated purposes and goals.  They may be open-ended and long-term, as in the case of natural 
resource management networks (Lubell and Fulton 2008; Thomas 2003) or health and human 
service networks (Isett and Provan 2005; Milward et al. 2010; Provan and Milward 1995), or 
they may be short-term and focused on specific outcomes, as in the case of infrastructure 
construction projects (Teisman and Klijn 2002).   
While few studies examine the significance of time frame differences on network 
processes, projects exhibiting clear goals and a short life span likely produce loosely coupled 
networks relying less upon maturing trust-based relationships and more upon arms-length linking 
 
 
44 
mechanisms (Mandell and Steelman 2003; Pryke 2005) to coordinate “linear” sets of tasks that 
clearly follow one another (McGuire 2002).   Therefore, the importance of formal agreements 
made between actors early on in the project in maintaining likely increases with decreasing 
network life spans where the network is more susceptible to changes in the organizational 
environment (Pryke 2004, 2005).   
Integrating the brownfield research from Chapter 2 with these network structure theories 
produces the following propositions about brownfield projects as cross-sector networks where 
structures evolve over time.   
1. Brownfield project performance will increase with increasing network centrality, 
network stability, and multiplexity. 
Network theory suggests that successful brownfield project networks, with their short life 
spans, clear project goals, and multiple expert domains, require highly central and stable formal 
structures to achieve successful outcomes. However, the entry and exit of project actors to and 
from the network across project phases challenges stability, suggesting that successful 
brownfield networks also exhibit high levels of multiplexity, or layers of ties between network 
actors.  These ties ensure that, while project actors may exit the network after they have 
completed their primary task, ties remain to highly central actors enabling the transfer of relevant 
information. 
2. As short-term, goal-specific networks characterized by distinct task phases, 
brownfield project network characteristics, such as centrality and composition, will 
change according to the expert-orientation of each phase.  
Actor composition, and the structural ties between actors, will shift over the course of a 
brownfield project due to the environmental and construction domain orientations and planning 
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and implementation characteristics of each project phase.  Contamination assessment and 
remediation tasks will require actors knowledgeable of chemistry, geology, and engineering.  
End use design and sales will require actors knowledgeable of marketing, economics, real estate, 
and architecture.  In essence, this proposition states that, despite the project network being 
comprised of individuals from multiple organizations both inside and outside city government, 
more successful projects will assume managerial structures similar to a hierarchy. 
Institutions and Network Ties.  The extent to which public managers arrive at highly 
central positions in project networks depends largely upon prevailing rules and norms (Kickert, 
Klijn, and Koppenjan 1997; Skelcher, Mathur, and Smith 2005; Klijn and Koppenjan 2004).  
Theory about rules and norms, or “institutional” theory, stems from work in both economics and 
sociology examining how institutions in an organization’s environment impact organizational 
behavior (Williamson 1998).  
Institutions, as rules, derive from cultural norms, the preferences of legitimacy-granting 
actors, formal governance agreements, and laws and mandates (Marchington and Vincent 2004; 
Frumkin and Galaskiewicz 2004; Provan and Milward 1991; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004) that 
both enable and prevent ties between network actors as they interact with one another to find 
shared meanings, manage conflicts, and make resource allocation decisions.  In brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment projects, policy tools serve as an important source of institutions, 
particularly regarding ways in which public managers may influence project partners by shaping 
institutions.  In the words of Lascoumes and Gales (2007), policy tools:  
. . . partly determine the way in which the actors are going to behave; they create 
uncertainties about the effects of the balance of power; they will eventually privilege 
certain actors and interests and exclude others; they constrain the actors while offering 
them possibilities; they drive forward a certain representation of problems.(9)   
 
Therefore, integrating policy tool theory into ideas about network structures provides a 
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mechanism for linking theories about network structure to theories describing network 
management. 
Policy Tools.  A resurgence in policy tool research has accompanied the recent rise in 
networked approaches for addressing policy problems (Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007).  In this 
research, Hood (2007) identifies three distinct streams of analysis that have asked three distinct 
sets of questions.  First, the “politics-of-instrumentality” approach emphasizes how policy tools 
come to be created and selected.  Researchers adopting this perspective ask why certain decision 
makers prefer some instruments to others (Peters 2002; Hood 2007; Linder and Peters 1989).  
Second, the “institutions-as-tools” approach asks questions about the nature of particular service 
delivery forms.  This approach considers whole organizations to be tools, a unique approach that 
does not separate organizational forms from laws, rules, and guidelines.  The third analytical 
stream encompasses a range of approaches that sort policy tools into broad, generic categories.  
Coined “carrots, sticks, and sermons” to reflect the incentives and means of delivering those 
incentives behind them, these approaches ask questions about how characteristics endemic to the 
tools themselves impact targeted actors (Hood 2007).  When considering the strategic application 
of policy tools to management situations, this third analytical stream provides the most insights. 
In describing categories of policy tool characteristics, Salamon (2002) proposes that 
policy tools consist of products and activities, delivery vehicles, and delivery systems.  Products 
and activities may include in-kind payments, restrictions, information, etc.  Delivery vehicles and 
systems refer to the structures through which products and activities occur, such as a grant, loan, 
or direct service.  Delivery vehicles and systems may be further classified by degree of 
coerciveness, directness, automaticity, and visibility, allowing public managers to assemble tool 
sets that match the management situation (Salamon 2002).  For example, a public manager may 
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perceive reluctance on behalf of private developers to commit to investing in a politically 
charged redevelopment and may select a tool that is both coercive and less visible.   
 Hood (2007) challenges Salamon’s (2002) inclusion of organizations/institutions, arguing 
that, because an organization may use a tool, they are empirically distinct from also being a tool.  
He points to work by Lascoumes and Gales (2007) as an alternate typology that not only 
distinguishes between organizations and tools but also provides more precise language about 
them.  Their scheme includes five tool types associated with five different types of relationships 
(Lascoumes and Le Gales 2007).  Legislative and regulatory tools direct social behaviors, 
economic and fiscal tools promote resource distribution, agreement and incentive-based tools 
appeal to specific interest of the tool target, information and community-based tools indirectly 
impact decisions through regulation of information, and best practices provide venues in which 
free choice behaviors may occur.  Each type subsequently suggests a particular form of structure 
between the implementing actor and their target. 
Combining Lascoumes and LeGales’ typology with Salamon’s tool list creates a general 
framework linking tools to management behaviors (Table 3-1).  Despite Hood’s argument, this 
framework includes “direct action”, or direct activities taken on by the implementing actor, as a 
legislatve means for achieving outcomes.  For example, in brownfield projects, local government 
may utilize internal resources and personnel to assess properties, providing the necessary 
information for potential private partners to make decisions about risk.  This is consistent with 
ideas of ways in which local government influence economic development (Blair 2002).  
Throughout the rest of this paper, policy tool discussions will occur with “direct action” listed as 
a legislative tool, understanding that it is not a tool in the theoretical sense but is a relative 
measure for tool use and will be in bold font to indicate its conceptual difference.   
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Table 3-1: Policy Tool Typology 
Type of Tool Type of Relations Examples (Salamon, 2002) 
Legislative/Regulatory Social Guardian State - Government 
directs actor behaviors 
Economic and Social 
Regulation 
Tort Liability 
Direct Action 
Economic and Fiscal Wealth Producer/Redistributive State - 
Government influences actor behavior by 
appealing to resource dependencies 
Taxes 
Grants 
Loans 
Insurance 
Agreement/Incentive-
Based 
Mobilizing State - Government 
negotiates actor behavior 
Contracts 
Information/ 
Community-Based 
Audience Democracy - Government 
shapes actor behavior by providing or 
withholding relevant information 
Public Information 
Best Practices Civil Society Adjustments and 
Competitive Mechanisms - Government 
creates venues for actor behavior 
Tradable Permits 
Vouchers 
Government Corporations 
Derived from Salamon, 2002 and Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007 
Applying this policy tool typology to existing brownfield research suggests that 
brownfield policy tool programs mostly offer economic/fiscal, legislative/regulatory, and 
agreement-based tool types (Table 3-2).  
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Table 3-2: Brownfield-related Policy Tools 
Tool Type of Tool Type of Relations Implementer→Targ
et 
Liability Relief to Innocent 
Parties 
Legislative/Regulat
ory 
Social Guardian 
State 
State→Municipality
→ 
Developer 
Environmental Liability 
Limitation 
Legislative/Regulat
ory 
Social Guardian 
State 
State→Municipality 
→ Developer 
Covenant Not to Sue Agreement-Based Mobilizing State Municipality→Devel
oper 
Tax Credits1 Economic and 
Fiscal 
Redistributive State Municipality→Devel
oper 
Technical Assistance Grants 
($50,000) 
Economic and 
Fiscal 
Redistributive State State→Municipality 
Cleanup Grants (90% onsite; 
100% offsite) 
Economic and 
Fiscal 
Redistributive State State→Municipality 
Revolving Loan Fund Economic and 
Fiscal 
Redistributive State State→Developer 
Empire Zone/Environmental 
Zone2 
Economic and 
Fiscal 
Redistributive State State→Developer 
Planning Grants (90%) Economic and 
Fiscal 
Redistributive State State→Municipality 
Citizen Participation Required 
at Various Milestones 
Community-Based Audience 
Democracy 
State→Municipality 
→ Developer 
Quasi-governmental Agencies Best Practices Civil Society 
Adjustments 
N/A 
1 Tax credits offset costs associated with real property taxes, site preparation, groundwater 
remediation, property improvements, environmental insurance premiums. 
2 Enhances existing tax credits if property lies in designated zone. 
 
Breaking down tool use by project phase suggests a strong task-specificity to which policy tools 
become used in any brownfield project where the pull of phase-specific project tasks plays a 
prominent role in the selection and use of policy tools in brownfield projects (Table 3-3).   
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Table 3-3: Phases of Brownfield Remediation and redevelopment and Tools Likely Applied 
Phase Stage Tools Likely Applied Primary Tool Types 
 
 
Remediation 
Site Identification 
and Assembly 
Direct Action, Quasi-
Governmental 
Agencies, Citizen 
Participation 
Community-Based, 
Legislative/Regulatory 
Initial Site 
Assessment – 
Phase I 
Investigation 
Grants, Contracts Agreement-Based, 
Economic and Fiscal 
Detailed Site 
Assessment – 
Phase II 
Investigation 
Remedial 
Assessment 
Grants, Contracts, Tax 
Credits 
Agreement-Based, 
Economic and Fiscal 
Economic 
Assessment and 
Planning 
Strategic Plans, Citizen 
Participation 
Community-Based, 
Legislative/Regulatory 
Redevelopment 
(Overlap) 
Remediation 
Project 
Development and 
Financing 
Loans, Contracts, Tax 
Credits 
Agreement-Based, 
Economic and Fiscal 
Cleanup Planning 
and Execution 
Liability Release, 
Contracts, Technical 
Assistance 
Community-Based, 
Legislative/Regulatory 
Redevelopment Redevelopment of 
Site 
Contracts Agreement-Based 
Adapted from Dennison (1998, pp. 142-147) 
The following proposition emerges from this integration of policy tool and brownfield 
theories: 
3. Policy tool use in brownfield projects will vary by project phase.  Planning phases 
will emphasize community-based information and legislative/regulatory tools and 
create network structures with highly directive qualities while implementation phases 
will emphasize agreement-based and economic and fiscal tools, creating network 
structures with highly redistributive properties.  
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This proposition infers that these selection patterns subsequently shape the links between 
project actors by prescribing the nature of actor relationships.  However, as the next section 
reviews, tool use and the subsequent impacts on network structures and actor behaviors also 
occur through strategic management behaviors.  
Network Management. Network management research examines individual-level 
strategic behaviors that target the decision-making processes of network partners as well as react 
to the uncertainties multi-actor processes generate (Kickert and Koppenjan 1997; Mandell 1990; 
McGuire 2002; Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Rethemeyer and Hatmaker 2008).  One branch of 
this research focuses on collaborative management and the skills associated with negotiation 
partner commitment (Agranoff 2005, 2006; Cooper, Bryer, and Meek 2006; Koontz and Thomas 
2006; Leach 2006; McGuire 2006). McGuire (2002) identifies four skill sets fundamental to 
collaborative management; activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing that roughly 
correlate with the network’s evolutionary stage (McGuire 2002).  Activation entails identifying 
and selecting network actors.  Framing seeks mutual agreement on the problem to be addressed, 
the roles to be filled, and the rules that should govern those roles.  Mobilizing involves creating 
incentives for and negotiating with network actors.  Synthesizing creates a favorable network 
management environment by facilitating trust and social capital.  Together, these skills enable 
managers to shape network actor behaviors when hierarchal authority is not an option.  Using 
this framework, McGuire predicts that, in networks characterized by shared goals and clear 
operating objectives such as infrastructure projects, network management strategies flow from 
activation to mobilizing to framing to synthesizing to produce outcomes (McGuire 2002). 
A second branch of network management research examines how managers react to the 
substantive, strategic, and institutional uncertainties associated with multiple organizations 
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interacting to address a common problem (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).  Substantive uncertainty 
derives from both a lack of information about the problem as well as divergent problem 
perceptions.  Strategic uncertainty happens when network actors lack understanding of each 
other’s goals.  Institutional uncertainty stems from the fact that network actors bring their own 
rules and norms from both their own organizational and network memberships (Koppenjan and 
Klijn 2004).   Effective network management in response to these uncertainties varies in relation 
to their relative mix.  For example, a public manager operating under substantive uncertainties 
will likely initiate a variety of information seeking and sharing behaviors.  Conversely, a public 
manager facing high levels of institutional uncertainties will likely try to negotiate a common set 
of rules and norms with network partners.  Given the likelihood that all three uncertainties exist 
at various levels throughout the network lifespan suggests that, not only does effective 
management require multiple strategies simultaneously, it also requires high levels of 
collaboration and coordination within the network (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004). 
Whether strategically seeking collaboration or reacting to network uncertainties, effective 
network management practice falls into one of two categories.  First, network managers may 
focus upon the interpersonal relationships between network actors, appealing to the 
psychological need for reciprocity by taking steps to generate trust and build social capital 
(Jeffries and Reed 2000; Jones and George 1998; Berardo 2008).  Second, network managers 
may shape the rules and norms governing behaviors in the network informally by regulating 
information and formally by adopting specific tools that alter the institutional environment 
(Oliver 1991; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).   
Managing Relationships.  The primary mechanism through which network managers 
shape interpersonal relationships is the generation and sustenance of trust (Fernandez 1991; 
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Edelenbos and Klijn 2006; Mehra et al. 2006).  Management behaviors most associated with 
building trust include reciprocity, interest-based negotiation, and information transparency 
(Oliver 1990; Weber and Khademian 2008; Ansell and Gash 2008; Waugh and Streib 2006; 
Droege, Anderson, and Bowler 2003; McGuire 2002).  Trust facilitates ongoing exchanges of 
information and resources throughout the life span of the network and provides greater 
opportunity for actors to achieve goal congruence (Edelenbos and Klijn 2007).  As a mechanism, 
trust is problematic to measure but research consistently indicates that perceived trust in a 
relationship and perceived trustworthiness of a network partner is associated with greater 
cooperation even when different interests exist (Lambright, Mischen, and Laramee 2009; 
Edelenbos and Klijn 2007).  Levels of trust across networks increases with network density, 
frequency of interactions, and relates to the perceived trustworthiness of actors occupying key 
network positions (Berardo 2008; Milward et al. 2010).  
Management with Institutions. The second set of network management behaviors 
involves identifying and manipulating the rules and norms that shape behaviors within a network 
(Klijn and Teisman 2003; Marchington and Vincent 2004; Lodge and Wegrich 2005; Feiock 
2008). Also termed “game management”, this approach entails self-interested actors establishing 
rules of exchange with other actors with whom they have overlapping interests (Ostrom 1990; 
Klijn and Koppenjan 2004).  Actors manage their games by changing the rules of the network to 
alter the behavioral patterns of others towards their own goals (Fung 2006; Skelcher, Mathur, 
and Smith 2005).  Institutional management skills include controlling network membership, 
adjusting the rules shaping how members engage and make decisions, imposing deadlines, 
crafting transparency, and altering the network’s environment to create a perception that the 
network creates advantage to the actor (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Kickert, Klijn, and 
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Koppenjan 1997; Ansell and Gash 2008).  Controlling the generation and dissemination of 
information underlies institutional management (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Kumar and van Dissel 
1996) as information needs change with changing task complexities (Nonaka 1994).  Network 
managers take advantage of these information needs by controlling information flows, shaping 
the understanding of appropriate decision making rules, and directing decision-making processes 
(Koppenjan and Klijn 2004; Byström and Järvelin 1995; Bressers and O’Toole 2005). 
Network managers manage relationships and institutions interchangeably (Marchington 
and Vincent 2004; Willem and Buelens 2007).  Much of the reciprocity required for trust 
building occurs when network partners agree upon a new rule or complete a successful 
information exchange.  Likewise, some rules or norms will refuse adjustment unless sufficient 
social capital exists between actors.  While managing relationships and managing institutions 
may occur independently, network process models should reflect the integrated use of both.  
Table 3-4 summarizes the primary network management behaviors captured in the literature, 
categorized by whether they are institutional or relationship-oriented.  
Table 3-4: Network Management Strategies 
Strategy Type Behaviors Measure 
Relationship 
Negotiation Making offers and counteroffers in search of mutually agreeable allocation 
Trust development Risk sharing Social interaction outside of partnership 
Institutional 
Persuasion Offering incentives to encourage participation 
Coercion Leveraging authority to direct behavior 
Accommodation Requesting or granting regulatory relief  
Arranging 
 
Seek/provide third party to mediate differences  
Seek financial resources 
Establish contract 
Framing 
 
Seek/provide information regarding brownfield 
property characteristics 
Seek/provide information and technical 
assistance 
(adapted from Agranoff and McGuire 2003) 
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Capacities for Network Management.  Effective network management is often discussed 
in terms of its potential, or the organizational and individual capacities required beyond 
behavioral skill (Moulton and Wise 2010).  At the organizational level, capacity refers to the 
human, financial, infrastructure, and external resources maintained by the organization 
(Christensen and Gazley 2008; Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003).  Resources within these 
four dimensions provide the means for organizations and their members to perform network 
management tasks.  Organizational size, monetary resources, structure, and management culture 
all impact the organization’s potential to perform (Table 3-5). Organizations lacking sufficient 
structures for information exchange (Agranoff and McGuire 2001; Provan and Milward 1995) 
and deficient of leadership that encourages and promotes boundary spanning behaviors 
(Ingraham, Joyce, and Donahue 2003) will therefore exhibit low capacities for supporting 
network management. 
Table 3-5: Dimensions of Organizational Capacity and Key Parameters of Each Dimension 
Dimensions Parameters 
Human Resources individual motivation, knowledge base, 
experience, personnel quality and quantity, 
leadership/management qualities 
Infrastructure organizational culture, size and structure, 
production system 
Financial revenues, assets, financial management system 
External relationships, trust, contract management, 
information 
Derived from Christensen and Gazley (2008) 
At the individual level, management capacity refers to the knowledge and abilities of 
individuals to achieve organizational goals (Van Slyke and Alexander 2006; Crosby and Bryson 
2005; Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham 2003; Agranoff and McGuire 1999; Brown and Potoski 
2003).  After key knowledge and skill areas include managing human resource systems 
(Donahue, Selden, and Ingraham 2000), financial resources (Hou, Moynihan, and Ingraham 
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2003), and contracts (Brown and Potoski 2003).   Without training and experience in these areas, 
individual managers lack capacity for practicing effective network management.  
Public Management, Networks, and Policy Tools.  Integrating theories of public 
management, networks, and policy tools requires an ability to capture many simultaneously 
moving parts.  Managers with the authority to introduce a policy tool to a network have the 
opportunity to introduce the rules that accompany those policy tools but also experience 
constraints.  As Bressers and O’Toole (2005) note, “although the managerial function can be 
exercised by actors within networks, and although this function can help shape what happens, 
managers themselves cannot be considered definitive shapers of what transpires when 
instruments are implemented in networks.” (141).  Managers utilizing policy tools in network 
management strategies must consider the impacts the tools will have upon their own actions as 
well. 
One example of this phenomenon particularly germane to the brownfield arena is the use 
of contracts in building public-private partnerships (Koppenjan and Enserink 2009; Sagalyn 
2007; Wettenhall 2003).  In these relationships, formal contracts address transaction cost 
concerns of private partners while minimizing government concerns of service delivery.  At the 
same time, the process of contract negotiation and its resulting implementation may build trust 
and improve actor relations (Brown, Potoski, and Van Slyke 2006; Jeffries and Reed 2000; Van 
Slyke 2009).  However, while well-written contracts effectively transfer risks, they also 
introduce new uncertainties regarding whether or not the contracted partner will behave as 
prescribed in the contract.  Therefore, contracts also require relationship management to address 
potential principal-agent problems (Hodge 2004; Klijn and Teisman 2003; Fischbacher and 
Beaumont 2003).  Despite the additional management required to ensure contract performance, 
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contracts facilitate the public-private actor service provision relationship more efficiently and 
effectively than other policy tools such as grants or tax incentives (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). 
Two frameworks in the policy tool literature attempt to capture this integration of 
theories to prescribe public management strategies in networked, policy tool heavy situations. In 
the first, the potential for public managers to successfully move network actor behaviors in the 
desired direction depends upon available resources, degrees of actor conflicts, the relative 
ambiguity of network goals, network resource constraints, and the complexity of network 
compositions (Howlett 2005; Matland 1995).  Public managers facing high levels of resource 
constraints and large numbers of project actors tend to rely upon economic and fiscal tools to 
leverage the resource dependencies faced by network partners.  As network actor numbers 
decrease, managers more frequently select regulatory tools to compel behaviors and, as resource 
constraints decrease, public managers increase use of information tools to appeal to the pursuit of 
mutual goals (Figure 3-1).   
Figure 3-1: Potential for Network Management Effectiveness When Using Policy Tools  
 
(Howlett 2005; Matland 1995) 
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In the second framework, when management potential is high, policy tool strategies work 
best when network managers are the tool implementers, have sufficient information about the 
problem, and maintain power over their policy tool targets (O'Toole Jr. 2004; Bressers and 
O'Toole Jr. 1998).  These three core circumstances shape the interactions between network actors 
hereby shaping how decisions occur and norms develop.  All other variables are secondary, 
impacting outcomes by altering one or more of these core circumstances.  This “contextual 
interaction” model also predicts positive outcomes when network actors mutually agree upon the 
problem, are motivated to address it, and share an understanding of the resources available 
(Bressers and O’Toole 2005; Bressers, Klok, and O'Toole Jr. 2000; Bressers 2004).  
Applying these frameworks and related public management theories to brownfield 
projects suggests expectations regarding certain patterns of public management behaviors under 
particularly circumstances.  Under the relatively short time spans and goal specificities of 
brownfield projects, public managers steering project processes face pressures to produce 
outcomes quickly.  The theories and frameworks discussed in this chapter suggest that the best 
means to achieve this is by consolidating influence over other network actors through the 
strategic selection and use of policy tools.  Therefore: 
4. Public managers effectively steering brownfield projects from highly central network 
positions will focus management behaviors on the selection and application of policy 
tools to manage network actor behaviors. Public managers operating in organizations 
with high levels of resource capacities will achieve this more successfully than those 
operating in organizations with lower capacities. 
However, policy tools also create new uncertainties within which network actors must operate.  
Network management research suggests that public managers utilizing policy tool strategies 
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overcome new uncertainties by generating trust between network actors through information and 
resource exchanges (Rethemeyer 2007).  The ability to do so increases when the public manager 
enjoys previous positive relationships with project actors and receives sufficient support from 
their home agency and government. Therefore: 
5. As uncertainties increase, public managers effectively steering brownfield projects 
from highly central network positions will increase their use of relationship 
management strategies relative to policy tool strategies. 
 Together, the propositions presented in this review posit that, in brownfield projects, 
network composition and network centrality will change according to the expert information 
orientation of each project phase (remediation vs. redevelopment) as well as the implementation 
and planning orientation of each phase.  At the same time, public managers operating out of 
highly central network positions will increase their emphasis on trust-based relationship 
strategies as uncertainties increase.   Project success will hinge upon the stability of network 
actors across project phases and on the capacities for public managers to obtain sufficient 
information regarding those actors in order to select policy tools that maintain their 
commitments.  
The next chapter in this dissertation lays out the research design and methodological and 
analytical approaches to collecting and analyzing data in response to these propositions. 
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CHAPTER FOUR RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
 
Introduction.  Applying a network lens to brownfield remediation and redevelopment 
projects prompted two research questions in this dissertation.  First, in what ways do brownfield 
projects function as public management networks? Second, to what extent do network 
management behaviors by city-level public managers impact project outcomes?  Utilizing the 
propositions developed in the previous chapter as guidelines, this chapter describes how a 
comparative case research design combined with case study and social network analysis 
methodologies best addressed these questions.  The chapter begins by discussing the research 
design and the steps taken to identify project level cases.  The next section details the methods of 
data collection and the final section discusses the analytical strategies applied to these data. 
Research Design.  The goals of a study determine the best research design.  For example, 
developing concepts, testing theory, describing processes, predicting outcomes, and determining 
causality all suggest different approaches.  Because the primary goal of this study was to 
understand the mechanisms and processes that link management practices to project outcomes, a 
comparative case approach was selected (Mahoney and Goertz 2006; Bennett and Elman 2006).  
Case selection utilized a “most similar” case selection strategy (Seawright and Gerring 
2008), selecting cases that varied on both the dependent (project success) and explanatory 
(network management capacity9) variables of interest in order to discern the effects of public 
management amongst all other impacts.  Because this strategy relied upon careful matching of 
                                                
9 Operationalizing “network management behaviors” posed several measurement problems.  
Therefore, “network management capacity” was used to capture the potential for network 
management behaviors. It is important to note that “management capacity” is not meant as a 
substitute for “management behavior” but rather as an intermediate predictor for the range of 
possible behaviors.   
 
 
 
61 
additional explanatory variables, case selection utilized highly specific decision rules to narrowly 
define a small population of cases that shared multiple similarities.  Despite constraining the 
ability to generalize findings to a broader population of brownfield properties, these decision 
rules generated the highest degree of case matching, increasing the likelihood that analysis 
captured explanatory effects that otherwise would have been missed (Collier and Mahoney 
1996)10. 
Variables Important to Case Selection.   Applying this logic of inference to case 
selection provided a schematic for specifying the desired cases.  In Table 4-1, Y1 refers to the 
dependent variable of brownfield project success, X1 refers to the explanatory variable of 
network management capacity, and X2 captures all additional explanatory variables from the 
model that could theoretically impact values of Y1.  The result is four cases varying along 
capacity and success dimensions. 
                                                
10 It is important to distinguish between this use of the logic of inference and statistical theory as 
it applies to the potential problem of selection bias when selecting cases based upon the 
dependent variable.  When applying statistical theory to large-N studies, selecting cases on the 
dependent variable truncates the data, underestimating the parameters.  The effect can be 
opposite for small-N comparative studies where selection bias is not as much of a concern 
(Collier and Mahoney 1996).  In small-N comparative studies, the goal is not to estimate average 
effects of causal variables but to articulate the details of causal relationships across a few, 
carefully selected cases.  What subsequently matters in case selection is not so much where in 
the universe of cases the case studies exist but that there is a strong theoretical rationale for the 
cases selected. The outcome of such research is subsequently not a set of generalizable 
statements relating to brownfield projects as a case population, but rather a set of propositions 
informing future study of the broader case population. 
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Table 4-1: Most Similar Case Matching Scenario 
 Variables 
Case X1 (Capacities) X2 (Context) Y1 (Success) 
1 + + + 
2 - + - 
3 + + - 
4 - + + 
Derived from Seawright and Gerring (2008). X1 refers to variables of theoretical interest, X2 
refers to vector of additional explanatory variables, Y refers to the outcome, and (+/-) specifies 
variable score if coded dichotomously. 
 
The ambiguity of defining project “success” posed several conceptual challenges.  
Therefore, taking cues from the brownfield literature suggesting that success measures derive 
primarily from locally held qualitative perceptions (Bacot and O'Dell 2006; Wedding and 
Crawford-Brown 2007; Ganser 2008), this study utilized an online survey, a series of stakeholder 
interviews, and project-level data collected from the New York State Remediation Database to 
develop an aggregated success measure.  This measure is described in greater detail later in this 
chapter.  
Variables in the X2 vector derived from the brownfield project and network management 
research literatures and included measures of the project resource environment, relative property 
market strengths, municipal policy tool use experiences, political support, and degree of 
intergovernmental ties.  Table 4-2 summarizes the case selection variables. 
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Table 4-2: Case Selection Variables 
Outcomes to Vary in Case Selection  (Y) 
Project-level remediation and redevelopment success 
Causal Explanation to Vary in Case Selection (X1) 
Network management capacity (municipal-level) 
Additional Explanatory Variables to Match in Case Selection (X2) 
Municipal-Level Variables 
Potential public sector resource 
environment 
Community development plan 
presence 
Potential private sector resource 
environment 
County level involvement in 
brownfield redevelopment 
Real estate market strength Federal (EPA) involvement in 
brownfield redevelopment 
Municipal experience with state-
level policy tools 
Degree of project initiation by 
municipality 
Project-Level Variables 
Property marketability Familiarity of city officials with 
policy tools 
Political support Project end use  
 
 
Data Sources for Case Selection. Case selection involved a range of online, survey, and 
interview sources.  Online databases accessed included ones from the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), the 
New York State Office of the State Comptroller, the New York State Department of Labor, and 
the New York Department of State (NYDOS) as well as various websites for New York 
municipalities. Data from these sources provided information about municipal economic 
indicators and the municipal use of federal and state policy tools for specific properties located at 
the municipal level.  In addition, case selection data were collected through an online survey 
targeting 368 individuals and agencies in the State of New York likely involved with brownfield 
processes and telephone interviews with key actors.   
Selecting Cases for Variation in Managerial Capacity.  Selecting cases that varied by 
managerial capacity but matched along other causal variables required a theoretically driven 
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decision process starting at the broadest definition of brownfield projects and ending at the 
specific municipality level.  Table 4-3 lists the steps taken in this process with each step 
described in detail below. 
Table 4-3: Case Selection Process – Narrowing Down the Scope of Cases 
Selection Pool Level Variable Matched to Narrow Pool 
1) All brownfield properties  
2) All brownfields in the state of New 
York 
All brownfields in this pool have access to 
the same set of state policy programs  
3) All brownfields in NY 
municipalities with sufficient and 
recent brownfield cleanup 
experience. 
All brownfields in this pool are from similar 
management experience contexts 
4) All brownfields in cities in state of 
New York 
All brownfields in this pool are from the 
same set of governance contexts  
5) All brownfields in economically 
depressed New York State cities 
with municipality-initiated 
brownfield experience. 
All brownfields in this pool are from similar 
market and management contexts 
6) All brownfields in cities that match 
along similar resource characteristics 
and industrial histories but vary by 
management capacities. 
All brownfields in this pool are from cities 
with similar industrial and resource 
environments that also vary by management 
capacities 
7) All brownfields in Buffalo and 
Rochester, NY, with housing as the 
designated end use 
 
 
All brownfield properties.  The broad definition of “brownfield” opened up the universe 
of cases to any piece of land thought to contain soil and water contamination.  However, the 
interest in examining municipality-led brownfield projects led to the elimination of properties 
contaminated at such a high level that federal and state actors assume project management 
responsibilities.   
All brownfield properties in the state of New York (NY).  Brownfield project outcomes 
vary based upon the mix of policy tools selected by project actors (DeSousa 2005; Alberini et al. 
2005).  Cases were limited to the state of New York to ensure that project managers across 
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individual cases operated at the same state-level policy context.  New York proved to be a 
particularly rich state for brownfield projects due to its strong industrial past, the predominance 
of older industrial communities, and the likelihood that these municipalities have experience 
brownfield remediation and redevelopment processes11. 
All brownfields in NY municipalities with sufficient and recent brownfield cleanup 
experience.  Starting with a sampling frame that included all common “administrative units” in 
the State of New York (counties, cities, towns, villages), the pool narrowed to include those 
administrative units within which brownfield remediation and redevelopment had occurred. 
Preliminary case selection interview and survey data confirmed that nearly all successful 
brownfield projects utilized state and federal financial programs. Therefore, municipalities were 
selected based upon their presence in the New York State Department of Environmental 
Conservation (NYSDEC) Remediation Database.  This database includes all New York 
brownfield projects applied to and accepted in a state policy program.  At the same time, 
municipalities were dropped if their most recent active project in this database were older than 
five years.  This ensured interview data collected for each case would be within a reasonable 
scope of personal memory and organizational records collections (Yan and Gray 1994).  As 
mentioned in Chapter Two, New York’s Voluntary Cleanup Program (VCP) incentivized private 
sector project investment from 1994 to 2003, when the current Brownfield Cleanup Program 
(BCP) took its place.  Therefore, all municipalities whose projects were only listed in the VCP 
were eliminated.  Finally, administrative units with less than four projects listed in the database 
dropped out as well based upon the assumption that a municipality with less than four known 
                                                
11 http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pubs/st_res_prog_report.htm (accessed May 6, 2009) 
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brownfield properties did not have sufficient brownfield management experience for the 
purposes of this study. 
All brownfields in New York cities.  The selection pool was next narrowed down to all 
cities listed in the Remediation Database.  This decision was made based upon the fact that cities 
in New York contain a larger concentration of properties listed in the database compared to the 
other municipalities (Table 4-4).  In addition, cities differ from towns, villages, and counties in 
that they have the highest degree of taxation power and are highly autonomous regarding 
planning, environmental services, and economic development.  If local-level policy tools exist 
for brownfield remediation and redevelopment, they would most likely occur at the city level. 
Table 4-4: Known Brownfield Projects by New York Administrative Unit 
Administrative 
Unit (AU) 
Total Number of 
AUs in New York 
State 
Brownfield Properties in DEC Remediation 
Database Associated with that AU 
County 62 Approximately 45* 
City 62 453 
Town 932 207 
Village 553 186 
*While several counties have received EPA cleanup grants and are part of the NY Brownfield 
Opportunities Area Program, it is not evident how many properties listed in the VCP, BCP, and 
ERP programs are county administered. 
 
All brownfields in economically depressed New York State cities with sufficient numbers 
of projects initiated by the city.  The interest in understanding public management strategies in 
weakly marketable brownfield properties led to a focus on “municipality-initiated” projects.  
Interview data collected during case selection defined these projects as those where the 
municipality holds title to the land at the start of project processes, and the resource and legal 
liabilities that accompany this ownership compel public officials to engage with external partners 
in order to implement project processes.  
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Brownfield theory suggests that properties with higher marketability tend to be private 
sector-led while those with lower marketability rely upon public sector initiation (McCarthy 
2002). In the Remediation Database, brownfield properties accepted into the New York State 
Environmental Restoration Program (ERP) were, by law, municipality-led but properties in the 
BCP may or may not involve municipality involvement, based upon the project’s level of 
marketability. Therefore, state remediation data were matched with data about real estate market 
and economic conditions across New York cities to determine which cities likely contained high 
numbers of low marketability projects.   
First, data from the Brookings Institution (Furdell and Wolman 2006) on the relative 
market strength of unique (not part of a larger metropolitan area12) U.S. cities with populations 
over 50,000 were collected to identify cities with weak market conditions.  New York cities 
appearing in the bottom third of economic rankings included Syracuse, Albany, Schenectady, 
Utica, Binghamton, Buffalo, and Rochester.  Pairing these data with information regarding 
enrollment in the ERP created a pool of twenty-six weak market cities with sufficient brownfield 
experience and high probabilities that the municipality initiated these brownfield projects (Table 
4-5). 
                                                
12 Cities that were part of larger metropolitan areas were excluded to control for the market 
effects of being proximate to a larger, economically stronger real estate market. 
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Table 4-5: Pool Of Weakly Marketable Cities With Sufficient Brownfield Project Experience 
City 
Total  
Properties ERP  VCP  BCP  City 
Total  
Properties ERP  VCP  BCP  
Rochester* 36 6 15 15 Beacon 7 1 3 3 
Buffalo* 31 8 10 13 Fulton 7 3 4 0 
Yonkers 26 6 9 11 Binghamton* 6 0 2 4 
Syracuse* 15 4 4 7 Elmira 6 3 3 0 
Poughkeepsie 14 5 2 7 Geneva 6 3 3 0 
Rome 12 9 3 0 Lockport 6 5 0 1 
Albany* 11 7 3 1 Newburgh 6 4 2 0 
Lackawanna 11 2 1 8 Troy 6 2 4 0 
Schenectady* 11 7 2 2 
New 
Rochelle 5 1 3 1 
Watertown 9 2 7 0 Peekskill 5 1 3 1 
Niagara Falls 8 2 2 4 Gloversville 4 3 1 0 
Utica* 8 6 2 0 Ogdensburg 4 1 3 0 
Amsterdam 7 4 2 1 Watervliet 4 1 3 0 
 * Also listed as a weak market city by Brookings (2004) 
 
All brownfields in cities that match along similar resource characteristics and industrial 
histories but vary by management capacities.  The next step in case selection required data 
collection for variables in the X1 and X2 vectors.  The contextual variables of X2 were measured 
with data about per capita municipal expenditures, presence of economic development and 
planning departments, presence of community and industrial development agencies, and the 
number of brownfield-related grants obtained from both state and federal governments. Data 
were then collected for “network management capacity”, capturing the number of Full Time 
Equivalency (FTE) employees assigned to brownfield project work, their degrees of expertise, 
and per capita city revenues.  Table 4-6 presents variable measures. 
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Table 4-6: Case Selection Variables for Case Selection - City Level 
City Selection Parameter Measure Used 
X2 Variables (to be matched) 
Potential public sector resource environment Market value of taxable property, 2006 
Potential private sector resource environment Presence of business councils and 
development associations. (Gordon, 
1997) 
Real estate market strength  Brookings Weak Market City data 
Management experience with state-level policy tools Total number of brownfield projects 
entered into NYDEC Remediation 
Database, by program, 1994-2008 
Community development plan presence Presence of city strategic plan 
Designation of state Brownfield 
Opportunity Area  
County level involvement in brownfield 
redevelopment. 
EPA grants given to county 
Designation of state Brownfield 
Opportunity Area 
Federal (EPA) involvement in brownfield 
redevelopment 
Number of EPA grants given to city 
Degree of project initiation by municipality Proportion of properties in ERP vs. VCP 
and BCP combined 
X1 Variables (to vary) 
Network management capacity – Personnel Capacity Number of FTE personnel committed to 
brownfield projects and average time on 
job 
Network management capacity – Expert Capacity Degree of environmental expertise 
Network management capacity – Resource Capacity Per capita city revenue 
 
Comparing each city for similarities between X2 variables and variation in the X1 variable 
revealed that the cities of Buffalo and Rochester presented the best match.  Of all cities within 
the case selection pool at this stage of the process, Buffalo and Rochester exhibited similar 
property tax bases, population sizes, city government expenditures, degree of experience with 
NYSDEC brownfield programs, proportion of municipally-led brownfield cleanups, and 
strategic plan presences while varying in terms of in-house brownfield expertise and per capita 
city revenue.  While the cities did not match exactly in terms of EPA brownfield grants, city 
populations, and total land area, the measures for the other parameters were closer than all other 
possible pairings of cities in the selection pool. Table 4-7 shows a side-by-side comparison of 
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these data.  Subsequent data collected through interviews and historical research confirm 
differences in residential end-use brownfield management capacities of these cities. 
Table 4-7: Matching the Cities of Buffalo and Rochester 
Parameter Buffalo Rochester Parameter Buffalo Rochester 
Number of 
FTE 
Brownfield 
Managers 
(2008) 0.5 2.5 
Primary City 
Agency 
Managing 
Brownfield 
Projects (2011) 
Office of 
Strategic 
Planning 
Division of Env 
Quality 
Average tenure 
of FTE 
brownfield 
managers 
(2008) 3 years 8 years 
Development 
Associations 
(2011) yes yes 
Total DEC 
Brownfields 
(2011) 31 36 DEC Region 9 8 
    ERP 
properties 8 6 
City Population 
(2000) 292,648 219,773 
    VCP 
properties 10 15 
City Taxable 
Property 
Market Value 
(2006) $5,495,591,958 $5,057,647,759 
    BCP 
properties 13 15 
City Property 
Taxes Collected 
(2006) $86,403,221 $52,226,210 
    A Class 
(cleanup 
incomplete) 24 27 
City Total 
Expenses 
(2006) $450,376,958 $452,757,523 
    C Class 
(cleanup 
complete) 7 9 
Per Capita 
Expenditures 
(2006) $1,539/person $2,060/person 
Percentage 
ERP 0.26 0.17 
City Land Area 
(sq mi) (2006) 40.6 35.8 
Brownfield 
Opportunity 
Areas (2011) 1 1 County Erie Monroe 
EPA 
Brownfield 
Grants (2011) 3 8 
County EPA 
Grant and DEC 
BOA 
Experience none DEC BOA 
Presence of 
City Strategic yes yes 
County 
Population 950,265 735,343 
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Plan (2000) 
Quasi-
Government 
Agencies multiple 1 
County Taxable 
Property 
Market Value 
(2006) $38,102,215,587 $33,528,442,883 
   
Total Expenses 
County (2006) 1,241,002,509 1,398,136,090 
Data derived from the websites for the New York State Environmental Site Remediation 
Database, New York State Department of State, and the Local Government Information pages of 
New York State Government 
 
Industrial Pasts of Rochester and Buffalo, NY.  The City of Rochester, like many upstate 
New York communities in the early 19th century, had its economic origins in mill processing, 
utilizing the energy of the Genesee River on which it sits. The city of blossomed as an industrial 
center immediately after the 1825 completion of the Erie Canal.  This transportation route 
linking the Great Lakes to the Atlantic Coast enabled the city to transform from the Flour City to 
the Flower City, exporting not only milled grains but also fruits and flowers.  
During the Civil War, Rochester became an important provider of supplies, receiving a 
boost to its growing manufacturing sector.  In 1881, Rochester’s most famous industrialist, 
George Eastman, began what soon became known as Eastman-Kodak and was quickly becoming 
the world’s largest producer of film.   By 1950, taking advantage of the post-war boom in 
demand for chemicals, Rochester had firmly established itself as an industrial center with such 
companies as Bausch and Lomb and Xerox basing their production facilities there.  Additional 
industry included numerous offshoots of the petroleum and steel industries (Buttino and Hare 
1984; McKelvey 1984).   
By the 1970s, after several cycles of economic contraction affecting both regional and 
national markets, many of these companies downsized or left the city, leaving behind a legacy of 
polluted properties.  Several key environmental cases during this era raised civic awareness of 
these environmental problems but inadequate public policy and declining financial resources 
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made it difficult for the city to address them.  In 2007, the Brookings Institution classified 
Rochester as a “weak market” community in their economic survey of older industrial cities in 
the United States (Vey 2007).  
Similarly, Buffalo, NY has gone through extremes of economic boom and bust.  Rising at 
the same time as Rochester due to the opening of the Erie Canal, Buffalo served as the major 
port and railroad city of western New York, becoming the eighth largest city in the country by 
the early 20th century.  Situated at the edge of the Great Lakes, Buffalo was the most important 
crossroads for raw materials and goods to be transferred between the east coast and the ever-
expanding frontier to the west, eventually becoming home to some of the largest steel mills and 
manufacturing facilities in the nation by the 1940s.  Part of this prominence has been attributed 
to both local government and the press embracing industry and being very flexible to attract 
major employers such as Lackawanna Iron and Steel (Goldman 2007).  Because of the industry 
boom during this time period, Buffalo became a mecca for the unemployed and the industries 
themselves built acres of “company housing” right next to manufacturing facilities to house 
them.  These arrangements led to much of the contamination of these neighborhoods.  However, 
by 1982 most of the major auto manufacturing facilities and steel mills were no longer in 
operation and the city was left with not only large tracts of formerly industrial land, but also 
vacant neighborhoods left by fleeing former employees prompting several interview respondents 
in this study to declare that Buffalo “is essentially one giant brownfield.”  
Network Management Capacities in Rochester and Buffalo, NY. From the abolitionist 
debates of the Civil War era through the 21st century, Rochester maintained a high level of civic 
engagement and focus on local governance (McKelvey 1984). Like many mid-sized cities in the 
industrial northeastern United States, conflict over economic disparities and race relations reared 
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its head in the 1960s and 1970s leading to a surge in neighborhood organizing and place-based 
mediation practice.  By the 1980s, Rochester was recognized as having some of the best 
organized neighborhoods in the country (Buttino and Hare 1984), with neighborhood groups 
gaining significant voice in city planning processes.  This voice was institutionalized in city 
government through a series of neighborhood-based offices that enabled citizens to have 
influence on city planning decisions.  On the governance side, Rochester fielded a council-
manager government through the early 1970s when a group of civic leaders began exploring a 
move to a strong mayor system.  Opposition groups were wary of consolidating power into an 
executive but in 1985, the citizens voted to change the charter to return to a strong mayor.  Up 
through 2010, only three mayors have served under this system.  Several individuals interviewed 
for this study linked this fact to the sense that Rochester city government operates under fewer 
political influences than comparable regional cities. 
Conversely, Buffalo was a town driven by the industrialists who brought it its 
employment and wealth.  City politics reflected this exclusivity by operating as a “machine 
town” where political decisions often matched the desires of the factory owners (Goldman 2007).  
Perceptions of individuals interviewed for this study indicate that this political culture of 
patronage and opaque political maneuvering carried forward to the present day.  As industry 
declined and the concentration of urban poor increased into the 1960s, Buffalo experienced a 
series of race and class conflicts.  However, unlike Rochester, these conflicts did not necessarily 
lead to a closer intertwining of neighborhoods and city government.  Instead, the increasing 
flight of city residents continued to decrease the resource capacity of city government.  Buffalo 
operated under this fiscal stress for many years until 2003 when the New York state legislature 
passed the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority Act.  This Act established an accountability board 
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to oversee the fiscal responsibilities of the city.  Since 2001, the city has experienced a 30% 
decrease in city personnel13 and continues to be reliant on funding from state and federal 
government to remain in operation.   
These historical factors contributed to different government capacities between Buffalo 
and Rochester for complex project management in the present day.  Data collection and analysis 
for this project subsequently revealed further capacity differences specific to brownfield projects 
that are discussed in Appendix B.   
Selecting Cases: Variation in the Project-Level Outcome Variable (Y1). At this point 
in the case selection process, projects remaining in the selection pool within Rochester and 
Buffalo were narrowed to those with market-rate residential end uses.  Selecting this common 
end use ensured both common sets of actors and policy tools across projects as well as a narrow 
variance in property marketability. In addition, while market-rate housing represent a minority of 
brownfield end uses, they are more likely to be municipality-led in pursuing urban planning 
goals (Page and Berger 2005). 
Final case selection required variation in project outcomes and, therefore, the 
development of a New York-specific measure for project success that incorporated numerous 
project outcomes measured through a series of social, economic, and environmental indicators 
weighted by stakeholder preferences (Wedding and Crawford-Brown 2007; DeSousa 2005; 
Bacot and O'Dell 2006).  To achieve this, a purposive sample of 368 email addresses were 
compiled for individuals and organizations likely engaged with brownfield redevelopment 
activity in the State of New York.  These addresses included local, state, and federal government 
                                                
13 
http://www.ci.buffalo.ny.us/Home/Mayor/Archive_Press_Releases/Leadership/2007Archives/Ju
ne2007/BFSA VoteToLiftCityEmployeeWageFreeze 
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officials, New York-based private developers and lenders, real estate professionals, directors of 
environmental advocacy nonprofit organizations, environmental lawyers, and environmental 
engineers (Dair and Williams 2006).  The survey asked participants to identify brownfield 
redevelopment projects they perceived as both successful and unsuccessful, why they thought so, 
the criteria they applied, and the type of agency or organization that they represented (Appendix 
A).  The survey also asked participants to forward the survey link to colleagues they felt would 
have the ability to answer the questions.  Due to this approach, the total number of actual survey 
recipients is unknown. 
Survey design required that survey respondents answered each question for survey 
completion.  Therefore, respondents without project-specific knowledge could not complete the 
survey.  Respondents were sent the survey invitation twice and, after removing incomplete 
responses, a total of 28 fully completed surveys remained (Table 4-8).  While this was a low 
response rate (8%), the purpose of the survey was to develop a measure for brownfield “success” 
in a New York context comparable to the ones described in the brownfield literature. 
Table 4-8: Survey respondents 
Agency Type # of Respondents 
TOTAL 28 
County Government 6 
Brownfield-specialized Private Developer 4 
NY Dept. of Environmental Conservation 4 
Economic Development Agency – Local Gov’t  4 
Planning Agency – Local Gov’t 3 
Community Development Agency – Local Gov’t. 2 
Consulting Firm 1 
Economic Development Agency – Federal Gov’t 1 
Law Firm 1 
Citizens-focused Nonprofit Organization 1 
University 1 
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The survey asked respondents to first list as many success criteria as possible and then to 
rank the top five criteria in order of importance.  For example, twenty respondents listed “the 
property is strategically located”, with five respondents ranking it as the most important criteria 
for success, three as second most, two as third and fourth, and one as fifth.  Assigning a value of 
“5” for “most important” and “1” for the fifth most important, a score was calculated against 
which to compare different criteria. Table 4-9 lists the top six success criteria identified by at 
least half of the respondents as important.   
Table 4-9: Success Criteria 
Criteria Count Percent of Respondents 
Scored 
Importance 
The project adequately remediated existing 
environmental contaminations. 24 88.89% 58 
The project impacts on community 
revitalization are area-wide. 21 77.78% 34 
The property is strategically located. 20 74.07% 48 
The project resulted in higher property 
values for itself and neighboring 
properties. 19 70.37% 31 
The project is/was supported by local 
elected officials. 18 66.67% 28 
The level of citizen support for the project 
is/was high. 14 51.85% 25 
 
These data suggested that perceived success of brownfield remediation and 
redevelopment projects entails the following three criteria in order of importance: 
1) Existing contaminations were addressed; 
2) The project was strategically located to maximize impacts; and, 
3) The project had high political support from elected officials and citizens. 
To confirm success perceptions, respondents were also asked to identify “unsuccessful” 
projects.  Table 4-10 provides survey results regarding how respondents applied “unsuccessful” 
criteria. 
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Table 4-10: Non-success Criteria 
Option Count Percent of respondents Scored Importance 
Existing environmental contaminations 
were not adequately remediated. 8 61.54% 23 
The time between assessment and 
cleanup is/was inefficient. 8 61.54% 15 
The time between cleanup and reuse 
is/was inefficient. 8 61.54% 9 
The total cleanup costs are/were over 
budget. 7 53.85% 14 
The project did not result in higher 
property values for itself and neighboring 
properties. 7 53.85% 7 
 
These data suggested that stakeholders apply the following three criteria, in order of 
importance, when identifying brownfield projects as “unsuccessful”: 
1) Existing contaminations were not addressed; 
2) The time and resource efficiencies of the project were low; and, 
3) The project was not strategically located for maximum community impact. 
Comparing these findings to the literature indicates reasonable validity (Table 4-11).  
Table 4-11: Outcome Indicators and Brownfield Project Success (alphabetical) 
Indicator Definition for “Success” 
Area-wide impacts Positive social, economic, and environmental impacts on broader 
community 
Citizen support Degree of citizen support for the project 
Cleanup costs Real costs for remediating property to levels appropriate for end use 
Development costs Real costs for constructing end use on remediated property 
Funding  Perceived satisfaction of levels of public and private financial support 
Impact of location Perceived importance of property as economic development 
New job creation Number of Full Time Employees hired for the project 
Planned end use Perceived satisfaction with end use 
Political support Degree of elected official support at multiple levels of government 
Property value 
impacts 
Real positive change in adjacent property values 
Return on investment Real income generated per cost over predetermined time period 
Use of time Perceived efficiency of time between start and end of project 
Derived from Wedding and Crawford-Brown 2007; DeSousa 2005; Bacot and O'Dell 2006. 
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These survey data were combined to produce five variables that, together, formed the 
success measure used for case selection (Table 4-12). Data were collected for each variable from 
project documents, interviews with city environmental engineers in Rochester and Buffalo, and 
the principal brownfield engineers at the state level in the Buffalo and Rochester regions.  
Projects were ranked within each city based upon their outcome measure scores, producing four 
project-level cases (Table 4-13).   
Table 4-12: Operationalizing the Dependent Variable: Brownfield Project Success 
Outcome 
Measures  
Operationalization as 
Success 
Ranking Scales Mechanisms of 
Data Collection 
Time to 
completion 
(TIME) 
Stakeholder satisfaction with 
time from initial site 
investigation to development 
or present 
High satisfaction 
Low satisfaction 
Phone interviews, 
actual time 
measured 
Cleanup costs 
(COST) 
Actual cleanup costs per acre Most expensive 
Least expensive 
Phone interviews, 
actual costs 
Implementation 
processes 
(PROCESS) 
Stakeholder satisfaction with 
implementation processes  
High satisfaction 
Low satisfaction 
Phone interviews 
Contamination 
abatement 
(CLEAN) 
Certificate of Completion or 
approved remediation 
CoC obtained 
CoC not 
obtained 
NYS DEC 
records 
 
Area-wide 
impact 
(IMPACT) 
Reported increase in values of 
neighboring properties 
High % increase 
Low % increase 
Phone interviews 
 
In Rochester, two discrete market-rate residential end use projects satisfied the case 
selection criteria while in Buffalo, the case satisfying selection criteria for low success shared the 
same property with the best case for high success.  This is due to an initial attempt at addressing 
the property failing in the eyes of key stakeholders but a subsequent attempt succeeding.  Despite 
the path dependency from Phase 1 to Phase 2 of this property and the shared environmental 
characteristics, sufficient network actor turnover between the phases created two different 
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management scenarios that could be treated as unique projects for this dissertation.   Therefore, 
for analysis purposes, Buffalo Phase 1 and Phase 2 were treated as two separate cases. 
Table 4-13: Comparison of Selected Cases 
Variable Buffalo Phase 
1 
Buffalo Phase 
2 
Rochester B Rochester A 
City Buffalo Buffalo Rochester Rochester 
Relative success rank Low Success High success Low success High success 
     CLEAN incomplete complete partially 
complete 
complete 
     TIME 2002-2003 2006-2009 2003-present 1996-2004 
     CLEANUP COST $1.2 million $605,000 $4.05 million 
     PROCESS 
SATISFACTION 
low high low high 
     IMPACT none high none high 
Property ownership during 
remediation 
City of Buffalo City of Buffalo City of 
Rochester 
City of 
Rochester 
Phase of redevelopment Cleanup 
complete, 
redevelopment 
complete 
Cleanup 
complete, 
redevelopment 
near complete 
Cleanup 
complete, 
redevelopment 
stalled 
Cleanup 
complete, 
redevelopmen
t complete 
Brownfield property size 4 acres 1 acre 6.85 acres 
Proposed end use Mixed Market-Rate 
Residential/Affordable Housing 
Market-Rate 
Residential 
Market-Rate 
Residential 
 
Data Collection.  Following best practices for comparative case analysis (King and 
Powell 2008), interviews, follow-up surveys, public records obtained through Freedom of 
Information Law (FOIL) requests, and media reports from newspapers, blogs, and professional 
journals provided data for each case. 
Semi-structured interviews served multiple data collection roles including filling gaps in 
historical timelines, finding omitted variables, and uncovering explanatory processes (George 
and Bennett 2005).   Interview participants were selected based upon their real and perceived 
centralities to project processes and were identified through project documents as well as through 
a snowball sampling technique (Provan and Milward 1995; Imperial 2005).  Each contact was 
approached by both telephone and email over a period of several weeks.  Contacts were removed 
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from the list if they did not consent to an interview or if no reply was received after five 
attempts.  Interview subjects for each case ultimately included elected officials, city public 
managers, private developers, investors, state regulators, and citizens (Table 4-14).  
Table 4-14: Project Actors Interviewed By Case 
Actor Category Rochester A Rochester B Buffalo 1 and 2 
elected officials X X  
planning managers X X X 
city environmental managers X X X 
state environmental regulators X X X 
community activists X  X 
lenders   X 
developers X X X 
county health manager X X  
state health manager   X 
environmental and engineering consultant X X X 
 
Interview questions emerged from the theoretical frameworks used to develop the study 
propositions (Appendix A).  Process-oriented questions included open-ended statements like 
“describe when you became involved with this project and why” while questions about key 
moments assessed actor motivations, perceived balances of power between actors, and general 
awareness of the project environment (Bressers, Klok, and O'Toole Jr. 2000).  Network questions 
measured social ties, strategic management behaviors, and institutional forces guiding behaviors 
(Provan and Milward 1995).  A municipal brownfield manager and a brownfield consultant 
outside the study reviewed the interview protocol and their suggestions were incorporated into 
the final version.   
Interviews occurred in-person or over the phone when in-person interviews were not 
feasible.  Interview subjects were asked for consent (Appendix A) and, upon consent, were read 
questions directly from the protocol.  Clarifying questions were asked only if the interview 
subject was not clear in their answer.  All interviews were conducted in accordance with the 
 
 
81 
Institutional Review Board of Syracuse University regarding the treatment of human subjects to 
minimize risk to respondents.  Interviews were transcribed both by this researcher using the 
Transcriva software package as well as by a contracted transcriber. 
While interview data were used to assess communication networks at the case level, an 
online survey targeting members of project networks collected more precise data measuring 
these ties. This survey asked respondents to identify the project phases in which they 
participated, the individuals and organizations with whom they interacted during those phases, 
the frequency of those interactions, and the types of information exchanged (Appendix A). The 
survey software sent three invitations for recipients to participate over the course of four weeks.  
If a recipient did not respond, three phone calls were made to offer to collect the information by 
hand.  If a recipient still did not respond, they were dropped from the survey list.   
For both project stories and network data, documents such as emails, contracts, media 
reports, and meeting minutes filled in missing data gaps.  Public records were obtained through 
FOIL requests from municipal agencies involved with each project.  Permissions were also 
obtained from private project actors to access a variety of project-specific internal documents 
such as photographs, project summaries, and internal communications.  In addition, newspaper 
articles, blog entries, meeting minutes and agency reports were collected to round out 
triangulation efforts. These data were utilized to confirm, or refute, the findings generated by 
interview data, a particularly important task for addressing the limitations of retrospective data 
(Golden 1992).  Table 4-15 summarizes data collected for each case. 
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Table 4-15: Data Collection by Case 
Collection Method Buffalo Phase 1 and 2 Rochester A Rochester B 
Interviews 21 individuals 
26 interviews 
14 individuals 
15 interviews 
13 individuals 
14 interviews 
Follow-Up Network 
Surveys 
28 invitations 
8 responses 
17 invitations 
8 responses 
23 invitations 
8 responses 
City Government 
Project Documents 
RFPs, contracts, fax communication, email communication, phone 
communication, citizen surveys, environmental reports, design 
narratives, financial reports, budgets 
~ 1000 pages ~ 3000 pages ~ 750 pages 
City Council Minutes 6 years 5 years 5 years 
Private Documents Annual reports, newsletters, design mark-ups, blueprints, evaluations 
Organizational 
Websites 
Websites for each key government agency, private contractor, 
consultants, and citizens groups, when accessible 
Newspaper Accounts ~30 articles ~30 articles ~10 articles 
Academic/Professional 
Journals 
Master’s Thesis, prior 
research on Buffalo urban 
policy 
none none 
Other Government 
Documents 
Sources: USEPA, NYSDEC, NYSDOH 
Types: annual reports, project summaries, budgets 
~600 pages 
Blogs Buffalo Rising 
Fix Buffalo 
Buffalo Pundit 
none none 
 
Data Analysis. The ability to assert causal processes during case analysis requires careful 
accounting of evidence to enable capture of alternative explanations (Bennett 2008).  Therefore, 
several analytical techniques were applied. First, project contexts were constructed out of 
interview and document data to establish a backdrop upon which to explain what happened and 
why (Yin 2003).  The broader resource, market and political backgrounds of each case 
(Appendix B) as well as the key events leading to project outcomes (Chapter 5) were described 
using evidence from both primary (survey, interview) and secondary data (past research, 
journalism, texts).  
Second, process tracing techniques were used to produce in-case analyses explaining how 
project outcomes came to be. Process tracing is often used to both build and test theories about 
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phenomena containing multiple interaction effects, such as explaining management outcomes of 
project networks (Bennett and Elman 2006).  Key decisions and actions within the broader 
project contexts were identified within the general brownfield project phase framework 
articulated in Chapter 2.  Anchoring case narratives around these phases provided structure in 
which multiple within-case observations could be made without clouding the analysis (George 
and Bennett 2005).  Interview respondents central to each case then reviewed the case stories to 
verify accuracy.  
Third, the interview and document data were coded using the TAMS Analyzer qualitative 
software package to capture institutional management strategies utilizing policy tools across 
project phases.  Data were first coded for the key decision phase described and then for the 
policy tools used in each phase (Table 4-16).  Once these codes were in place, data were recoded 
to capture management behaviors associated with the use of each policy tool. 
Table 4-16: Codebook for Policy Tools and Project Phases 
Code 
Type 
 
Code Category Code Sub-Category 
Policy 
Tools 
Local, State, and 
Federal levels 
Liability Relief Regulation 
Tax Credits Deregulation 
Grants Strategic Plan 
Revolving 
Loans 
Direct Action 
Economic 
Zones 
Permit 
Contracts Technical Assistance 
Quasi-Governmental Corporations 
Project 
Phases 
Property Assembly Design 
Economic Assessment Construction Planning 
Environmental 
Assessment Construction 
Remediation Planning Sales 
Remediation  
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The retrospective nature of the data prevented measurement of actual management 
behaviors enabled in direct observation.  Therefore, data surrounding mentions of policy tools 
were examined for cues indicating management intent behind tool selection as well as 
perceptions of behavioral impacts resulting from tool use.  Interview data were also scanned for 
descriptions of interpersonal interactions matching the institutional and relationship management 
behaviors found in Table 4-18 below. 
Table 4-17: Management Behaviors 
Strategy Type Behaviors Measure 
Relationship 
 
Negotiation Making offers and counteroffers in search of 
mutually agreeable allocation 
Trust development Risk sharing 
Social interaction outside of partnership 
Institutional Persuasion Offering incentives to encourage participation 
Coercion Leveraging authority to direct behavior 
Accommodation Requesting or granting regulatory relief  
Arranging 
 
Seek/provide third party to mediate differences  
Seek financial resources 
Establish contract 
Framing 
 
Seek/provide information regarding brownfield 
property characteristics 
Seek/provide information and technical assistance 
(adapted from Agranoff and McGuire 2003) 
Finally, social network structures within each project were measured by applying social 
network analysis (SNA) techniques to the data (Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979; Milward 
and Provan 1998). These techniques used relational information between individual and 
organizational actors to define structural properties of each project network over time, 
particularly as they related to information exchanges (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  Sociometric 
matrices indicating who exchanged information with whom were constructed using data from 
interviews, the post-interview survey, and documents. If respondents reported a single dyadic 
information exchange with an individual or organization within the network during a particular 
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project phase, the exchange was assigned the value of 1.  Otherwise, the cell linking the two 
actors was assigned a 0.  Additional exchanges indicated in interview and document data were 
then added to the matrices to fill in gaps created by survey non-responses.  Links were 
considered binary, symmetric, non-directional, and non-weighted, allowing for only basic 
description of network structures utilizing the SNA software AGNA. 
 First, the data were coded by project phase to count active relationships between actors 
within each phase as well as to provide a measure for the network relationships across the entire 
project.  Because of the focus of this research on local government actors, actor types were 
broken down between sectors and then between different government agencies and offices. 
Individual-level network actors were categorized by primary expert area, regardless of sector 
affiliation.  Primary expert areas pertained to the tasks implied by specific job titles and agency 
missions affiliated with each actor, verified by interview and document data. 
 Actor-level centrality measures identified which actors were most central to both the 
whole network as well as during each network phase.  A common way to conceive of this 
involvement is to examine an actor’s “betweenness”, or the extent to which an actor lies between 
all other actors based upon their geodesics, or the shortest path between the actor and all other 
actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994).  The Bavelas-Leavitt (BL) Centrality index as calculated by 
AGNA suited this purpose (Bavelas 1947; Wasserman and Faust 1994; van der Aalst and Song 
2004).  This Index measures the ratio of the sum of geodesic distances for all nodes by the sum 
of geodesic distances to the node in question.  The shorter the distances between the node and all 
other nodes, the index score increases.  Subsequent analysis of public management behaviors 
within the network focused upon public managers exhibiting high BL Centrality Index scores.  
For example, if a municipal-level manager exhibited high centrality compared to all other 
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network actors, it is likely that that manager had the best structural position from which to 
influence the behavior of other network actors and should be the initial focus of analysis. 
AGNA also used the BL Centrality Index scores for each project and project phase to 
generate a measure for group-level centrality called the Freeman Centrality Index.  This index 
summed the differences between the largest value for single actor centrality and the rest of the 
actor centralities and divided it by the maximum theoretically possible sum for that sized 
network.  This produced a score between 0 and 1 for each network.  A score of 0 indicated a 
network where all actors have the same centrality and 1 indicated a network where all shortest 
paths lead to the same actor; the higher the score, the closer the network was to a perfectly 
central network (Faust and Wasserman 1992).  However, this index assumes that only one 
network exists within a matrix.  More than one unique network will skew this measure above 1, 
requiring separate measures for unique networks operating within the same arena.  One 
advantage to using the Freeman Centrality Index measure was that the standardization of scores 
in the index across networks enabled cross-case comparisons between networks of different 
sizes.  Therefore, actors not active in a particular phase of a project could be removed from the 
network data for that phase without removing the ability to compare phase centralities. 
Network density was measured in AGNA by dividing the total number of edges, or 
unique links between actors, by the total number of possible edges for that network.  This 
produced an index between 0 and 1 where low values indicated fewer links and higher values 
indicated more comprehensive connections within the network (Pryke 2005; Wasserman and 
Faust 1994).  Because isolate actors were removed, density index values measured the density of 
active network participants only.  
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Together, these four analytical strategies enabled a rich description of the critical factors 
impacting project outcomes and the relative influence of public management behaviors within 
project networks on these outcomes.  
Threats to Research Validity. The primary limitation of comparative case analysis 
using qualitative data and a small number of cases is the ability to generalize findings to a 
broader population of cases.  However, as explained at the start of this chapter, research designs 
spring directly from research goals and, with the aim of this study to trace causal processes and 
identifying the mechanisms enabling these processes, small-N comparative case analysis 
remained the best research design (Gerring 2004; Kaarbo and Beasley 1999; Dion 1998).   
A challenge to this design, however, was the ability to adequately capture rival 
explanations in the data collection.  This ability first relied upon sufficient knowledge at the start 
of the study of what potential rival explanations might be and then later upon the ability to 
collect sufficient data to fully capture the extent to which these explanations occurred. The 
potential for omitted variable bias increased the more key data sources were missed.  While the 
data triangulation, interview selection, and respondent verification methods addressed this 
limitation to the greatest extent possible, data gathered for the Buffalo Phase One project 
constrained findings for that case. 
A second challenge specific to this study was the use of retrospective interview data in 
constructing story narratives.  As more time passes after events occur, the ability of individuals 
to accurately depict events diminishes (Bernard et al. 1984).  To address this, this study selected 
projects with active processes within five years of the study dates, implemented the same semi-
structured interview protocol with exhaustive lists of interview subjects, and verified interview 
data with multiple secondary data sources. 
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A third challenge pertained to the data used for social network analysis.  Social network 
data from interviews relied upon recall and the abilities of interviewees to remember their 
primary partners when making key decisions.  The network survey did not elicit a full set of 
respondents, limiting its ability to verify exchanges of information and resources between those 
actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994; Tichy, Tushman, and Fombrun 1979).   Document data, 
while filling in many of the gaps left by interview and survey sources, may also be biased 
towards relationships requiring formal documentation and away from the informal exchanges 
that may have been central to decision making processes.  Despite these limitations, the 
extensive triangulation of these three sources enabled the best possible saturation of network data 
(Dyer and Nobeoka 2000).  Subsequent analysis proceeded cautiously, recognizing where data 
gaps existed. 
Presenting Findings.  Through careful case selection and data collection, the research 
design for this study enabled the construction of a dataset sufficient for analyzing the extent to 
which public managers influenced brownfield remediation and redevelopment project outcomes.  
By tracing processes in a set of comparative case studies and conducting social network analysis, 
the research propositions regarding the use of institutional management strategies were 
examined.  Despite careful matching of case-level data, findings reveal four complex brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment projects with four distinct stories.  The next three chapters 
present these findings, carefully producing an analysis addressing the theoretical propositions.  
Starting with the Assembly phase (Table 4-19), Chapters Five, Six and Seven alternate between 
examining the critical factors shaping key decisions and identifying the prevailing patterns of 
network structures, policy tool use, and network management behaviors surrounding these 
decisions. The end of each case story then aggregates phase-specific critical factors to the project 
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level in order to illustrate the link between these factors and the multiple outcome measures 
utilized to assess relative project success. Chapter Eight continues the analysis by examining 
these findings across the case stories to determine the extent to which public managers operating 
towards the center of brownfield project networks impacted partner behaviors and, subsequently, 
project outcomes through the strategic selection and use of policy tools. 
Table 4-18: Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Framework 
Phase Stage Decision-Making Path 
 
 
 
 
 
Cleanup 
 
Site Identification 1. Assembly 
Initial Site Assessment – Phase I 
Investigation 
2. Environmental 
assessment 
3. Remediation 
planning 
Detailed Site Assessment – Phase II 
Investigation 
Remedial Assessment 
Economic Assessment and Planning 4. Economic 
assessment 
Redevelopment 
 
(Overlap) 
 
Cleanup 
Project Development and Financing 5. Redevelopment 
planning 
6. End use design 
Cleanup Planning and Execution 7. Remediation 
process 
 
Redevelopment Redevelopment of Site 8. Construction 
process 
9. End use sales 
Bold font indicates phases around which the case narratives are organized. 
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CHAPTER FIVE ROCHESTER HIGH SUCCESS: RIDING A POLITICAL WAVE 
 Introduction.  The first project examined in this research was the high success case in 
the high capacity city, Rochester, NY.  As the case story revealed, this project achieved its 
success through a combination of strong political support, timely policy tool availability, 
thorough remediation, and effective institutional and relationship management on behalf of key 
public managers operating towards the center of project networks.  This chapter lays the 
foundation for identifying how these critical factors influenced one another to enable the 
emergence of successful outcomes.  Each section of the chapter describes how the interaction of 
key factors occurred at the phase level before culminating with a general discussion of critical 
factors at the project level. 
Background. Rochester Project A (RPA) is a market-rate single-family home residential 
development that occurred between 1996 and 2004 and is characterized by high levels of citizen 
engagement and large amounts of money spent on remediation and redevelopment.  The property 
assembled for RPA lies in the southeast quadrant of the city of Rochester at the boundary 
between an established, stable neighborhood and one experiencing more of the challenges 
associated with lower-income, transient areas.  Demographically, the neighborhood around RPA 
had been predominantly working class Caucasian families with, at the start of the project, low 
levels of organized neighborhood association activity.   
The property itself originally hosted two active construction companies, one providing 
general contracting services and the other performing asphalt services for road and infrastructure 
construction.  These two commercial properties had been grandfathered into what eventually 
became a single-family home urban neighborhood.   This unusual integration of commercial and 
residential persisted largely because, at the time that RPA began, the city had an ongoing policy 
of not foreclosing or otherwise acquiring environmental properties that might pose undue 
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liability and financial risk for the city.  Therefore, as long as political pressure remained low, 
there was little incentive for the city to invest time and money into property acquisition. 
Property Assembly and Economic Assessment.  Starting in the early 1990s, individual 
neighbors living adjacent to what eventually became RPA began complaining to city officials 
about strange odors, late night digging activity, and suspicious looking run off originating from 
the contractor yards sitting in their midst.  
You'd be sitting here and next thing you know a stick of dynamite would go off or 
somebody would be out back at 2 or 3 in the morning and you'd see a backhoe start up 
and they are digging and burying and hiding stuff and illegally bringing trucks in from 
main street down through the street that was there and dump in the middle of the night. – 
RPA Neighbor, 2008 
 
While neighbors logged complaints with the City, the County Health Department, and the New 
York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), they felt that nothing 
significant was being done about this public nuisance. Sensing that part of the problem was their 
lack of organization, the neighbors formed a neighborhood group (given the pseudonym 
“BANG” here) to coordinate complaints.  This effort to organize caused city council to recognize 
the neighbors as a substantial political force. The council president, who also represented their 
district, met with key public managers in the environmental quality and community development 
departments to see what could be done.  However, despite this growing political momentum to 
address the nuisance, there was not a strong precedent for direct city action. While the potential 
liability risks played a role in this informal policy, the greater barrier was a lack of funding for 
potential remediation costs. 
 At around the time that the political pressure from the neighborhood on city council 
increased, the lead manager at the city’s Division of Environmental Services (DES) heard from 
NYSDEC headquarters that a new policy program was in the works in New York State to aid 
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municipality-led remediation of contaminated properties.  Termed the Environmental Restoration 
Program (ERP) under the 1996 New York Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act, the program 
contained a set of policy tools for use by municipalities specific to brownfield properties with the 
most attractive tool being state reimbursement grants for up to 75% of total remediation costs. In 
addition, upon completing remediation to the satisfaction of the New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC), any future property owners would receive 
indemnification from the state for future issues pertaining to its past contamination.  Recognizing 
that this program would likely be approved, the DES manager proposed that the city move 
forward on property acquisition in anticipation that the money for remediation reimbursement 
would be there.  With increasing political pressure from the community and likely financial 
assistance from the state, city council gave the green light and the city real estate, housing, and 
DES offices made room on their agendas for addressing the nuisance properties and city council 
approved that property acquisition activity commence. 
As a first step, with approval from city council, the city real estate office acquired the 
nuisance property through a combination of tax foreclosure and direct purchase, compelling the 
owners to sell the property at market rate while the city paid for their move to a site in a more 
industrial area.  Then, when surveyors contracted by the city reported back to the real estate 
office that additional property segments might be needed for a usable final product, the city 
purchased an entire property from the second contractor who owned a smaller, adjacent piece of 
land in addition to slices of properties from surrounding residential neighbors.  The sum effect of 
this assembly approach provided enough space for potential development that might include 
building a new street with adequate access for emergency vehicles.  However, city officials at 
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this point did not have a clear end use in mind because the initial motivation was to address a 
neighborhood nuisance, not to fulfill broader community or economic development goals. 
RPA Assembly and Economic Assessment: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, 
and Public Management. Network data for this first phase reveal that the DES manager occupied 
the most central space of the project network (Table 5-1).  Initially, it was this individual who 
reported on the up and coming funding source for remediation.  Once the project was given the 
go-ahead, and with support by his department commissioner, this manager assumed the role of 
liaison with BANG, pouring many hours into communicating what was happening at City Hall 
regarding the acquisition process, even when it involved information that may have been outside 
of the environmental arena.  It is important to note that, despite not exhibiting as high a 
centrality, the director of the city real estate office performed much of the negotiation with 
property owners and facilitated property acquisition procedures.  These tasks did not require that 
he occupy a central network position due to delegation of authority to him by city council to 
work directly with the property owners. 
Table 5-1: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Assembly Citizen Sr. Env Mngr City Council 
Economic Assessment Sr. Env Mngr City Council Citizen 
 
The policy tools exhibiting influence on project processes during these phases were 
largely legislative/regulatory by nature and were primarily used to facilitate the real estate 
transactions away from the center of the project network (Table 5-2).  For example, the real 
estate and housing development managers applied the direct actions of condemnation and 
purchase to the nuisance property owners.  While purchasing required some negotiation, the 
ability to use condemnation and threaten eminent domain as a potential action forced compliance 
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by the owners. Additional use of direct action included the use of money from a bond sale by 
city council to pay for land and the leveraging of zoning laws by community development 
managers to aggregate the properties under city ownership.  
While not directly implementing any specific tool, the senior DES manager was able to 
leverage the potential for the state ERP fiscal tools to convince political leadership to commence 
property assembly processes, and to convene key actors within city government.  The impact of 
this anticipation impact indicates that policy tools influence actor behaviors prior to their actual 
implementation and, in the case of policy tools as threats (i.e. eminent domain), may be used to 
compel behaviors of network actors.   
Table 5-2: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Assembly 3 1 1 0 5 
Economic Assessment 0 0 0 0 0 
 
During property assembly, public management activity largely occurred through the 
efforts made by the environmental and real estate managers to accomplish two very different 
tasks. The DES manager, through his central network position, focused on building positive 
relationships between city council and neighborhood residents to address immediate conflicts 
and lay the groundwork for a longer term working relationship.  The real estate and housing 
managers on the other hand primarily targeted property owners over the short term using several 
direct action tools as authorized by city council.  As a result, the DES manager found himself 
utilizing high levels of relationship building strategies through a large amount of information 
exchange with multiple city and citizen actors while the real estate manager achieved his task 
through the routine use of legislative and regulatory policy tools made available to him by city 
council to target a specific subset of property owners. 
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Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning. By acquiring the properties, 
the city committed to lead remediation processes so the DES manager retained a private 
engineering and environmental consulting group to conduct an initial Phase I assessment prior to 
purchase and, once the properties legally belonged to the city, a more comprehensive Phase II 
assessment.  The manager selected the firm from a pool of consultants pre-approved for 
assessment work on behalf of the city.  The contract ultimately drawn up with the consultant was 
done so in accordance to pre-established contract management rules at the city.  
The Phase I investigation involved a visual inspection of both buildings and open space 
for pipe vents or other indication that underground contaminations might exist.  After witnessing 
various instances of poorly stored pesticides, a buried truck, and other chemicals, the consulting 
firm sunk a series of boring holes, monitoring wells, and test pits to provide data for the Phase II 
assessment. The Phase II assessment revealed that:  
The site contained construction and demolition debris, municipal solid waste, drums and 
smaller containers, scrap metal, and mercury, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) 
and pesticide-contaminated soils that needed to be removed.  In addition, two separate 
petroleum-contaminated soil/groundwater plumes, originating from the two sets of 
underground storage tanks, extended onto the neighboring residential properties.” 
(Consulting Firm Report, 2002, p.3) 
 
At this point in the RPA project, a conversation tool place between the area homebuilders 
association and the mayor’s office that had an impact on remediation planning as it pertained to 
potential land uses.  During the previous few years, leaders at the regional homebuilders 
association had been talking with the city’s deputy mayor regarding possibilities to construct 
new market-rate housing within the city of Rochester, the absence of which the mayor believed 
drove much of the suburban sprawl around the city.  While the mayor’s office frequently sought 
homebuilder association commitment to building city housing, association members could not 
find sufficient property sizes that would allow for projects within their desired profit margins. 
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However, when the RPA property appeared on the city’s policy agenda, interest spiked within 
the homebuilders association and an association executive became involved with the effort to 
find funding for property remediation, working through the mayor’s office to connect with the 
DES manager.  Simultaneously, the DES manager and the association executive worked with 
state-level officials to stress the importance of the RPA project receiving entry into the ERP. 
 These strategies worked and RPA earned the first entry into the new ERP, garnering 
approval from the central office of the NYSDEC in Albany as well as significant political 
attention from the Governor.  With this green light, the consulting firm hired to perform the 
assessments put together a set of possible remediation strategies and submitted them to the 
NYSDEC for approval.  In accordance with the new ERP requirements, the NYSDEC consulted 
with the state and county health departments and received citizen input to produce a record of 
decision formally designating their preferred plan. 
After receiving the project bids produced by the consulting firm, the DES manager 
realized the 75% ERP cleanup cost commitment would be problematic for the city.  So, city 
council, the mayor’s office, and the environmental commissioner made an appeal to officials at 
the NYSDEC that ultimately led to a change to a more manageable 90%/10% split.  Even so, 
10% of overall remediation costs were quite large but the central role of the city council 
president in this project enabled smooth passage of each spending vote that council encountered. 
RPA Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning: Network Characteristics, 
Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. With the strong environmental nature of these phases, 
the senior environmental manager maintained his position as the most network-centric public 
manager.  He worked closely with city council in pursuing the ERP funding as well as continued 
to work with the citizen’s group in keeping them up to date on how the contamination would be 
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addressed.  He also found himself working more closely with the consulting firm to generate the 
environmental information required for this communication as well as for state and county 
regulators whose remediation plan approval was necessitated by the ERP (Table 5-3).  While the 
conversation with the homebuilders proved to be significant in setting the standards of 
remediation goals, this conversation occurred primarily between political leaders and the 
homebuilders, not at the center of total project processes. 
Table 5-3: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Environmental Assessment Sr. Env Mngr City Council Consult1 
Remediation Plan City Council Sr. Env Mngr Citizen 
 
The number of policy tools mentioned as impacting decisions during environmental 
assessment and remediation planning decreased relative to the previous project phase and 
derived primarily from the fiscal and information tools made available from the NYSDEC by the 
ERP program (Table 5-4). These tools included ones that the city could apply to incentivize the 
behaviors of others as well as tools to which they had to respond as the tool target.  Tools city 
managers could apply included technical assistance and the promise of the remediation 
reimbursements and liability releases.  Tools to which city managers had to respond included 
NYSDEC regulations regarding the assessment and remediation planning processes.  These 
regulations were the basis of many of the relationships between the city’s DES, the consulting 
firm, the County Health Department and the NYSDEC.  An additional policy tool playing a 
prominent role during these phases was the use of a contract by the DES manager to steer 
behaviors of the consulting firm through information gathering and remediation planning tasks.   
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Table 5-4: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Environmental Assessment 1 0 1 1 3 
Remediation Plan 1 0 1 1 3 
 
As the most central public manager to project processes, the DES manager applied both 
institutional and relationship management strategies.  Institutional strategies utilizing contracts 
directed the behaviors of the consulting firm while relationship strategies using reciprocity and 
transparency built trust with BANG.   By asking the consultant to participate in BANG meetings 
early in the process, the DES manager successfully wove these strategies together to create 
strong ties between employees of the firm and BANG members.   
The DES manager continued to operate at the center of the project network during these 
phases and utilized a contract and the ERP grant to implement the environmental assessment and 
develop the remediation plan. In addition, the DES manager continued his information 
dissemination behaviors with BANG leaders and neighborhood residents.  On the other hand, the 
mayor’s office led the political negotiations with the homebuilders association and handed the 
ensuing relationship to the DES manager and his colleagues for follow up coordination.  
Construction Planning and Design. As project processes approached the formal 
designation of property end use, conflict arose within the neighborhood.  Because of where the 
neighborhood lay, factions of two adjacent neighborhoods who felt they had a stake in the 
property attended early BANG meetings to assert their opinions regarding what should be built 
on the property. BANG leaders quickly realized that these factions only clouded the 
conversation, causing combative meetings in which city officials likely missed hearing the 
values of the most proximate neighbors.  Therefore, BANG leaders decided to exclude outside 
groups and rebuild their own capacities for engagement from within.  They formalized their 
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group and made numerous door-to-door visits to build neighborhood trust and commitment.  As 
a result, a core group of members began attending meetings regularly. 
The city council president, DES manager, and engineering consultant spent a great deal 
of time with BANG members from this point forward, meeting frequently at their community 
library to provide updates and to hear concerns.  Aware that city council, the mayor’s office, and 
the homebuilders association wanted suburban style single-family homes, the environmental 
manager took great care to elicit ideas from BANG to minimize dissatisfaction with the city-led 
process. The BANG leader described the process:  
Every individual brought back  . . what they wanted to see in that property and then we 
sat here and we took all of the solutions and came up with common denominators and out 
of all of that, we as a neighborhood went back to the city and said "we have five 
proposals that as a neighborhood we will accept".  And the city came back and said "well 
we have four proposals that we'll accept if you guys decide to agree upon them" and what 
(RPA) ended up being was a combination of the two most popular ones for us as a 
neighborhood and one of the most popular ones for the city as a compromise for all of us 
and it was amazing. – BANG leader, 2008 
 
Initially, the neighbors generated many ideas for end use including a public park, but city council 
was not interested in spending a large amount of money for something that would subsequently 
require additional resources to maintain.  Through careful facilitation on behalf of both BANG 
leaders and the environmental manager as well as information generated from a city-led tax-
impact analysis, neighbors agreed on market-rate homes as long as they fit to a design standard 
approved by the neighborhood.   
After end use selection, conversations at the neighborhood meetings turned towards 
design standards for the new homes.  Treading a balance between what they believed would sell 
and meeting the interests of the neighbors, the city DES and community development managers 
brokered design solutions that, while not perfect for any single party, enabled the project to move 
 
 
100 
forward with minimal friction.  It was at this point that city managers earned the trust and 
support of the once angry neighbors.  
When (the city) says "well we are going to supply you as an architect as a neighborhood 
group" and that architect represents you and we have your own architects and at first we 
were like "yeah, right, well that's a sort of squirrelly group" but she did . . she took our 
drawings and she did what we needed her to do and did it as our representation and 
represented us correctly and as we wanted to be represented. – BANG leader, 2008 
 
The houses themselves reflected what project stakeholders felt were the best of both urban and 
suburban home designs.  While the houses appeared suburban in their use of materials and 
distance from the sidewalk, they also exhibited the pitched roofs, front porches and hidden 
garages found in the city.  
With design ideas in hand, the city’s community development project manager assigned 
to construction processes negotiated with the regional homebuilders association to obtain their 
commitment, meeting more times than was normal for city projects, until mutual trust existed.  In 
these negotiations, the city, through city council, ultimately agreed to remediate the property, 
obtain liability releases, produce design standards and build the new street and landscaping.  
Homebuilders, in turn, committed to building demo homes, sponsoring a marketing home show, 
and constructing houses for each buyer.  Buyers would finance homes with individual mortgages 
while homebuilders would front the construction costs.  In addition, per the requirements of the 
county health department, builders agreed to halt construction with discovery of any new 
contaminations.  These agreements met multiple interests.  City officials were eager to draw new 
homeowners into the city while homebuilders were attracted to the prospect of a small profit 
combined with positive public relations to be found by cutting a ribbon on what was once city 
blight rather than unveiling a new development on what was once farmland. 
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RPA Construction Planning and Design: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and 
Public Management. Despite increased involvement of the homebuilders association and the new 
community development project manager, the relative centrality of project actors did not shift 
during these phases (Table 5-5).  The DES manager maintained his highly central position with 
the BANG leader, indicating the extent to which, regardless of task orientations of each phase, 
communication between city government and the neighbors remained prominent throughout the 
project.  The consulting firm liaison became more important during construction planning as 
specifics about the remediation schedule, land surveys, and street layouts had to be 
communicated to the homebuilders, the city community development staff, the neighbors, and 
the subcontractors.  While his role working with the homebuilders intensified, the community 
development manager primarily communicated his efforts to his supervisor, city council and the 
DES manager who, in turn, broadcast that information to the broader network as needed. 
Table 5-5: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Construction Plan Sr. Env Mngr Consult2 Citizen 
Design Sr. Env Mngr Citizen City Council 
 
Formal tool use in construction planning centered on actions taken by the community 
development manager to secure construction financing and develop contracts with homebuilders 
(Table 5-6).  This manager worked with city council and the zoning board to access bond 
funding for street development, to rezone and survey the property to create construction plans, 
and to purchase remaining slices of adjacent properties that would enable street construction in 
accordance with city and county codes.  In addition, this manager established contracts with the 
homeowners association and the engineering consulting firm regarding who will do what in the 
construction of new homes.  The homebuilders contract formalized agreements developed 
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through careful discussion while the engineering contract derived from a formal template 
previously applied to other construction projects. 
 For the DES manager, facilitating end use design selection, however, did not entail the 
use of any formal policy tools.  Instead, the DES manager continued his role of information 
gatherer and disseminator through various meetings and memos and actors reached agreement 
through trust-building behaviors such as interest-based negotiation and practicing reciprocity.  
To augment this, this manager initiated a regular meeting between key city officials involved 
with this project for the purpose of exchanging information and anticipating process problems.  
Table 5-6: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Construction Plan 4 2 1 0 7 
Design 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Remediation.  As construction planning and design unfolded, the DES manager, his staff 
members, and the consultant implemented the remediation plan. As evidenced by the large 
amount of remediation paperwork exchanged between the consultant, the city of Rochester, the 
county and state health departments, and the NYSDEC the ERP subjected the city to a rule-
bound process under high scrutiny, enhanced by its status as the “first ERP project”.  However, 
the ERP was so new that residential end use standards had not yet been developed.  Therefore, 
the county health department liaison acted outside his normal responsibilities for brownfield 
remediation and established intermediate residential standards until the NYSDEC rule-making 
process caught up.  At the same time, the members of the city legal office navigated the evolving 
ERP language to ensure appropriate compliance.  Commenting upon the difficulties of 
implementing the first ERP project, the NYSDEC point person for RPA stated “the fact that the 
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city was very capable and had very capable staff dealing with procurement requirements for 
contracting helped immensely.” 
Remediation processes ultimately involved: 
. . .vector control for wildlife; site clearing; excavation, sorting screening and disposal of 
26,000 tons of non-reusable construction and demolition debris, contaminated soils and 
asbestos-containing materials; excavation and staging of petroleum impacted soils; and 
removal and disposal of 300,000 gallons of impacted water.  Salvageable materials such 
as scrap steel were sorted out and recycled.  Concrete was crushed and re-used on site as 
backfill. (Consulting Firm Report, 2002, p. 3) 
 
In order to verify the achievement of remediation goals, the consultant obtained 525 samples 
from across the property at 24-foot intervals and dug test pits where future basements might be. 
In addition, they installed oxygen injection systems to treat petroleum-contaminated plumes 
present in the soils, an innovative approach at the time.   
Actors frequently on site during remediation processes included the private consultant, 
multiple DES employees, the NYSDEC project manager, and the county health department 
liaison.  These latter two actors held the authority to set and monitor target levels of 
contamination.  These roles were important because ERP reimbursements and legal 
indemnifications were contingent on the approvals of these two individuals.  
Throughout remediation, the DES manager and the consultant maintained frequent 
communication exchanges with other project actors, particularly the neighbors and the city 
council president. In turn, BANG leaders served as proxies for the DES program manager, 
educating other neighbors about the unfolding of events and any new information.  One leader 
ended up with a full set of remediation files in her basement equal to that sent by the DES to the 
NYSDEC.  Members of the city real estate office were also very active during remediation to 
assist with obtaining access permissions for neighboring private properties for environmental 
 
 
104 
testing and machinery access.  This entailed lots of knocking on doors and phone calling to 
explain in detail the purpose of the request and to allow citizens to modify access requirements.  
In the end, every neighbor approached granted permissions and remediation occurred 
successfully.  
RPA Remediation: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management.  
Consistent with the preceding project phases, the DES manager again maintained his central 
position during remediation, particularly because the primary tasks of this phase addressed the 
politically contentious issue of the environmental contamination (Table 5-7).  The greatest 
intensity of communication between this manager, the consultant, and BANG occurred during 
this phase as evidenced by the quantity of shared paperwork.  The state-level political focus of 
remediation processes drew the city council president closer to the center of the network as well 
as she hosted site visits by the governor while continuing her communication with neighbors. 
Table 5-7: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Remediation Sr. Env Mngr City Council Citizen 
 
The prominent policy tools activated during this phase were contracts, the city 
regulations governing contracts, and technical assistance from the state and county.  Contracts 
dominated actor relationships primarily because the consultant used multiple sub-contracts for 
tasks like debris hauling, soil dewatering, fencing, and site surveying.  Table 5-8 represents these 
contracts as a single contract between the city and the main consulting firm because the 
consultant managed the subcontracts after the city approved them.  The remaining tools derived 
from the ERP including state and county regulations that shaped the extent of remediation, 
technical assistance that enhanced information transfers and grant money for process 
reimbursements.  It is important to note that the promise of liability indemnification increased 
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commitment of the homebuilders at this point despite the fact that the NYSDEC did not 
formalize this indemnification until after remediation was complete. 
Table 5-8: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Remediation 2 1 1 1 5 
  
In a shift from previous phases, public management behaviors by the DES manager 
during this phase were largely institutional and centered upon contract management, ensuring 
that the consultant and the sub-contractors fulfilled their responsibilities.  Accompanying these 
strategies was an increased application of information dissemination in response to regulatory 
requirements.  For example, because city council had to approve transfers of large amounts of 
money, the DES manager needed to communicate remediation progress to them in detail.   
Other public managers at the state and county levels were also key to the implementation 
of remediation activities such as the NYSDEC liaison negotiating with his superiors to allow for 
the county health liaison to establish intermediary regulations to allow remediation to proceed.  
However, centrality remained with the DES manager as his role in project coordination 
increased. 
Construction and Sales. As remediation completed, construction process began to 
unfold.  These processes included the solicitation, review and selection of proposals from 
homebuilders, sale of subdivided land to homebuilders, construction of the roadway, linking 
home sites with utilities, and planning a suburban-style home show exhibiting model homes. The 
city community development manager worked with the engineering consultant to coordinate the 
efforts of homebuilders to keep the project on a schedule satisfactory to both the neighbors as 
well as to city council.  However, construction of the streetscape faced multiple delays.  First, 
miscalculations by one of the sub-contractors led the city project manager to request more 
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funding and time to replace a drainage pipe under the roadway.  Second, the project timeline ran 
into the winter season in which rain and snow prevented work from proceeding. 
As stated in their contract with the city, the homebuilder association and the participating 
builders led RPA home construction and sales processes.  Individual builders became engaged, 
not through a standard request for proposal process, but rather as a result of targeted recruitment 
by the homebuilder association on behalf of the city.  Working with one of his member/board 
members, an association executive framed the project to builders as an innovation that would 
provide positive publicity for the suburban homebuilding industry as well as a service to the city.  
Many of the builders involved expressed that these values contributed to their commitment but 
that the minimization of financial risk still played a prominent role. 
To ensure that the return on investment existed prior to the actual investment, builders 
constructed a set of model homes on the site for a home show event.  In this show, the city 
charged visitors a limited fee to preview homes and to make initial bids.  Despite being pushed 
back on the calendar due to the delays mentioned above, the home show drew an unprecedented 
10,000 visitors over eight days and the lots sold quickly. 
Having multiple homebuilders construct houses as opposed to one single developer also 
added to the distribution of financial risks across multiple actors. During sales, the city sold lots 
to individual builders and the individual builders sold to the property owner.  The DES manager 
provided the final site assessments to homebuyers to ensure transparency regarding 
environmental processes, but the thoroughness of remediation minimized any environmental 
concerns. 
The successful sales created the immediate economic impact on the surrounding 
neighborhood. Total assessed value of the new homes in 2009 was $4,227,000 with the average 
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assessed value at $176,125.  This led to a significant jump in tax revenues for the city.  Property 
assessments in the surrounding neighborhood went from $155,133,700 to $197,620,700 for a 
27% increase (Private Consultant Report, 2009).  While some of these increases derived from the 
high quality design of the new houses, most were the result of property improvement on the 
fringe of a larger, stable city neighborhood. 
RPA Construction and Sales: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public 
Management.  The onset of coordinating a range of city offices, subcontractors, and the 
homebuilders association brought the community development project manager into a more 
central position of the project network during home construction and sales (Table 5-9).  Yet, the 
DES manager continued to be the most central actor due to his ongoing role as a central 
communicator between key political actors as well as a new role of facilitating existing 
relationship for the community development manager.   
Table 5-9: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Construction Sr. Env Mngr Comm Dev Mngr City Council 
Sales Sr. Env Mngr Citizen Comm Dev Mngr 
 
Policy tools shaping construction and sales emphasized regulation and formal agreements 
(Table 5-10).  City law required permits on behalf of builders and contractors and the ERP 
agreement required builders to report any new concerns.  In addition, the city passed the ERP 
liability release to builders, following through on a strong incentive used to engage the builders 
in the first place. All policy tools during these phases reflected standard best practices of city-led 
construction management and public management behaviors were largely institutional, targeting 
contractors and sub-contractors involved with construction, marketing, and sales. 
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Table 5-10: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Construction 3 1 0 0 4 
Sales 0 1 1 0 2 
 
Dominant public management behaviors centered on the information exchanges and 
permit coordination required for the builders to initiate and complete home construction.  The 
DES manager reverted back to his relationship management behaviors while the community 
development took on the institutional management of homebuilders and subcontractors using 
policy tools as the construction coordinator. 
Explaining Project Outcomes.  In RPA, several contextual factors shaped the five 
outcome measures used in case selection (Table 5-11), including the political influence of the 
neighborhood group on city council, the timely creation of the New York state ERP brownfield 
program, the stability of the real estate market, and the preexisting relationship between the 
mayor’s office and the area homebuilders association regarding the construction of market-rate 
homes in the city.  Accounting for these factors, critical moments emerging in the public 
management process included the identification of the ERP program as a means for achieving 
remediation successes, the high degree of information sharing facilitated by the DES manager to 
political stakeholders across all project phases, and the use of policy tools to coordinate property 
acquisition, remediation, and construction processes by the real estate, DES, and community 
development managers respectively.  The use of policy tools in this manner conformed to 
expectations, particularly during both remediation and redevelopment implementation phases 
while the relationship management strategies applied by the DES manager served to smooth 
political relationships, making it easier to subsequently obtain external resources.  
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Table 5-11: RPA Project Success 
Outcome Measures  RPA Outcomes 
Time to completion (TIME) 1996 – 2004 
Cleanup costs (COST) $4.05 million 
Implementation processes 
(PROCESS) 
High satisfaction levels across multiple project actors 
Contamination abatement (CLEAN) Earned Certificate of Completion from NYSDEC ERP 
Area-wide impact (IMPACT) 1254% increase in assessed values of property 
27% increase in assessed values of neighboring homes 
 
For example, project prioritization occurred when news of the ERP and the voices of the 
property neighbors converged, lowering the financial and liability risks to the city for property 
engagement and jumping RPA to the top of the city council agenda.  Therefore, the ability of the 
DES manager to identify and then quickly communicate the prospect of the ERP policy tool 
package to citizens and city council proved to be the spark for allocating initial resources 
towards early project phases.  This decision to apply to the ERP resulted in acceptance into the 
program and enabled the broader project network to move past remediation concerns and 
consider property end use.  However, the success of the relationships relied upon the fact that the 
individuals participating in them maintained their roles throughout the projects.  The city council 
president in whose district RPA lay attributed project success to not only to these relationships: 
. . but also the continuity of them because this was such a long project and we know that 
these kinds of projects take so long to finally accomplish that without the continuity of . . 
the political continuity as well as the appointed staff, I don't know if it would have 
happened. – City Council President, 2008 
 
Non-city actors also noted the extent to which the city listened to their concerns and adapted 
their processes in order to address them.  The homebuilders association executive involved with 
RPA reported that, traditionally: 
In the City of Rochester you go from department to department to department.  You had to 
get an electrical permit, then you had to get a plumbing permit, then you had to get zoning 
and you had to go through all these different permits. . and the city was so good about 
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communicating information down to each and every one of those levels that it made the job 
all that much easier. – Home Builders Association Executive, 2008 
 
Utilizing multiple meetings, the city and the homebuilders developed an agreement unique to this 
project, enabling what the city’s community development manager described as a “a paradigm 
shift for the builders to say well ‘gee I'll have to look at myself a little differently.  Maybe I will 
go into the city and build a home.’"   
Once these commitments were made between the city and BANG, the city and the 
NYSDEC, and the city and the homebuilders association, policy tools played a much more 
instrumental role in coordinating project tasks.  Contracts with the consulting firm and their 
various subcontractors spelled out implementation tasks for each firm, city council authorized a 
series of fiscal tools to pay for up front project costs, and a range of standard permits required by 
the city for new home construction and city ordinances shaping who to hire and how for 
subcontract work impacted time, cost, and process satisfaction measures. 
It is tempting to explain RPA success purely as a result of timing.  Several project 
stakeholders pointed to a coming together of multiple factors to create a perfect implementation 
scenario.   
This project is probably a once in a life type of deal.  Everything fell together at once.  
Timing wise, partnership wise, funding wise, all the way through, everything just meshed 
together. – Homebuilder Association Executive, 2008 
 
However, sufficient evidence exists pointing to the role relationship management strategies 
played in selecting and producing policy tools that solidified sufficient commitment for 
successful project outcomes. 
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CHAPTER SIX LOW SUCCESS IN ROCHESTER: MANAGING INCREASING 
UNCERTAINTIES 
 
Introduction. Moving next to the low success project in the city of Rochester, data 
reveal a different style of market-rate housing constrained by a different set of environmental, 
political, and market-based forces than RPA.  In this project, a complicated off-site 
contamination scenario, a lack of neighborhood-based political push, and rapidly diminishing 
lending and real estate markets all challenged public management efforts to achieve positive 
project outcomes.  Similar to the previous chapter, this one begins with a brief background of 
how the project occurred in the broader flow of city housing efforts before stepping through key 
decisions made within each project phase.  The concluding section summarizes the extent to 
which public management activities influenced project outcomes within these contexts.  
Background. Rochester Project B (RPB) was a city-led brownfield project targeting new 
downtown home-ownership that did not achieved full redevelopment.  Initiated in 2003, the RBP 
property lies within the boundaries of downtown Rochester on the city’s east side, bordered to 
the west by a mix of new condominium rental residential and light commercial buildings 
constructed on another former brownfield, to the north and east by historic commercial buildings 
and a few single family homes, and to the south by a downtown highway. The entire property 
sits a few blocks from a major university performing arts center and several popular restaurants.  
Prior to property acquisition, the RPB land hosted a variety of industrial, commercial, and 
residential uses including auto body shops, a dry cleaning business, and an electrical contracting 
company. 
The impetus for RPB project originated from a broader strategic plan to introduce owner-
occupancy in the downtown Rochester area.  An early portion of this area-wide plan involved 
converting the brownfield property located to the west of RPB into rental housing.  This property 
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formerly hosted an auto dealership and was immediately adjacent to both a growing 
entertainment district and one of the city’s downtown university campuses, leading city officials 
and their private developer partner to believe in the property’s potential.  The city therefore 
remediated the property through the NYSDEC ERP and developers constructed condominiums, 
successfully renting all units by 2000.   
Property Assembly and Economic Assessment. The success of the rental 
redevelopment led two senior managers in the city’s real estate and development services office 
to see a stepping-stone for the city to promote downtown home ownership and decided to seek 
permission to push development momentum onto adjacent properties just to the north and east.  
Holding a design charette for the neighborhood surrounding the RPB properties to present their 
ideas for owner-occupancy and to obtain feedback.  The low numbers of residents and related 
levels of political activity within this neighborhood resulted in minimal feedback so the city 
managers proceeded to promote their own ideas for higher density town home units on this site 
to city council.  Despite the lack of citizen involvement city council members agreed with the 
opportunity to capture redevelopment momentum and gave a green light to proceed with 
property acquisition for RPB, once initial environmental information had been obtained.   
Working with an environmental manager from DES and a consulting firm hired from 
firms on retainer, the two community development managers acquired the necessary parcels by 
utilizing a land-banking approach, purchasing lots from existing owners with money authorized 
by city council and foreclosing on others where owners were behind in payments.  Two lots 
arrived through a donation when the property owner agreed that the tax write off was worth more 
than the market value of the property.  After acquiring seven distinct parcels, the managers 
worked to rezone the properties, creating a continuous lot suitable for development. The city 
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managers then retained private contractors to demolish all existing structures and prepare the site 
for environmental review. 
At this point, the managers examined a second lot bordering the first located to the south 
that hosted a viable electrical contractor, motor repair, and warehouse business.  Initially, the 
business owner did not consider selling, but as the city moved forward with demolition on the 
other properties, the business owner changed his mind and the real estate manager received city 
council permission to move forward with a purchase.  After acquiring this final property, the city 
owned a development footprint covering an entire city block. 
RPB Assembly and Economic Assessment: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, 
and Public Management. Despite the important roles filled by the real estate and housing 
managers initiating project processes and implementing property assembly transactions, network 
data indicate that a member of the city’s DES (working under the more senior DES manager 
prevalent in RPA), his environmental consultant, and the city legal office operated at the center 
of the project network during this first phase (Table 6-1). This occurred primarily because of city 
council’s need to understand the environmental conditions of the property before authorizing 
resources for purchase.  Therefore, the DES manager and his contractor worked as 
communication hubs between city council, the city lawyer, and the community development 
managers. The community development managers primarily communicated with property 
owners and city council to fulfill acquisition responsibilities, necessitating their temporary 
position at the center of the project network during economic assessment where the total network 
size was small. 
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Table 6-1: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Assembly Consultant Env Manager City Lawyer 
Economic Assessment Comm Dev Mngr 1 Comm Dev Mngr 2 Mayor 
  
Public management during these phases centered on institutional management 
approaches where network actors acted in response to a set of policy tools.  The tools utilized 
during these initial phases focused upon property acquisition and enabled such actions as direct 
purchase, foreclosure, and the adjustment of zoning (Table 6-2).  In receiving permission to 
implement these tools from city council, the community development managers followed 
standard transactional procedures.  In addition, the DES manager implemented a contract to 
establish a formal agreement with the consulting firm. 
Table 6-2: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Assembly 3 2 0 1 6 
Economic 
Assessment 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning. Once the city formally 
acquired the properties, the consulting firm and the DES manager commenced with the Phase I 
and Phase II assessments.  The Phase I assessment revealed several petroleum underground 
storage tanks on the northern properties and a petroleum plume in groundwater in the southern 
property. With this initial information painting a seemingly manageable picture, the community 
development managers then asked the DES manager to find a way to sufficiently remediate for 
residential end use in as little as time as possible.  This meant taking a different approach than 
the strategy of submitting the property in RPA.  The senior environmental project manager 
described the situation: 
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Ok, here are our choices - chase ERP funds, wait a year before you know or before you 
have a work plan.  The Brownfield Cleanup Program, 3-6 month application process.  
Petroleum spills, I can get a work plan approved in 6 weeks. Well, you know, even 
though the discussion is more involved than that, the response is that "we don't want to 
wait" . . . we want to get this out to developers. - Senior Environmental Manager, 2008 
 
With the decision to pursue redevelopment expediency and with the determination that 
the property contamination was largely petroleum in nature, the environmental managers 
submitted the property to the state Petroleum Spills Program.  The Petroleum Spills Program 
process involved state review of the proposed remediation plans, state environmental and health 
oversight of remediation processes, and, if the NYSDEC felt compliance occurred, a letter of no 
further action that would provide evidence for potential investors and developers that the city had 
remediated the property to the greatest extent possible.  While utilizing the Petroleum Spills 
Program meant relatively fast approval of the remediation plan, it did not come with the promise 
of state-level liability protections associated with the ERP.  In addition, the Petroleum Spills 
Program treated the properties not as one contiguous cleanup but as a set of spills discovered on 
different parts of the property, raising the risk that remediation processes might reveal problems 
not previously revealed.  Finally, the Petroleum Spills Program did not offer remediation 
funding.  Therefore, the environmental and community development managers had to seek city 
council approval to secure additional funds for remediation.  These funds ultimately came from 
an EPA brownfield remediation grant as well as internal city sources.  
Interested in minimizing costs incurred by time delays, the community development 
managers immediately sought proposals for a condominium complex from the private 
development community, requiring in the initial request for proposals (RFP) that developers 
assume responsibility for remediation. After being selected as the winner by a team of city 
managers across economic development, community development, environmental quality and 
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zoning divisions, the initial developer tried to renegotiate this remediation requirement as well as 
acquire indemnification.  The RFP review team stood firm and the developer subsequently 
backed away from the project, providing a setback for project momentum.  Recognizing the 
barriers to finding a willing developer created by the remediation requirement, community 
development officials removed that requirement and approached the DES managers to discuss 
options for city-led remediation.  According to one of the community development managers: 
We did get a proposal.  We actually got one that we liked but they wanted us to 
indemnify the site and they backed out.  We made it very clear in the RFP that we would 
not indemnify the site and they backed out of the deal.  We then decided that we had to 
resolve the groundwater issue ourselves. – Community Development Manager, 2008 
 
From the developer perspective: 
The basic premise is that don't buy anything unless the seller cleans the land. Don't take 
on that risk. Number two, if there's any future issues with the closure report, get an 
indemnity from somewhere or other for the seller. I think those are two critical points. 
Otherwise, I don't see any reason to take the risk. There's plenty of other projects to do.  – 
Developer, 2008 
 
However, as the Phase II assessment unfolded, it became evident that the contamination 
picture was more complex than originally thought.  In addition to contamination derived from 
surface use, the RPB property also experienced off-site pollution migrating through the 
groundwater into the northeastern portion of RPB.  This discovery not only complicated how the 
environmental management team conceived of possible remediation strategies, it also began to 
shape how the community development managers conceived of end use design.  Under county 
and state health codes, residential end uses required near complete removal or containment of 
contaminations.  However, in the case of RPB, complete remediation was not feasible as long as 
the offsite contamination source continued to exist.   
RPB Environmental Assessment and Remediation Planning: Network Characteristics, 
Policy Tool Use, and Public Management.  A flurry of construction planning activity occurred 
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during the environmental assessment phase, brought on by the interest of the community 
development managers in finding a developer willing to take on the costs of remediation.  
Simultaneously moving forward in both these areas raised the risk of decisions being made 
without complete information exchanged between environmental and community development 
managers.  However, the inclusion of the DES manager on the RFP selection committee 
decreased the probability that such communication gaps would not occur.  Subsequently, the 
project actors most central to assessment and remediation planning included the senior 
environmental manager and his staff member as well as the consultant they retained to perform 
assessment work (Table 6-3).  This arrangement suggests that environmental assessment and 
remediation of RPB did not require extensive interaction with individuals outside the 
environmental expert domain and supports interview and document data suggesting that the 
focus of these phases was on completing environmental due diligence in the most efficient 
manner possible.  
Table 6-3: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Environmental Assessment Env Mngr Sr. Env Mngr Consultant 
Remediation Plan Env Mngr Consultant Sr. Env Mngr 
  
A small number of policy tools both shaped and were shaped by management behaviors 
during these phases (Table 6-4).  First, the DES manager contracted out assessment processes to 
the consulting firm, utilizing a standard contract template frequently used for this purpose.  
Second, entering the property into the state Petroleum Spills Program subjugated the 
environmental manager and the consulting firm to a set of regulations that required 
communication with state and local health departments and the NYSDEC in order to receive 
approval for the remediation plan.  At the same time, the Petroleum Spills Program authorized 
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the NYSDEC to provide technical support regarding appropriate remediation processes.  Third, 
the potential EPA remediation funding motivated the environmental managers to allocate staff 
time towards submitting an EPA proposal during the remediation planning phase.  Finally, 
although it was not successful, the community development managers conducted a proposal 
solicitation and review process that utilized existing city regulations for how proposals were to 
be developed.  While never formalized, these managers also tried, and failed, to negotiate a 
contract with the selected developer. 
Table 6-4: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Environmental 
Assessment 0 1 0 0 1 
Remediation Plan 2 0 1 1 4 
 
Dominant public management behaviors during these phases were split between the 
environmental and community development managers.  The environmental managers focused 
upon managing the consulting firm contract while the community development managers 
focused their management behaviors on negotiating with both the selected developer regarding 
remediation responsibilities as well as with colleagues inside city hall to pursue the more 
expedient Petroleum Spills Program as the remediation tool program.  The focus on remediation 
required the environmental manager to communicate to a broader number of network partners 
while the community development managers limited primary communication to the initial 
developer. 
Remediation. Remediation processes ultimately occurred over two phases.  City council 
approved funds for remediating the first acquired properties while an EPA grant paid for the 
remediation of the former electrical contractor’s property.  City council had to agree to enter into 
the grant agreement with the EPA, but no one questioned the decision to do so given the 
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consensus around the potential benefits of new downtown residential development. However, the 
EPA grant did impose a transaction cost by requiring that the city submit a formal RFP for a 
consulting engineer as opposed to selecting one from a pre-approved list.  The city 
environmental management team ultimately rehired the firm that performed assessment work, 
enabling continuity of strong information flows between the city, the NYSDEC, and the county 
and state health departments.  Remediation processes proceeded smoothly until, while digging 
test pits, the consulting firm and their subcontractors discovered an additional underground 
storage tank and a hydraulic lift not identified during the Phase I and Phase II assessments that 
required removal.  Addressing these items ultimately required extra time and money.   
Ultimately, the southern portion of the property was dewatered and spills were addressed. 
Overall, the environmental consultant and their subcontractors removed 12,000 gallons of 
groundwater and 1,250 tons of impacted soils from the southern portion and 2,000 tons of soils 
plus seven underground tanks and pumps from the northern portion.  Then, they buried 700 
pounds of oxygen release compounds across both portions to aid in ongoing decomposition of 
residual petroleum products.  Finally, the consultant sunk a series of permanent test wells to 
facilitate ongoing assessment of environmental conditions (Private Consultant Report, 2004).  
However, the off site contamination impacting the northern property could not be accessed 
After completing these processes, the city received a closure report from the county 
health department that they could present to development partners as evidence of “best remedial 
effort.” In addition, the city received two “no further action” letters from the NYSDEC 
indicating that due remediation diligence occurred. The NYSDEC project manager assigned to 
the project noted that city environmental managers and their consultant took far less time to 
achieve the no further action letter than most spill projects.   
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RPB Remediation: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. 
Similar to assessment and remediation planning, environmental experts remained most central to 
the project network during the RPB remediation phase (Table 6-5).  Implementing the Petroleum 
Spills Program and issues associated with the offsite contamination generated greater scrutiny by 
the county health manager, bringing this official closer to the center of the project network.  
Involvement of the community development managers decreased during remediation as they 
waited to see if there were to be design controls on potential development due to unresolved 
contamination. 
Table 6-5: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Remediation  Env Mngr County Health Mngr Sr. Env Mngr 
  
Key policy tools implemented included the NYSDEC Petroleum Spills Program, the EPA 
grant, and the consulting firm contract as well as direct funding mechanisms approved by city 
council (Table 6-6).  While the environmental managers selected the Petroleum Spills Program, 
the policy tools accompanying that program largely targeted the city itself, requiring specific 
involvement of county and state agencies.  As a means to an end, completing remediation 
processes under the Petroleum Spills Program made the letters of no further action from the 
NYSDEC available to the city for use in negotiating with potential developers.  In addition, 
given the environmental complexities of the property, technical support from the NYSDEC and 
the county health department provided through the Petroleum Spills Program proved important 
to the development of the next development RFP. 
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Table 6-6: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Remediation  3 1 2 1 7 
 
Public management behaviors on behalf of the DES managers primarily focused upon 
coordinating remediation processes, both by directing the consulting firm how to proceed as well 
as by complying with regulatory processes brought on by the EPA grant and the NYSDEC spill 
program.  In addition, the environmental manager continued to practice information sharing 
behaviors on a voluntary basis as new information arose during remediation in order for the 
project to enter the redevelopment phases.  He described: 
When an RFPis sent out, we (DES) usually have some input into the actual scope of the 
RFP and we want to make sure in the RFP that we identify the existing environmental 
and somewhat more recently, subsurface geotechnical conditions that exist on the site so 
that the developers understand some of the project limitations and redevelopment issues 
that may face them so that we don't get back an unrealistic proposal or a proposal which 
does not take into account the environmental and the geotechnical issues. – 
Environmental Manager, 2008 
 
Once this information solidified and the community development managers understood the 
design requirements, they moved forward in designing the second RFP process. 
Construction Planning and Design. The ongoing environmental concern of offsite 
contamination compelled the county health department and, subsequently, the NYSDEC to 
require that any residential development on the site have the means to ventilate underneath units 
to prevent volatile organic compounds (VOCs) from entering living spaces.  The community 
development managers therefore inserted the requirement for these controls into the RFP.  While 
this additional requirement had the potential of scaring off potential proposals, the environmental 
and community development teams’ effort at communicating both the remedial steps taken by 
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the city as well as the vetting of the design standard by the health department and the NYSDEC 
built trust with a few developers, including the one who ultimately won the second RFP round.  
There was a lot of due diligence going on at my behalf to make certain that I'm 
comfortable . . . Everyone felt very strongly that, again, as I've said a number of times, it's 
probably the best site in the city, or the county.  It's been cleaned up so well – the 
corrective action plan, the future for potential remedies for potential infiltration. With all 
of those comforts, we felt good. – Rochester Developer 
 
At this point in project processes, a significant turnover of personnel occurred within city 
hall.  Citizens elected a new mayor and, as this new administration came in, a number of long-
term community development managers, including the community development managers who 
initiated this project, retired.  At the same time, the new mayoral administration redesigned city 
development services, laying the groundwork to merge the community development department 
with the economic development department.  In doing so, the city replaced the retiring managers 
with two new managers more closely identified with the economic development arena.  
Simultaneously, the region began to feel the impact of a nationwide downturn in development 
lending incurred by the global financial crisis that incurred more risk averse behaviors by lending 
institutions and, subsequently, private firms relying upon lending institution resources for new 
project development. 
During these changes, the selected developer sought to streamline the development 
contract regarding the city’s preference for higher density town homes and city rules about 
utilizing union labor.  With single-family homes, builders could build a model home and then 
sell individual lots as buyers appeared.  Town homes, however, required simultaneous 
construction as each unit shares walls, water, sewer and electric infrastructures.  Therefore, with 
the town home designation of RPB, the winning developer could not build a showcase unit to 
market to potential buyers therefore limiting his ability to comply with his lenders who required 
 
 
123 
that 50% of the units be pre-sold in order to qualify for construction loans.  As the city wouldn’t 
budge regarding the town home designation, largely due to the environmental restrictions, 
lenders pulled away from the project. At the same time, union labor requirements, despite being 
the norm for city projects, hindered the developer from cutting potential construction costs. 
The developer therefore proposed a unique idea for project financing.  Attempting to cut 
risks, he convened the new city economic development project manager and union 
representatives and proposed that the unions invest their pension funds into the project given that 
the developer could pre-sell 60% of the proposed units.  The city was on board right away: 
RPB involves negotiation with a collection of unions who are interested in financing this 
project in exchange for union contracts to do the work.  The city has incentive to do this 
because of finding financing in tough times and that it hits economic development 
objectives of creating stable, high paying jobs in the city.  The developer and the 
Department of Economic Development came up with this idea.  – Economic 
Development Manager 
 
However, the ongoing environmental concerns from the off-site pollution and the 
potential liabilities they carried slowed these negotiation processes.  In an attempt to prevent a 
second failed RFP process, the city environmental management team, the economic development 
manager, city council, and city lawyers innovated several new policy tools to help sway the 
unions and the developers.  First, the city put together a limited liability policy tool that released 
the developer and the unions from liability as long as specific barriers and environmental 
controls placed on the property were not broken through or damaged.  Second, the city agreed to 
pay for the costs of the vapor venting systems necessitated for the town home design by the 
environmental situation.  Third, the city linked RPB to a pre-existing city-level tax abatement 
program put in place through a partnership with the county industrial development agency that 
incentivized downtown residential owner-occupancy. Finally, the city developed an insurance 
policy tool designed to protect homebuyers from property devaluation linked to ongoing 
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contamination.  City council felt comfortable approving these city-based tools based upon the 
trust established between the city DEQ and the state NYSDEC regarding the extent of completed 
remediation.  However, the developer felt that these new tools added more time to the legal side 
of contract development.  
Despite the availability of policy tools designed to address ongoing project concerns, 
construction processes never commenced due to the inability for the developer and the unions to 
agree upon the details of project financing and the subsequent reprioritization of projects within 
the developer’s portfolio away from RPB as Rochester market characteristics continued to 
evolve in the deepening financial crises.  
RPB Design and Construction Plan: Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and 
Public Management.  The fact that the environmental characteristics of the RPB property 
complicated the design parameters for future residential units required that the environmental 
and community development managers exhibit high levels of communication during these 
phases.  However, the turnover in the community development managers also meant that 
institutional memory of the project remained within the DES managers.  Network centrality data 
for the design and construction planning phases support these findings, showing how the senior 
environmental manager stepped in during construction planning to support the communication 
efforts of the economic development manager new to the project (Table 6-7).  In addition, 
network data reflect the leadership role played by the developer himself as he proposed the idea 
to tap union pension funds for construction loans. 
Table 6-7: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Design Env Mngr Sr. Env Mngr Comm Dev Mngr 1 
Construction Plan Sr. Env Mngr Developer Econ Dev Mngr 
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The primary policy tools influencing design processes were the design control regulations 
required within the letter of no further action provided by the NYSDEC to the city.  As noted 
previously, this requirement was a consequence of the city seeking remediation expediency at the 
cost of remediation completeness.  Then, in the construction planning phase, the city innovated 
multiple financial and liability tools of their own to address union and developer concern over 
these design controls and the lack of indemnification from the NYSDEC (Table 6-8).  
Table 6-8: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Design 1 0 0 1 2 
Construction Plan 4 1 3 0 8 
 
The uses of these tools at this stage were much less about implementing a preset plan, as 
in RPA, but about securing commitment and appealing to the relationship values of reciprocity in 
the developer.  For this reason, a significant shift in project framing on behalf of the city 
occurred during these phases when the community development managers retired and the 
economic development manager took their place.  Moving from the original idea that RPB was 
about creating market-rate housing opportunity to a new frame that painted the project as being 
about job creation, and using the newly innovated policy tools as leverage, this manager 
negotiated with union representatives and the developer for eighteen months.  However, the time 
delay, increasing lending and real estate market instabilities, and other opportunities motivated 
the developer to prioritize other projects over RPB and project processes ground to a halt.  For 
their part, the environmental managers played a back up role to the economic development 
manager in this negotiation despite the ongoing centrality of the senior environmental manager, 
suggesting that network centrality for communication purposes does not always signify network 
leadership in key negotiations. 
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Explaining Project Outcomes. The lower success of RPB (Table 6-9) compared to RPA 
largely stems from a set of external factors that created a project context in which key decisions 
made by city actors led to certain project failures.  These external factors included the off site 
contamination problem that led to restrictive project design requirements by state and county 
environmental and health officials, the rapidly changing real estate and lending markets towards 
the end of the study time period that influenced the developer and the unions to back out of the 
project, and the personnel turnover within the project management team incurred by a new 
mayoral administration that interrupted project negotiations.  Together, these factors introduced 
high levels of uncertainty after project processes had already commenced that proved too 
difficult for the key public managers to overcome.  
Table 6-9: RPB Project Success 
Outcome Measures  RPB Outcomes 
Time to completion (TIME) 2003 – present 
Cleanup costs (COST) $605,000 
Implementation processes 
(PROCESS) 
High satisfaction with environmental processes, 
low satisfaction with redevelopment processes 
Contamination abatement (CLEAN) Earned no further action letter through NYSDEC 
petroleum spills.  Adopted institutional controls 
preventing contamination problems. 
Area-wide impact (IMPACT) Site ready for construction.  No resulting 
property value impact. 
 
A key decision laying the groundwork for RPB susceptibility to these contextual factors 
was the decision by the community development managers to value development speed over 
remediation completeness. This subsequently led to selection of the NYSDEC Petroleum Spills 
Program as the regulatory program for obtaining state and county redevelopment permissions.  
While this gamble may have worked in a stable market with a property amenable to complete 
remediation, the environmental and financial uncertainties cropping up throughout project 
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processes required project managers to continually react and adapt.  One consequence of 
selecting the Petroleum Spills Program was that the city was not reimbursed by the state for 
remediation activity nor did the city obtain liability releases that they could pass on to 
developers.   Therefore, the environmental manager had to search for additional remediation 
funding options and, in construction planning, the community development and, later, economic 
development managers had to work with city council and city lawyers to devise a city-based 
indemnification tool. 
The increasing uncertainty surrounding RPB also led to a shift in the strategic orientation 
of public management behaviors over time.  Initially, the community development managers 
strategically gained city council approvals to apply property acquisition policy tools for building 
the property footprint.  However, as uncertainties grew, public management behaviors became 
more reactive, ultimately shifting the power to move the project from the city to the private 
developer.   
Across RPB phases, the key public managers largely relied upon institutional approaches 
to network management when trying to shape behaviors of non-city actors, particularly as 
uncertainties increased.  With contracts, design controls, tax incentives, insurance products, and 
liability waivers, the community and economic development managers worked to steer unions 
and developer towards project completion.  However, these institutional management efforts 
occurred in conjunction with an effort to appeal to reciprocity values through relationship 
management strategies with the idea being that the efforts made by the city to address developer 
concerns would create a willingness on behalf of the developer to make comparable efforts to 
move the project forward.    It is important to note that these management behaviors came not 
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from the most central public manager but from the managers most directly connected with the 
developers and unions. 
A key absence in the critical factors shaping project outcomes was strong political 
impetus in the form of a project champion or citizen advocacy.  While city council was 
compliant in approving financing for RPB, there was little additional involvement.  The council 
member whose district includes RPB noted “it is my district, too, and they knew that I would be 
supportive but I didn't quite have the human cry of neighbors.”  
Despite a flurry of management strategies integrating institutional and relationship 
management strategies, public managers were unable to compel construction processes to begin 
and RPB failed to achieve redevelopment success.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN GROWING SUCCESS FROM FAILURE IN BUFFALO 
Introduction. Shifting to the low management capacity city in the case selection, this 
chapter describes the context in which the Buffalo projects Phases One and Two (BP1 and BP2) 
occurred and the extent to which interactions between project networks, policy tools, and public 
management explain the low success of BP1 and the high success of BP2.  While there is much 
overlap between these two phases and evidence that BP1 greatly influenced BP2 processes, the 
two phases exhibited sufficient differences in network actor composition and construction 
planning, end use design, construction implementation and sales processes to merit separate 
descriptions of each project’s network structures, policy tools, and management practices.  
However, the strong path dependency of BP2 on decisions made during BP1 requires that both 
projects be discussed together. 
Background.  The BP1 and BP2 projects are a pair of mixed market-rate single-family 
home residential developments characterized by their embeddedness within a larger federal 
housing initiative, a backdrop of previous brownfield-to-residential stumbles, and low city 
resource capacities brought on by years of declining tax bases and increasing service demands.  
These two projects occurred one after the other on the same property located in the southeast 
portion of the city, an area that had experienced a great deal of deterioration and resident flight 
since the 1950s.  Multiple mayoral administrations had targeted most of this area with state and 
federal assistance to try to revitalize the once active neighborhoods and, in 1990, the city applied 
for and received federal Housing and Urban Development (HUD) funds to build affordable 
housing developments within this blighted region.   
Between 1990 and the start of BP1, the city had initiated a few experiments acting as a 
developer for market-rate residential projects within other parts of the city.  On one of them, 
investigators discovered that contaminated soils still remained even after housing units were sold 
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and homeowners had moved in.  In addition to this public relations nightmare, the city faced a 
series of lawsuits from the homeowners.  This project, and the proximity of Buffalo to the 
infamous Love Canal neighborhood, created much skepticism for city-led residential 
development as evidenced by writings found in local blogs and the independent media. 
Property Assembly and Economic Assessment – BP1. Because of these broader efforts 
targeting this neighborhood, property assembly for BP1 occurred indirectly in 1997 through the 
acceptance of the broader neighborhood into HUD’s Home Ownership Zone program (HOZ), a 
HUD demonstration program initiated in 1996 to expand homeownership in blighted 
neighborhoods within a subset of struggling U.S. cities.  City community development and 
planning officials applied to this program at the urging of the city’s mayor and a local private 
developer with national-level ties to HUD officials.  Both the mayor and developer believed that 
the city would greatly benefit from an infusion of federal dollars targeting the renewal of 
downtown housing.  City public managers working in the housing and real estate offices of the 
permits and inspection services department provided the data collection and grant writing work, 
but it was the developer and mayor who championed the HOZ application resulting in its 
acceptance.  The HOZ program ultimately provided the City of Buffalo a $3.5 million grant and 
a $7.7 million dollar loan to develop 344 units of new homeownership housing in a 70 square 
block area east of downtown. 
As was the norm in Buffalo, the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency (BURA) administered 
these funds14.  However, as the HOZ program unfolded, it became quickly apparent to HUD 
                                                
14 Traditionally, the city of Buffalo utilized several quasi-governmental organizations such as 
BURA to accomplish economic and community development goals because of their legal 
abilities to receive and spend grant dollars more efficiently than a traditional government agency.  
The state legislature authorized BURA in 1966 and created a governance board consisting of the 
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officials that BURA was not on track to build the number of income-qualified homes originally 
promised.  One problem was that the city was using HOZ funds to pay for basic administrative 
functions for which traditional income sources were not available.  This drew down the funds 
available for homebuilding activity and relationships between HUD officials and city community 
development managers subsequently soured as the city simultaneously tried to renegotiate its 
HOZ contract while jumpstarting housing construction efforts.  One parcel within the HOZ was a 
property owned by the city formally hosting a forge and, later, a soda bottling facility that had 
been torn down, leaving a sizable vacant lot with questionable environmental histories. With 
pressure to fulfill their HOZ obligations, housing officials in the city’s Office of Strategic 
Planning (OSP) prioritized this property for new home construction and an environmental 
manager assigned to the project retained a private consulting firm to prepare a broad Phase I 
environmental assessment. 
BP1 Property Assembly and Economic Assessment: Network Characteristics, Policy 
Tool Use, and Public Management.  Network data reveal that, during property assembly, a 
communication gap existed between community development and environmental actors during 
project (Figure 7-1).15 As depicted in Figure 7-1, one group of city real estate and housing 
officials (MT, DA, BasS, MaT, PD, QL) interacted with the local HUD manager and related 
private development partners while in the second group, the NYSDEC regional manager linked 
                                                                                                                                                       
mayor and a mix of city council, city lawyers, and city commissioners.  Organizationally, BURA 
operates as a separate financial entity from the city.  However, BURA staff technically work 
within the bureaucratic structure of city hall. 
15 Interview data show engagement of a slightly broader array of city actors during these early 
phases. A discrepancy between interview and network data is likely due to interview subjects 
discussing engagement in a particular phase but not mentioning interaction with specific actors.  
Based upon the methods of analysis used, these individuals appear in data coded by phase but 
not in network data. 
 
 
132 
together one of his staff members, the state health official assigned to the Buffalo region, and the 
environmental lawyer at the city (LD, DM, NS, OC) for discussion of the property’s 
environmental aspects.  The centrality of the private developer and state environmental officials 
within these two sub-groups indicates the extent to which non-city actors played highly central 
roles early on in project evolution. 
Figure 7-1: Property Acquisition Phase Sub-Networks 
 
 
Much of the policy tool influence at this stage in the project derived from the HOZ 
program that provided grants and loans towards general property acquisition in which BP1 
acquisition occurred (Table 7-1).  Utilizing these tools, the city, through actions taken by the 
OSP, acquired many properties through foreclosure and then land banked them in anticipation of 
future development.  By using HUD fiscal tools for this purpose, the city agreed to be subject to 
HUD regulations regarding paperwork and process that accompanied the tools.   
Table 7-1: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase One Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Assembly 4 0 2 0 6 
Economic Assessment 0 0 1 0 1 
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Public management behaviors at this point of the project were limited to managers 
operating within the two sub-networks.  In one group, the real estate and housing officials 
negotiated with the developer and the HUD manager to enroll the neighborhood into the HOZ 
program.  In the other, the environmental manager worked with the NYSDEC managers and, 
initiated Phase I assessments through a private consultant.  There is no evidence in the interview 
or document data that these two groups had any extensive information exchanges at this point. 
Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning, Construction Planning, and 
Construction – BP1. Because the OSP director and the developer targeted the broader 
neighborhood for housing development, Phase I assessments occurred across all properties in the 
zone, funded by a 1995 EPA assessment grant that the environmental manager renewed with 
approval from city council.  The Phase I investigation indicated that legitimate environmental 
concerns existed for the area, prompting the environmental manager to keep the private 
consultant on board to perform a more detailed Phase II assessment for the section of the 
neighborhood being targeted for BP1.  However, in a manner detrimental to BP1 outcomes, 
construction processes proceeded before Phase II assessments could reveal the extent of existing 
contamination.   
So they did Phase One environmental and when it got onto Phase Two . . . we started to 
construct and build model houses. Then somebody decided they would do a Phase Two, 
we were already into construction. – Buffalo Environmental Manager, 2009 
 
While Phase I assessment processes unfolded, the OSP housing manager assigned to manage the 
project proceeded to form a construction contract with the firm owned by the developer who 
initiated the HOZ proposal and collaborated with the city real estate manager to market the 
developer’s suburban style homes to potential buyers.  Once they identified sufficient numbers of 
income-qualified homeowners interested in the project, the housing manager gave the green light 
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for construction to begin without seeking out or waiting for the Phase II assessment results16.  At 
this point in time, turnover occurred in OSP leadership. 
After the builder completed three houses, the environmental manager received the Phase 
II results and alerted the BURA lawyer who then raised concerns with the newly appointed OSP 
director that if houses were sold, new lawsuits could arise against the city regarding a lack of due 
environmental diligence when constructing housing units.  This assessment, submitted to the 
NYSDEC office in Buffalo per standard operating procedures, revealed elevated heavy metal 
contamination throughout the property down to bedrock, four feet below the surface.  While the 
NYSDEC project manager, the city environmental manager, and lawyers for both the city and 
the construction company met to discuss this realization.  The new OSP director immediately 
made the decision to halt all processes until the consulting firm could perform a more thorough 
assessment.  Ultimately, these data revealed the extent of contamination and the developer, not 
willing to wait for remediation processes to unfold, left the project.  At the same time, the 
housing manager whose decision-making led to premature construction left city employment.  
The environmental manager’s account of that time period indicates the nature of communication 
and conflict between his team and that of the housing project manager’s: 
I went down to the housing manager and I said that you have to stop work. You can't 
allow it to go forward. We've got an environmental concern here and I don't know why 
you've let these people go ahead as it is.  Out of my department, I had no authority over 
that.  It was not my ballywick to tell this man how he should do his work although he was 
aware that there were environmental concerns on the property before he gave his 
contractor the go ahead. – Buffalo Environmental Manager, 2009 
 
                                                
16 This housing manager could not be located for this study, so it is unknown as to the motivation 
behind these decisions.  However, several interview respondents speculated political pressures 
on this individual to implement the contracts in addition to poor communication occurring 
between city officials. 
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After seeing Phase II completed, the city environmental manager submitted a full 
assessment of the property prepared by the consultant to the state health department and the 
NYSDEC.  When regional manager of the state health department determined that new 
construction would not be able to proceed without soil remediation, the OSP director decided to 
restart the project and instructed the city environmental manager to apply for NYSDEC 
Environmental Restoration Program (ERP) remediation funding. It was during this wait for 
acceptance into the ERP that a new administration entered city hall, effectively ending BP1 and 
starting the processes for BP2. 
BP1: Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning, Construction Planning, and 
Construction Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. Interview and 
document data indicate that the timing between environmental assessment and construction 
occurred in a manner inconsistent with the brownfield process framework presented in Chapter 
Two of this paper, largely as a result of the lack of communication between environmental and 
redevelopment actors.  Environmental actors at the city and state levels primarily communicated 
with one another during the assessment and remediation phases while construction planning and 
construction implementation networks consisted of city housing officials and the private 
developer.   
 Policy tool data for BP1 exhibit the lack of adequate assessment and remediation 
performed before construction planning and implementation occurred (Table 7-2).  The 
assessment phase incorporated grant dollars from the EPA but by not allowing sufficient time 
Phase II assessment processes, it was not possible to move very far with securing additional tools 
during remediation planning (shaded row in table).  Policy tool use in construction planning and 
implementation phases arose from both the promise of HUD grants and loans as well as their 
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actual implementation.  For example, the builder moved forward in construction, anticipating 
that HUD loans and funds were guaranteed for prospective homebuyers. 
Table 7-2: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Environmental Assessment 1 0 1 0 2 
Remediation Plan 0 1 1 0 2 
Construction Plan 2 1 4 0 7 
Design 1 0 1 0 2 
Remediation 0 0 0 0 0 
Construction 2 1 2 0 5 
Sales 0 0 4 0 4 
  
The large turnover of city officials between BP1 and data collection activities for this study 
in addition to the lack of BP1-specific documents at the City of Buffalo archives limited data 
available to assess public management for this project.  However, interview data with remaining 
project actors and journalism accounts of the time period indicate that no single public manager 
within the city dominated management activity during BP1 and, perhaps more significantly, non-
city actors such as the NYSDEC manager and the developer appeared to steer several project 
phases themselves.  Those city officials that were active included the environmental manager, 
the environmental lawyer, the housing manager and, to a lesser extent, the lead engineer for 
public works and the city council member in whose district BP fell.  However, the ties between 
these actors did not cross expert area boundaries, a phenomena extending to interactions with 
non-city actors as well.  The public management behaviors captured in the data indicate that city 
officials active in BP1 either focused on coordinating partners to implement tasks, such as the 
environmental manager working with his consultant, or responding to directives from project 
decision makers. 
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It is important to highlight how decreasing resources for effective project management and 
the constant cycling of both personnel as well as positions at city hall contributed to the poor 
public management performance in BP1.  For example, the environmental manager assigned to 
the project eventually performed all environmental work for both OSP and as a member of 
BURA.  He described:  
When I started here, there was a small environmental department with a supervisor, myself, 
and environmental planner, secretarial help and another man that would attend or staff the 
city's environmental management commission.  I'm the only person left. – Buffalo 
Environmental Manager, 2009 
 
Due to this ongoing loss of support staff, he limited his involvement to environmental 
assessment unless instructed by city council themselves to proceed with formal remediation 
processes.  In addition, political pressures to show progress in complying with HUD construction 
requirements contributed to these communication problems by compelling construction action 
over thorough environmental information diffusion. 
Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning and Remediation – BP2. After 
the OSP director halted construction processes, a time lapse occurred between active property 
processes while the original builder, their subcontractors and the city worked out contractual 
disputes and the ERP funding application moved through NYSDEC channels.  Once these 
disputes were mostly resolved, the OSP director approved further assessment processes, 
initiating what this research identifies as the BP2 project.  The initial steps for BP2 entailed 
completion of the Phase II assessment and the planning and implementing of remediation 
strategies through the ERP.   
In the initial ERP application, the environmental manager proposed leaving two of the 
houses and simply remediating the soil around them.  However, weather damage and looting as 
well as evolving design ideas made this impractical to the OSP director.  Therefore, he asked the 
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environmental manager to amend the ERP application to include full remediation of the site after 
eliminating the existing structures and approached city council for a bond issuance to pay for 
demolition and remediation costs. 
The NYSDEC and the state health department ultimately approved a remediation plan for 
the property that required the removal of all soils on the site four feet down to the bedrock and 
the filling in of certified clean soils from an off-site source.  The environmental manager rehired 
the consulting firm that had performed the BP1 assessment work to implement this plan through 
a set of subcontractors.  When the firm completed these actions, the NYSDEC did not actually 
issue a Certificate of Completion (COC) because the remedy effectively removed all 
contamination, deeming a COC unnecessary.  However, the state did provide the city full 
liability release they could pass on to developers. 
BP2: Environmental Assessment, Remediation Planning and Remediation Network 
Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public Management. Network data reflect the transition in 
personnel as well as management focus that occurred between BP1 and BP2.  The city 
environmental manager moved to a highly central role after the OSP director and mayor 
recognized the near miss of building homes on contaminated land again and focused their 
attention on remediation (Table 7-3). The environmental manager maintained this most central 
position throughout the rest of the environmental phases but the high centralities of the NYSDEC 
managers during this portion of BP2 affirms interview and document data that show the city 
manager received much technical support and attention from the NYSDEC.  While this high 
degree of involvement by state officials stemmed from motivations and abilities on behalf of the 
lead NYSDEC manager, it also indicates the extent to which the NYSDEC regional office helped 
the environmental manager to compensate for diminished capacities within city hall.   
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Table 7-3: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Environmental Assessment Env Mngr Sr State Env Mngr State Health Mngr 
Remediation Plan Env Mngr Sr State Env Mngr OSP director 
Remediation Env Mngr Sr State Env Mngr State Env Mngr 
 
 The OSP director and the environmental manager selected a range of policy tools to 
achieve full remediation of the BP property (Table 7-4).  The EPA grant provided assessment 
funding, the ERP provided a reimbursement grant and a liability release as well as imposed 
regulations impacting remediation processes, city council provided bond dollars to fill in expense 
gaps and approved contracts with the environmental consulting firm and their subcontractors, 
and the NYSDEC and state health department provided technical support.  Each of these tools 
provided the necessary resources but also incurred additional layers of responsibilities on behalf 
of city managers regarding paperwork, project performance, and other regulatory requirements. 
Table 7-4: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Environmental 
Assessment 2 1 1 0 4 
Remediation 
Plan 3 1 1 1 6 
Remediation 5 1 3 1 10 
 
The OSP director had the greatest impact during this phase by directing OSP and BURA 
staff members to restart the environmental phases of the project and appealing to city council for 
additional funding approvals.  However, it was the coordinating behaviors of the environmental 
manager that caused the EPA and ERP policy tools to impact the project and management 
process.  These two tool packages both empowered and constrained the environmental manager 
to link to federal and state environmental and health officials in order to access the funding and 
technical support provided through them.  City lawyers supported these efforts by settling 
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lingering conflicts related to BP1 and enabling processes to move forward.  From the start, 
public management of BP2 occurred at two levels; top-down directing by the OSP director and 
centralized coordination by the project manager. 
Construction Planning and Design – BP2. When the new OSP director arrived at the 
city, he brought with him a set of new ideas on how the city should organize and implement 
planning and development activities.  Because one of his first tasks involved halting the 
construction of BP1, addressing this property jumped to the top of his agenda.  Public pressures 
to complete the HOZ obligations and eliminate the bad publicity of the abandoned houses further 
compelled this prioritization, even though it was not, according to members of the community 
development community, a high priority vacant property relative to all others.  Nevertheless, the 
OSP director assigned a new project manager from within his housing staff to coordinate city 
efforts for BP2, despite the fact that this manager had not worked on such a project before.  He 
did have experience within the OSP prior to BP2 conducting design and construction of infill 
housing but had not yet worked on a project the scale of BP.  While several project actors viewed 
this housing manager’s work as very positive, they recognized that his own experience combined 
with general city capacity challenges constrained his efforts. 
In adopting BP2 as his “pet project”, the OSP director took a sharp turn away from the 
original design ideas generated for BP1.  He strongly believed that the growing interest in 
downtown living by suburban residents made market-rate homes feasible for the BP2 property.  
Therefore, he instructed the housing manager to create a New Urbanism17 design for the 
development to appeal to traditionally suburban homebuyers.  This shift away from the BP1 
                                                
17 A design genre for urban areas involving placing houses close together and against the 
sidewalk as in traditional urban design, but with home features such as carports, front lawns, and 
small porches found in suburban style homes. 
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design increased construction costs, making the need to sell homes at market rate in order to for 
the city to recoup costs more imperative.  However, a fully market-rate neighborhood was not in 
compliance with the HUD HOZ program, hereby exempting the project from HOZ dollars and 
potentially complicating the already stretched relationship with HUD.  Yet, the OSP director 
received approval from the mayor who desired a high profile project in the city to promote his 
revitalization credentials to political stakeholders.  However, in order to build market-rate 
homes, the project required a different source of home ownership loans.  
Initially, the OSP director had formed an agreement with a local nonprofit community 
lending organization to supply these loans.  However, he dropped that lender when it appeared 
that Fannie Mae could provide a better deal.  When, in the construction phase, home construction 
costs went above budget, the OSP director returned to the nonprofit lender and made an appeal 
for a quick infusion of capital to cover the overrun.  The lender recognized the immediacy of 
need and followed through, but expressed dissatisfaction for having to “bail out” the city in this 
matter, particularly in response to the OSP director’s directive management approach.    
To be blunt about it, the (BP2) project was a specific plan that (the OSP director) wanted done.  
Period. End of story. He wanted to bring a neighborhood market-rate product into the city. Period! 
And there was not going to be anyone that was going to tell him to the contrary. How it got done, 
how it got financed, were all our issues, but it was his desire to do this project. – Buffalo 
Community Development Corporation Executive, 2009 
 
These shifts in sources of loans subsequently shifted financial responsibilities from city council 
to the BURA board and the Department of Budget, providing the OSP director with more control 
over the project through his position on the BURA board.   
Moving forward, the housing manager rehired the engineering consulting firm that 
participated in the construction processes for BP1 to manage the same process for BP2, but only 
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after working through the OSP director and his agency lawyer to resolve lingering and 
negotiating pro bono work.  The city public works engineer observed:   
They were trying to blame (the consultant) for some of the mistakes, and (the consultant) 
bent over backwards, like I said. They did a lot of pro bono work. They should have been 
kissing their ass to pay them, get it done and get out of there.  But people like (the new 
housing manager), he hadn't been around contracts, and he got a new lawyer there, and 
they're all like “Oh, my God”...they got in trouble before with this testing, so they were 
being extremely careful about what they were doing, but (the consultant) ended up paying 
the price for that. – Buffalo City Engineer, 2009 
 
Ultimately, the consulting firm absorbed past costs, and site preparation began.   
During pre-construction processes, the housing manager acted as the designated project 
manager but the private consulting firm ended up working for the City Engineer whose public 
works department held much of the actual responsibility for preparing the site for home 
construction.  This difference between the planned and actual management arrangement reflected 
the uniqueness of this project for the city. Typically for housing projects community 
development corporations normally held project management responsibilities within the HOZ 
program, not city managers.  The fact that the new mayor and the OSP director believed the city 
needed a “win” partly influenced the decision to manage the project in-house, but the perception 
in the community development corporation community was that the city had to be the primary 
developer for liability reasons.  The nonprofit lender observed: 
One of the big reasons, I think, is that (BP2) was done on a tract of land that was 
brownfield, and that because of the City running into problems with environmental issues 
on housing projects in the past, I think that they pretty much knew that nobody was going 
to come in there and develop housing on that lot. – Community Development 
Corporation Executive, 2009 
 
BP2: Construction Planning and Design Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and 
Public Management. Network data indicate unified project networks during BP2’s design and 
construction planning phases with the new housing manager and OSP director playing highly 
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central roles (Table 7-5).  The high centrality of the environmental manager during the design 
phase suggests greater communication across expert domains than what had occurred during 
BP1.  However, the fact that zero lingering pollutants remained on the property after remediation 
minimizes the importance of this finding because the property did not require continued 
involvement of environmental actors18.  Despite the high centrality of the community 
development project manager during these phases, total network composition continued to 
evolve as the OSP director pulled in new partners, such as the community lender, to shore up 
project financing. 
Table 7-5: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Construction Plan Comm Dev Mngr OSP director Community Lender 
Design Comm Dev Mngr Env Mngr OSP director 
 
 Policy tool use during design and construction planning phases spanned multiple tool 
types (Table 7-6) as the OSP director and his project manager engaged with several different 
network partners, particularly regarding financing for home construction. The OSP director 
convinced city council to approve a bond sale and supplemented money from this sale with 
assistance from the community lender.  In addition, the project manager used a contract to 
formalize a work agreement between the city and the consulting firm, but only after significant 
negotiation between city lawyers and the consulting firm regarding disputes from BP1.   
                                                
18 The high centrality of the environmental manager in the design phase contradicts interview 
data suggesting that design decisions were primarily between the OSP director and his staff.  
Closer examination of the data reveals a discrepancy between how the environmental manager 
completed his network survey and how respondents he reported interacting with completed 
theirs.  Future research utilizing social network analysis should include multiple means of 
confirming network ties (Vehovar et al. 2008).  Further review of data for this study indicated 
that these discrepancies in data were limited to the BP2 design phase.  
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Table 7-6: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Construction 
Plan 3 1 4 0 8 
Design 2 0 2 0 4 
 
Public management continued to occur at two levels with the OSP director leading 
negotiations for many of the policy tools while the project manager coordinated the resulting 
agreements.  Together, they leveraged the formal agreements formed with project partners and 
the symbolic significance of building homes in a blighted neighborhood to compel continued 
participation by these partners even when circumstance led partners to question the balance of 
costs to project benefits. 
Construction and Sales – BP2. Once construction plans were in place, the OSP director 
delegated responsibility for project construction and sales to the housing manager and abruptly 
left the city for another job.  In the wake of this departure, the housing manager struggled 
through multiple challenges and network partners felt pressured by political leaders to contribute 
more than they had intended for the project to achieve redevelopment success. 
The first challenge involved project funding.   The decision to adopt a mostly New 
Urbanist approach meant placing houses close together, against the sidewalk, but with 
affectations found in suburban style homes.  This increased the cost burden on the city for site 
preparation, particular with the more intricate design and the construction of a unique serpentine 
street planned to run between the houses.  These factors required the housing manager to plead 
with his counterparts in the public works, water, and sewer offices to ensure appropriate 
infrastructures.  Originally, the OSP director, with support from the mayor and approval from 
city council, expected separate departments to fund their own portion of the work out of 
departmental budgets.   
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Basically the mayor told me, get this done. Drop everything, it was a big deal with them 
and (the OSP director) to make this thing turn out positive. Like I said, when it came 
through as part of the capital budget, we were like, “Well, we didn't approve that on our 
request”. “Well, we did, you're building it, so get to work”. – Buffalo Public Works 
Engineer, 2009 
 
However, the design called for work above and beyond what these budgets would allow and, 
despite not being the designated project manager, the city engineer in public works filled in the 
leadership vacuum and spent time convincing city council to issue another set of bonds to 
supplement his budget for the project.  Similarly, the community development organization 
providing loans stepped up in the absence of the OSP director to steer the financial processes for 
the project director. 
On the construction side, miscommunication between the company contracted to provide 
blasting services for basements and the consulting firm led to the basements being blasted too 
deep. The city had to pay for reconfiguration of the foundations and finger pointing occurred 
between the city public works department, the blasting company, and the engineering consulting 
firm.  The need to blast the bedrock in the first place caused one public works employee to state, 
“if you were a private developer, you wouldn’t have picked this site for housing” (Interview, 
2008). 
The project also faced initial challenges regarding housing sales.  As early as when the 
OSP director first drafted home designs, the housing manager played the role of real estate agent, 
setting up a home design show for prospective buyers and advertising the homes in local real 
estate publications.  As interest grew and sales responsibilities ballooned, the mayor assigned his 
marketing director to assist.  However, the responsibilities were still too much for the limited 
capacities of the city and the marketing director successfully argued for funding from the 
mayor’s office to contract a real estate consultant to take over real estate duties full time.   
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Ultimately, the development included twenty market-rate houses and four subsidized 
homes that sold at prices agreeable to the builder but not sufficient to cover costs to the city.  
Market-rate homebuyers received a tax rebate under a state program where full property tax rates 
were gradually phased in over ten years and the city itself underwrote second mortgages for 
homebuyers.  While deemed a success by the mayor’s office, the OSP, and the neighborhood, the 
city newspaper and multiple local blogs questioned the overall expenditure of city money 
towards construction given the reality of declining property tax values19. 
BP2: Construction and Sales Network Characteristics, Policy Tool Use, and Public 
Management. The construction and sales phases of BP2 were marked by a big push initially by 
the OSP director and then by his project manager to engage both city and community partners to 
complete the project.  In order to do so the housing manager to work closely with the private 
firms contracted to manage construction and sales processes especially after the OSP director 
left.  Centrality data confirm the central positions each of these actors  played at this point in the 
project (Table 7-7). 
Table 7-7: Top Three Individuals by B-L Centrality Values 
 1 2 3 
Construction Comm Dev Mngr OSP director 
Private Engineering 
Consultant 
Sales Comm Dev Mngr City Mrkting Director 
Private Real Estate 
Consultant 
 
 The city implemented a range of policy tools securing during construction planning in 
their push to complete construction processes and sell the homes, particularly those enabling 
direct city action.  Where city capacities fell short, agreements were developed for others to take 
                                                
19 Schulman, Susan. "Housing upgrades — at any cost." The Buffalo Daily News, August 21, 
2010. http://www.buffalonews.com/city/special-reports/article37726.ece. 
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direct action (Table 7-8).  During construction, city council approved bond money for 
constructing the streetscape and second mortgages for homebuyers while the OSP director 
incentivized sales through an existing city grant program providing home buying dollars for 
certain service-sector professionals moving into the neighborhood.  Then, the OSP director 
established contracts with the community lender to obtain their lending tools and the project 
manager contracted with a real estate professional to simplify the workload for the project 
manager.  The sales phase entailed implementing these lending tools and, when the work became 
too much for the housing manager, forming a contract with a real estate consultant to take over 
sales tasks. 
Table 7-8: Policy Tool Types by Phase 
Phase Leg/Reg Agreement Econ/Fisc Information TOTAL 
Construction 4 3 3 0 10 
Sales 2 1 4 0 7 
 
The departure of the OSP director in the middle of these phases incurred a shift in public 
management responsibilities for city actors.  At the tail end of this tenure, much of the public 
management behavior on behalf of the OSP director involved using his political power to compel 
and coerce project partners both inside and outside city hall, to implement construction 
regardless of cost while the project manager coordinated the resulting agreements.  After the 
OSP director departed, the housing manager had to find ways to fill the vacuum left by this 
project champion and did so by securing support from the mayor’s marketing director.  Together, 
they completed the project by contracting out sales responsibilities and continuing to motivate 
partners by appealing to their desire to help the neighborhood and an interest in maintaining 
positive relationships with the city. 
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Explaining Project Outcomes.  BP1 and BP2 exhibited two tiers of project outcomes 
with the results of BP1 rating lower than those of BP2 (Table 7-9).  The primary critical factor 
causing low success in BP1 was a lack of project network cohesion that led to 
miscommunication of environmental information to redevelopment actors.  As a result, 
construction occurred before remediation, causing project leaders to cease activities and 
ultimately tear down already built houses.  BP2, on the other hand, experienced full remediation 
and successful sales of New Urbanist-style homes.  The ability of the OSP director to identify 
and access a range of policy tools relevant to project implementation and to champion the project 
with his political power to secure partner commitment proved to be the primary factor leading to 
these outcomes.  However, even best efforts at coordinating project networks by the city project 
manager towards successful outcomes encountered challenges incurred by low management 
capacities. 
Table 7-9: BP Project Success – Phases One and Two 
Outcome Measures  BP1 Outcomes BP2 Outcomes 
Time to completion 
(TIME) 
2002-2003 
(incomplete) 
2006-2009 
Cleanup costs (COST) $1.2 million 
Implementation processes 
(PROCESS) 
Low satisfaction levels 
across multiple project 
actors 
Community partners expressed 
overextension of commitments 
Contamination abatement 
(CLEAN) 
No abatement occurred Complete abatement occurred 
Area-wide impact 
(IMPACT) 
No immediate impact Average house sale $203,000 but 
houses sold for less than 
construction costs.  No 
information on proximate impacts 
due to lack of real market.  
Increase in neighborhood pride. 
 
One impact of these low capacities stemmed from not enough staff inside the city to 
cover project management responsibilities.  As the city struggled with an entrenched fiscal crisis 
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spanning decades, city personnel dwindled causing those remaining to wear multiple hats even 
when those hats were outside of their personal professional trainings.  For example: 
Prior to the housing division I was in the design and construction division as supervisor 
of construction, and prior to that position I was still in the same division of design and 
construction as a project manager; and now, as of November of last year, I was promoted 
to BURA Architect under the Department of Public Works and Streets. – City Project 
Manager, 2009 
 
This practice of shuffling staff between offices hampered the abilities for city actors to 
coordinate their own resources around project tasks, therefore impacting their abilities to engage 
in network management in the broader project context. This shuffling and reorganization also 
occurred at the organizational level.  The same manager described, 
Because OSP is the Office of Strategic Planning . . . and although I'm still with BURA, 
I'm now working under the Department of Public Works. Departments change, BURA 
stays the consistent agency, and then the divisions may change. – City Housing Manager, 
2009 
 
Evidence for this organizational reshuffling exists within the city’s annual financial 
report to the state fiscal authority oversight board.   Between BP1 and BP2, offices relevant to 
housing redevelopment shifted from the mayor’s executive department to the economic 
development department.  Yet, zoning and environmental affairs remained within the strategic 
planning office.  One state office official involved with the project confirmed the impacts created 
by these changes in organizational design. “I think some of the frustrating things about working 
with the city of Buffalo is that there are so many different authorities and agencies that you never 
have one-stop shopping.” (Interview, 2009).  As a result, multiple phases required that non-city 
actors play a central role in project processes. 
Notably absent from BP1 and BP2 project networks were citizens and neighbors.  
Interview data and site visits revealed low levels of organized neighborhood activity centered on 
this project, primarily due to the large number of additional vacant properties in the area and the 
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general acceptance by all that the project would bring positive benefits when completed.  As a 
result, the entire project experienced minimal bottom-up, neighborhood-based political influence. 
Evidence also exists indicating a historical lack of support for environmental processes 
within city development projects.  This culture derived from the anticipation that discovery of 
environmental concerns meant additional cost expenditures and delay in project processes.  The 
senior environmental manager for the city described the culture in saying “I'll be the first to 
admit that there have been times in my career because I have feared for my job because I've been 
the messenger of bad news.” (Interview, 2009) 
The challenges posed by these organizational capacities exacerbated the public 
management missteps of BP1.  Network data for BP1 indicate that environmental actors 
remained largely in the environmental phases and community development actors remained 
largely in the design and construction phases, creating a critical information vacuum between 
actors.  These findings illustrate the importance of maintaining whole-network ties that link 
actors from divergent expert orientations and provide clear evidence that structural gaps in the 
project network, particularly between environmental and community development actors, lead to 
communication breakdowns and poor public management decision making, regardless of the 
policy tools selected and implemented in the project.   
The reversal of success with BP2 experienced by the city indicates that these gaps may be 
overcome through assertive behaviors on behalf of a project champion possessing sufficient 
political authority to compel partner commitments with the assistance of carefully selected policy 
tools.   Essentially, the OSP director who arrived at the city towards the end of BP1 served as a 
project champion, using his authority to direct to action city departments whose resources he 
needed and leveraging his position as a BURA board member and confidant of the mayor to 
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direct community partners to engage in what he framed as a development opportunity crucial for 
that part of the city.  The ongoing fallout in the news media and the blogging world of the 
brownfield-turned-housing project prior to BP1 that ended in litigation produced strong 
incentives for mayor and, subsequently, the OSP director create a winnig project. He therefore 
pressured the public works department and the private engineering consultant to build the 
subdivision as quickly as possible.  A member of the project management team remembers the 
new mayor’s interest in erasing BP1 and creating a success story.  
Not to bring politics into it but when we were campaigning, we were going to an event 
and the mayor said we've gotta get this going because there were these sad little Tyvek 
houses . . . three houses that were sitting there he goes ‘we gotta get (BP2) going.’ – City 
Marketing Manager, 2009 
 
Having support from the mayor’s office and BURA as well as the backing of city council 
enhanced the OSP director’s ability to champion project processes to city staff and push them 
along more forcibly than they might have otherwise. 
 After the OSP director left the city, follow-up implementation by his housing manager 
relied upon increased density of project network ties and the abilities of the housing project 
manager to maintain these ties by appealing to partners’ senses of obligation and commitment 
articulated in the formal agreements binding them to the project.  Ultimately, both city and non-
city network actors committed time and resources above and beyond what they normally would 
have.  For example, the community lender brought in to fill financing gaps during construction 
processes spent more time on this project than on any other previous city-led project.  In 
addition, the consulting engineer spanning BP1 and BP2 provided some services pro bono.  The 
role these particular actors played caused the community lender state “I think the uniqueness of 
(BP2) was the expertise on the outside and the lack of expertise on the inside” (Interview, 2009).  
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Between the political authority and persuasive management efforts of the OSP director, 
the resulting formal agreements with a range of internal and external actors, the availability of 
key policy tools funding remediation, and the persistent coordination activity of the project 
manager, BP2 achieved successes where BP1 had failed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT NETWORKS, POLICY TOOLS, AND PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN 
BROWNFIELD PROJECT SUCCESS 
 
Introduction.  The previous three chapters identify the critical factors that shaped 
outcomes for the individual cases explored in this study.  Evidence exists in each story that the 
paths to brownfield project outcomes entail multiple combinations of network structures, policy 
tools, and public management strategies contingent upon the broader political, economic, social 
and environmental contexts in which the project exists.  However, examining the cases as 
individual stories alone does not fully address the research questions presented at the onset of 
this study, particularly regarding the extent to which network characteristics and specific public 
management behaviors within these networks, particularly those involving the selection and use 
of policy tools link to positive project outcomes.  This chapter strives to answer these questions 
by presenting a cross-case analysis comparing network, policy tool, and public management 
patterns as they link to the varying project outcomes that were fundamental to case selection.   
In general, this analysis validates several aspects of the propositions.  First, changes in 
network characteristics and policy tool use over the course of each project linked closely, as 
expected, to changes in task and expert information orientation albeit in slightly different ways. 
Second, evidence exists supporting the proposition that overall network centrality and stability 
correlate with project success.  However, the relationship between public managers operating 
towards the center of project networks, the policy tools activated to steer project actor behaviors, 
and the selection of public management strategies did not conform to expectations.  Political 
power and its presence in the public management network emerged as the key factor influencing 
how these project components interacted to influence outcomes. In addition, findings show that, 
while capacity for network management at the city level shapes management strategies, neither 
sufficient capacity nor a lack of it predicts the ability to achieve success.   
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This chapter begins by examining patterns of network characteristics at both the full 
project and within-phase levels.  The next section presents patterns of policy tools aggregated 
across all projects to identify correlations between tool use and the task orientation of project 
phases.  Integrating the findings from these two analyses sets up the final section that describes 
patterns regarding the impact of public management behaviors by network-centric actors on the 
various project outcomes. 
Network Structures and Project Outcomes.  Network data for each entire project 
exhibit differences between successful and unsuccessful projects in measures of overall network 
centralities, the most central actors, and total actor numbers (Table 8-1).  
Table 8-1: Total Network Statistics, By Case 
 Network Statistics Most Central Actors 
 
Primary 
Actors 
Freeman 
Centrality Density First Second Third 
RPA (High) 56 0.599 0.109 
City Senior 
Environmental 
Manager Citizen Leader 
City Housing 
Manager 
BP2 (High) 40 0.530 0.145 
City OSP 
Director 
City Housing 
Manager 
City 
Environmental 
Manager 
RPB (Low) 27 0.493 0.179 
City Senior 
Environmental 
Manager 
City 
Environmental 
Manager 
Environmental 
Consultant 
BP1 (Low) 27 0.443 0.128 
Environmental 
Consultant 
City OSP 
Deputy Director 
Community 
Lender 
 
These findings affirm previous research that found higher overall network centralities and 
relatively low project densities correlated to more positive network performances (Provan and 
Milward 1995; Provan, Huang, and Milward 2009).20 In the RPA case, the high network 
                                                
20 Recognizing the possibility for endogeneity between the number of phases completed for a 
project and centrality scores due to greater opportunity for relationships to form, network 
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centrality enabled the efficient communication between political actors, citizens, private partners, 
environmental regulators, and community development managers that characterized the public 
management context of that project.  Interview data indicate that the number of direct ties 
between the senior environmental manager and all other individuals in the project network 
greatly enhanced information exchange and expediting project processes.  As stated by the city 
council president, “(The senior environmental manager) was terrific.  He would always keep 
people up to date on what was happening” (Interview, 2008).   The high overall centrality of the 
BP2 project network also enabled communication facilitation by the OSP Director and then, 
when he left his position, the city housing office project manager.  In this case, however, the ties 
were less about information exchange and reciprocity as much as it was about directing project 
partners internal to the city, framing the project as a “win” for the community to non-city project 
partners, and negotiating with financial gatekeepers for resource allocations addressing last 
minute resource needs.  
Data about the relationship between the number of primary actors involved with project 
networks and degrees of project success appears to indicate a pattern, but a closer look warns 
against drawing immediate conclusions. The low number of actors for RPB and BP1 primarily 
reflect that these projects did not achieve full phase implementation, thus limiting the total 
                                                                                                                                                       
statistics for RPA were calculated up through the remediation phase to compare with the number 
of phases completed for RPB.  The Freeman Centrality Score and density increased to 0.696 and 
0.131 respectively, suggesting that the construction and sales phases actually incurred less 
centralized behaviors across the entire project, likely due to the centralized coordination required 
by construction activity and the resulting decrease in cohesion of the whole project network 
when total relationships between all actors were included.  The top two most central actors 
remained the same, but the third highest centrality belonged to the environmental consultant.  
Because these differences went in the opposite direction than expected, the measures in Table 1 
were left as is, reflecting the total number of actors engaged in each project at any point in time 
and their resulting relationships. 
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number of individuals engaged in project processes.  However, RPA, the most successful project 
of the group, included more numbers of primary actors21 than the other high success project, 
BP2.  This largely stemmed from the greater involvement of citizens and higher numbers of 
building contractors engaged through RPA’s unique redevelopment plan that included multiple 
builders rather than a single firm.  Despite research indicating that greater numbers of network 
members impose an additional transaction cost for network managers in disseminating 
information and coordinating actions (Provan and Milward 1991, 1995), the larger numbers in 
RPA did not appear to curtail project successes. Exploration of the impact of network size should 
be addressed in future brownfield research. 
Examining centrality data across phases provides a different picture regarding the 
relationship between network stability and project outcomes.  While project centrality measures 
at the whole project level for RPA are greater than BP2 and RPB (Table 8-1), measurements by 
phase reflect the opposite (Table 8-2). However, these data speak more to the role of network 
stability in facilitating project outcomes than to the role of network centrality.   For example, 
interview data suggest that the higher centralities for each individual phase in BP2 and RPB 
resulted from the need for highly centric actors to transmit information directly to members new 
to the project.  In BP2, the OSP Director practiced highly directive behaviors by working directly 
with project actors to compel their cooperation.   His housing manager described the process of 
bringing in new partners: 
It was aggressive. It was aggressive, but we moved forward and we got to this point 
where we are today. It was aggressive, and that was another maybe obstacle that we had 
to get folks to buy in, is they didn't want to do this by when? At first, there was 
                                                
21 Primary actors do not include individuals or organizations subcontracted by first-level 
contracting agencies. 
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resistance, but they were all at the table and we were trying to tell them, we've gotta get 
this done. – Buffalo Housing Manager, 2009 
 
Table 8-2: Freeman Centrality Measures by Project Across Each Phase 
 RPA BP2 RPB BP122 
Assembly 0.708 N/A 0.533 1.766 
EconAssess23 0.683 
insufficient 
information 0.000 insufficient information 
EnvAssess 0.675 0.964 0.803 6.251 
CleanPlan 0.696 0.714 0.894 1.008* 
ConstPlan 0.662 0.866 0.580 1.817 
Design 0.645 0.807 0.615 1.124* 
Cleanup 0.585 0.934 0.861 0.639 
Const 0.587 0.742 N/A 0.790 
Sales 0.854 0.670 N/A N/A 
* Networks characterized by low actor numbers and high degrees of centrality. 
Bold font indicates phases in which more than one distinct network occurred. 
N/A refers to project phases not reached or achieved during a prior project. 
 
Further complicating network stability effects, both BP2 and RPB experienced turnover in 
terms of who operated from highly central project positions (Table 8-3). In RPB, project 
managers formerly central to project processes left the entire project part way through due to a 
new mayoral administration and resulting staff retirements.  This complicated the ability of the 
environmental managers handling the environmental complexities of the property to adequately 
support the economic development manager operating at the center of the network during 
redevelopment phases. The senior environmental manager described these effects: 
                                                
22 BP1 exhibited the lowest overall centrality and the most disparate centralities across phases of 
the cases due to the structurally separate sub-networks that formed during project processes. As a 
result, it is difficult to compare BP1 network statistics to the other projects. 
 
23 Across cases, including RPA, project participants did not express and document data did not 
indicate direct discussion of the economic implications of the intended project.  These 
discussions, as in the case of RPB and the Buffalo projects had occurred prior to property 
assembly activities.  Economic assessment in RPA occurred “after the fact” due to the need for 
city political leaders to respond to increasing citizen activism.  
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The administration changed . . . and the director of real estate and the director of technical 
services which is sort of a combination of getting things demolished and organizing sites, 
um, both of those people changed and the Departments of Economic Development and 
Community Development, the commissioners changed . . . So there might have been some 
continuity issues there. – Rochester Senior Environmental Manager, 2009 
 
Table 8-3: Number of Phases Individual Actors Occupied Network-Centric Positions 
RPA (9 total phases) BP2 (7 total phases) RPB (7 total phases) 
Actor # Phases 
in Top 3 
Actor # Phases 
in Top 3 
Actor # Phases 
in Top 3 
Senior Environmental 
Manager 
9 Environmental 
Manager 
4 Senior 
Environmental 
Manager 
5 
Citizen Leader 7 Community 
Development 
Manager 
4 Environmental 
Manager 
5 
City Council 
President 
7 OSP Director 4 Engineering 
Consultant 
3 
Community 
Development 
Manager 
2 Senior State 
Environmental 
Manager 
3 Community 
Development 
Manager 1 
2 
Engineering 
Consultant 
2 Six different 
actors 
1 Five different actors 1 
* BP1 exhibits multiple sub-networks for the phases completed, preventing generation of whole-
network centrality data for each phase. Therefore, BP1 does not appear in this table. 
 
An additional pattern that emerged in both the interview and network data, particularly 
for RPA, was that strong network relationships across all project phases mattered not only 
between the city and non-city actors, but also between actors within the city itself (Table 8-4).  
Hearkening back to the community development manager involved with RPA and the start of 
RPB who described the projects as “two octopuses making love”, these observations strongly 
support the idea that cities must have their “ducks in a row” internally in order to effectively 
form resource exchange relationships with external partners (Agranoff and McGuire 2001, 
2003). The data in Table 8-4, however, indicates that high centrality within city actors alone is 
not sufficient for successful project outcomes, as indicated by the lower centrality for BP2 than 
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for RPB.  The following section on public management strategies within these networks 
addresses this discrepancy.   
Table 8-4: City-Only Network Statistics 
 
Actors Freeman Centrality Density Most Central Actor 
RPA 20 0.713 0.226 
Senior Environmental 
Manager 
RPB 17 0.513 0.235 
Environmental 
Manager 
BP2 17 0.471 0.265 OSP Director 
BP1 7 N/A* N/A N/A 
* Network data for BP1 indicates separate sub-networks for city actors. 
Finally, examining network characteristics across project phases provides support for the 
proposition that the task-orientation of a project phase influences general network membership 
within a specific phase. Environmental experts dominated environmental assessment, 
remediation planning, and remediation phases and community and economic development actors 
were more prevalent in economic assessment, construction planning, construction, and sales 
phases (Figure 8-3).  These patterns amplify the public management finding that communicating 
cross-disciplinary information between phases, particularly when key network actors leave the 
project, is important.  In BP1, complete separation between these phase-specific actors incurred 
project failure.  In RPB, the departure of the community development managers and their 
comprehensive knowledge of the environmental characteristics of the property hampered 
subsequent efforts on behalf of the city. 
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Figure 8-1 
 
 
Policy Tools and Project Outcomes. Across the cases, patterns of policy tool use also 
changed over project phases, but not in the anticipated manner. Propositions stated that planning 
phases would emphasize information, legislative, and regulatory tools while implementation 
phases would feature use of agreement-based, economic, and fiscal tools.  However, the data 
from this study show that the projects did not incorporate as many information tools as 
anticipated and that legislative, regulatory, economic and fiscal tool use spanned planning and 
implementation phases, particularly if the task-orientation focused on property assembly and 
redevelopment.  Figure 8-2 presents an aggregation of tool types across all projects for each 
project phase24.  
                                                
24 Each case exhibited similar proportions of tools used for each phase, making it feasible to sum 
total tools used across all projects. It is also important to remember that the numbers for 
legislative tools include direct actions taken by city decision makers to accomplish tasks for 
property acquisition processes.   
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Figure 8-2 
 
One explanation for these findings is that it is during implementation phases that public 
managers had the greatest need for asserting authority over non-governmental partners in order 
to achieve desired outcomes (Bressers and O’Toole 2005; Bressers and O'Toole Jr. 1998).   In 
addition, resource needs increased in implementation phases and the number of total actors 
required to complete implementation tasks rose. This is congruent with previous work indicating 
that resource dependencies facilitate tool usage (Howlett 2005). For example, the RPA and BP2, 
agreements between the home builders, the cities, mortgage lenders, and future homeowners 
required multiple layers of tools to ensure that new home and site preparation construction 
complied with preexisting codes and rules and addressed potential liabilities of lenders and 
buyers alike.  
A closer examination of tool data reveals that, while most policy tools enabled the city to 
shape relationships with project partners, some policy tools put cities in the role of the policy 
target as well. Regulatory tools imposed by county, state, and federal actors that shaped city 
behaviors accompanied some of the tools selected by project leaders.  Prominent amongst these 
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tools were paperwork requirements, permits, and environmental regulations regarding pollution 
levels allowed for residential end use on the properties.   
While the ratios of tool types used varied across individual projects, some similarities 
existed for projects within the same management contexts (Figure 8-3). For example, the 
Rochester projects emphasized legislative/regulatory tools and direct action over other tool types 
but the Buffalo projects emphasized economic/fiscal tools.  These patterns across projects within 
the same management context likely resulted from decision makers selecting tool types with 
which they have familiarity through previous experience (Peters 2002).  However, closer 
examination indicates that, while projects within the same city showed similar uses of tool types, 
specific tool use varied to a greater extent based upon specific project characteristics.  For 
example, RPA project leaders selected the NYSDEC ERP tool package to reimburse what they 
anticipated to be significant remediation costs while RPB project leaders selected the NYSDEC 
Petroleum Spills Program to enable a quick turn around for remediation to take advantage of 
property momentum.   
Figure 8-3 
 
 
Policy Tool Use by Tool Categories
0
5
10
15
20
25
RPA RPB BP1 BP2
Leg/Reg
Agreement
Econ/Fisc
Information
 
 
163 
It is important to consider two data characteristics when interpreting these findings.  First, 
it is likely that these data underestimate the prevalence of agreement-based tools (contracts), 
particularly within remediation, construction, and sales phases.  However, many of these 
contracts were used to delineate relationships between the private consultants retained by each 
city to oversee implementation phases and the sub-contractors these consultants secured.   
Research data excluded these sub-contractors because the relationships were not considered 
central to core project planning and implementation processes.  A second consideration is the 
manner by which the influence of a tool on decision-making was measured in a particular phase.  
For example, in BP2 and RPA, the anticipation of remediation funding through the ERP shaped 
property assembly and remediation planning phases even though the process of utilizing that 
funding did not occur until the remediation phases.  Therefore, the funding mechanism of the 
ERP was counted as being part of each of these phases.     
Data across each project support existing policy tool theories that link the extent to which 
policy tools become used in networked situations to the desired outcomes attached to specific 
tasks (Blair 2002; Bressers and O’Toole 2005; Salamon 2002; Peters 2002).  However, the types 
of tools used conformed more to presumed managerial preferences and network partner interests. 
Public Management Behaviors and Project Outcomes.  Capturing public management 
behaviors proved to be more difficult than measuring network structures and policy tool use due 
to the retrospective nature of the data collected for this study.  However, analysis of the available 
data reveals management patterns across projects and project phases that tie network structures 
and policy tool use to a fourth factor; that of political power and influence.  Together, these 
factors help contextualize the extent to which management influenced project outcomes.  
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Recalling the typology of network management strategies summarized in Chapter 3 
(Table 8-5), interview data reveal different public management strategies implemented by key 
public managers across each project (Table 8-6). 
Table 8-5: Network Management Strategies 
Strategy Type Behaviors Measure 
Relationship 
Negotiation Making offers and counteroffers in search of mutually agreeable allocation 
Trust development Risk sharing Social interaction outside of partnership 
Institutional 
Persuasion Offering incentives to encourage participation 
Coercion Leveraging authority to direct behavior 
Accommodation Requesting or granting regulatory relief  
Arranging 
 
Seek/provide third party to mediate 
differences  
Seek financial resources 
Establish contract 
Framing 
 
Seek/provide information regarding 
brownfield property characteristics 
Seek/provide information and technical 
assistance 
 (adapted from Agranoff and McGuire 2003) 
 Several key differences between projects emerge from these findings.  First, RPA and 
RPB reflect relatively higher emphasis on trust development behaviors than the Buffalo projects.  
This is in congruence with expectations regarding differences between high and low capacity 
management environments but is also attributable to the individual management styles of the 
senior environmental manager who operated at the center of both project networks. Second, each 
project, with the exception of BP1, presented wide use of institutional management behaviors 
utilizing policy tools.   However, data indicate that both the economic development manager in 
RPA and the OSP director in BP2 used policy tool strategies towards the end of project processes 
as a means to appeal to values of reciprocity on behalf of project partners.  By providing a flurry 
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of incentives, these managers hoped that project partners would recognize city efforts to meet 
their needs and would agree to sacrifice some needs in order to achieve project outcomes.   
Table 8-6: Emphasis of Network-Centric Public Management Strategies by Project 
Strategy 
Type 
Behaviors RPA RPB BP1* BP2 
Relationship 
Negotiation Medium High High/Low High 
Trust 
development High Medium Low/Low Low 
Institutional 
Persuasion Medium High Medium/Low High 
Coercion Low Low Low/Low High 
Accommodation Medium High Low/Low Low 
Arranging 
 High High High/High High 
Framing 
 High High Low/Medium High 
* Findings for BP1 represent data for the housing manager/environmental manager due to the 
two-subnetwork nature of BP1 processes. 
 
The story of the environmental manager in RPA supports theory asserting that public 
managers operating at the center of project networks obtain significant network influence from 
their position (Tsai 2001; Provan, Fish, and Sydow 2007; Balogun et al. 2005; Honig 2006). 
However, evidence in this study indicates that political forces also shape public management 
strategies and their impacts and that, because of this influence, key decisions directly impacting 
project outcomes can occur away from actors operating at network centers as well.  In these 
situations, power to influence network processes becomes decoupled from network position and 
highly central managers operate largely as coordinators than initiators. 
For example, the OSP director combined his authority as a BURA board member and 
confidant of the mayor with his role as a senior public manager to coerce city and non-city 
project partners into compliance with his project implementation vision.  Evidence from 
interviews cited above reveal the extent to which this leveraging of political power compelled 
redevelopment to occur.  On the other hand, the community development managers in RPB who 
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initiated and championed project processes lacked this political legitimacy and were unable to 
overcome increasing project uncertainties with political power.  Even the environmental manager 
in RPA who enjoyed a highly central coordinating position benefitted from political power 
through his strong positive relationship with BANG and, subsequently, his strong support from 
both the mayor’s office and the city council president.  This legitimacy enhanced his and his 
community development counterpart’s abilities to collaborate with the homebuilders association. 
The influence of political power outside the power of network position in these projects 
also became known when project processes required intense negotiations regarding property 
acquisition and project financing.  Across each project, these negotiations occurred in dyads 
consisting of community or economic actors acting on behalf of city council and individual 
property owners, lenders or developers.  It is evident in each case that the agreements achieved 
through these negotiations are necessary for successful project outcomes but do not necessarily 
occur at the broader network level.  To some extent, the effort to meet the interests of neighbors, 
the city, and homebuilders in RPA is an exception to this finding, but even in this case, key 
decisions entailed mutual decisions made between the environmental manager and citizens or the 
mayor’s office and home builders. 
These management findings provide partial confirmation of the propositions presented in 
this study.  The review of public management research suggested that public managers operating 
towards the center of successful brownfield project networks, particularly those embedded in 
local governments with higher management capacities, would emphasize policy tool use, or 
institutional management strategies, in managing project partners and would only emphasizing 
relationship management strategies when project uncertainties increased.  While both strategies 
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influenced outcomes in different ways, the influence of political power on management efficacy 
shaped the extent to which these strategies ultimately impacted project outcomes.   
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CHAPTER NINE SUMMARY, SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
It's probably been one of the nicest success stories I have been involved in.  You know I stand at 
that kitchen window and I can look out and see six nice houses . . . I have a friend that bought a 
house and lives there and she is very happy being there.  She lived out in the suburbs and moved 
into the city . . . and she said that she couldn't have asked for a better neighborhood to be 
involved in and when I hear that I think ‘Ok.  That's it.  Did good.  We did good.’ – BANG 
Leader, Rochester, NY, 2008 
 
Introduction.  Using theories of institutional management of public sector networks, this 
study examined how project network structures, policy tools, and public management behaviors 
interacted to produce remediation and redevelopment outcomes in a set of carefully selected 
brownfield projects.  With intent to inform both public management theory as well as brownfield 
project practice, two questions were asked.  First, in what ways do brownfield projects function 
as public management networks?  And, second, to what extent do network management 
behaviors by city-level public managers impact project outcomes?  
This chapter summarizes the theoretical contributions and practical lessons derived from 
my findings.  The first section describes the significance of these findings to public management 
theory, particularly as scholars in this area continue attempts to account for increasingly complex 
public management processes and environments.  The second section highlights findings specific 
to the research on brownfield projects themselves.  The third section then discusses the manner 
by which these theoretical contributions translate into practical lessons for policy makers, public 
managers, and public administration educators focusing on addressing brownfield and related 
policy problems.  Finally, the chapter concludes with a proposal for future research directions.  
Then, in a twist on the traditional dissertation format, a tenth chapter follows that presents a 
tangible way in which these theoretical and practical lessons may be translated into the public 
administration classroom. 
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Contributions to Public Management Theory. The research propositions specific to 
public management predicted that highly central public managers would effectively utilize policy 
tools to shape network rules in achieving project goals, particularly when overall management 
capacities were high (Howlett 2005; Matland 1995) and that relationship management strategies 
would likely serve to augment these institutional management strategies as project uncertainties 
increased (Klijn and Teisman 2003; Koppenjan and Klijn 2004).  
My findings revealed that effective public management in the two successful projects 
occurred when high levels of political legitimacy accompanied management efforts, either 
through these central managers themselves as in the case of the strong relationship with citizens 
and city council enjoyed by the environmental manager in RPA or through the actions of 
political champions separate from the public manager such as the OSP director in BP2.  This 
political power in both of these cases enhanced the ability of the public managers working a the 
center of project networks to more effectively coordinate information diffusion processes by 
increasing the priority of this information for network partners.  In each case, the potential 
consequences of network partners not doing so included exclusion from the project or 
diminished relationships with key political stakeholders.  For example, in RPA, the city council 
president realized the importance of maintaining positive relations with BANG and the citizens 
BANG represented and made sure that the environmental manager had access to all the 
information required to do so.  This included access to public works information, to 
environmental engineering information, and to the homebuilders themselves.  In BP2, the OSP 
director specifically championed the project to a range of network actors by using his political 
influence to alter internal budgets to force cooperation of other agencies with the project 
manager and to coerce non-city partners to comply by threatening their standing in the eyes of 
 
 
170 
the mayor office for future projects.  In RPB, the negative case compared to these two positive 
cases, the community development managers largely drove the project and, although they 
received approval from city council to do so, the city council president herself observed that one 
reason for project failure was the lack of assertive political support on behalf of the mayor, city 
council, or any visible citizens group.  The effects of this were seen towards the end of RPB 
project processes when last minute city efforts to retain commitment of the developer failed.  It is 
possible that a concerted political push to keep the developer engaged may have increased 
chances for success. 
Accounting for the influence of political power in enabling the efforts of highly central 
public managers to success, integrating findings about project network structures, policy tool 
use, and network management behaviors across the case studies revealed key differences in how 
policy tools were used in public management practice by highly central public managers 
(identified in Table 9-1) as they related to project outcomes. 
Table 9-1: Highly Central City-Level Public Managers by Project 
RPA BP2 RPB 
Senior Environmental Manager OSP Director Environmental Manager 
Community Development 
Manager 
Housing Project 
Manager Economic Development Manager 
 Environmental Manager 
Community Development 
Managers 
  
First, policy tool selection by these managers and the resulting institutional management 
impacts mattered.  Tool selection impacted actor behaviors both directly and indirectly with the 
anticipation of policy tools being implemented incurring ripple effects, both positive and 
negative, experienced further downstream in project processes.  In RPA, an important critical 
decision shaping project outcomes was the environmental manager’s selection of the state ERP 
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policy tool package as the means by which the property would become remediated.  The 
anticipation of the fiscal and regulatory tools captured in the ERP enabled the central public 
managers to leverage early commitment by key project partners that spanned both the 
remediation and redevelopment expert domains.  The probability that remediation funding would 
occur and liability releases obtained convinced city council to allocate up front costs and the 
homebuilders association to commence discussions about participating.   
This decision to obtain ERP funding for RPA also reinforced the network-centric position 
that the senior environmental manager maintained throughout the entire project. With NYSDEC 
and county health regulations requiring that he act as the go between for the city, state, county, 
and private consultant, and city council compelling him to link directly with the neighbors, this 
manager accumulated the project knowledge and relationship ties the community development 
manager subsequently needed to pursue the redevelopment portion of the project.  Conversely, 
influences of policy tools early in project processes may also have negative impacts on project 
outcomes.  The selection of the Petroleum Spills program in RPB as the regulatory tool 
addressing remediation ultimately led to a less than satisfactory situation for potential developers 
regarding liability and design restrictions. In addition, the short turn-around of NYSDEC 
approvals that accompanied the Spills Program did not allow sufficient time for city officials to 
fully comprehend the environmental situation and prepare for the impacts that would have on 
developer interests.  This policy tool package failed to effectively bridge the gap between 
remediation and redevelopment. 
However, my findings indicated that, while policy tools are necessary for public 
managers to secure resources and address network partner concerns, they are not, by themselves, 
sufficient for creating positive brownfield project outcomes.  This is clearly evident in the RPB 
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case where the developer, the city economic development manager, and the union pension fund 
directors engaged in intense negotiations to identify and innovate a number of city-level liability, 
insurance, and financial tools to bridge differences.  Despite these efforts, the policy tools could 
not address the growing project uncertainties and the redevelopment fell through.   
The insufficiency of policy tool strategies to achieve project goals suggests that public 
managers generally face uncertain prospects for achieving brownfield outcomes but the data in 
my cases also revealed the extent to which relationship management strategies can catalyze the 
effectiveness of policy tool approaches.  For example, the public management team in RPA 
achieved outcomes by integrating relationship management strategies into the use of policy tools, 
leading to a graduate decrease in tools required at the tail end of project processes.  The trust 
developed between BANG and the city and, subsequently, the city and the homebuilders, 
heightened stakeholder satisfaction with project processes and enabled collaborative decision 
making about multiple aspects of the project including end use designation, end use design, 
policy tool selection for funding construction processes, and the marketing and sales of the 
newly constructed homes.  While two important factors assisting the development of this trust 
were the preexisting relationships between the development community and the mayor’s office 
as well as amongst the public managers from the environmental and community development 
agencies within the city, multiple new relationships occurred unique to this project that further 
enhanced the ability of the core public managers to access the information needed to drive 
processes forward.  Even the consulting engineers hired by the environmental manager 
contributed to positive relationship building through their constant presence at BANG meetings 
and their ability to communicate technical information regarding remediation and engineering to 
non-expert audiences.   
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While RPA showed that trust between network actors positively impacts policy tools 
selection, RPB contained evidence that policy tool selection can be used to generate trust, even if 
the overall strategy fails to deliver the desired project outcomes.  In this case, the economic 
development manager operating at the center of the network during the Construction Planning 
phase worked through the city legal counsel’s office to innovate a large number of policy tools in 
a short amount of time in an attempt to address an increasing number of lender and developer 
concerns.  While the strategy ultimately failed, the show of effort and reciprocity on behalf of the 
city improved the developer’s perception of the city’s public management integrity, subsequently 
increasing his trust in their abilities. 
Yet, my findings show that relationship management does not need to be the primary 
emphasis of public management behaviors, as indicated in BP2.  The success of a more assertive 
use of policy tools in BP2 by the OSP director to compel redevelopment amidst financial and 
market uncertainties only succeeded when accompanied by his ability to use political power to to 
push project partners into allocating resources and participating in redevelopment processes.  
While he did successfully frame the project as a must-win situation for the surrounding 
neighborhood to appeal to a sense of common good, he still needed to coerce specific actors into 
compliance with his goals.  
Based upon these findings, it is very important that public management scholars 
examining networked governance of complex policy problems not advocate for policy tool or 
public management-only explanations for policy outcomes but that they support an integration of 
the two approaches.  In addition, these researchers must incorporate political influence into their 
network mapping techniques in order to discern the extent to which institutional and relationship 
management strategies influence network performance and project outcomes.  Understanding the 
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ways in which this influence can be both integrated into and decoupled from public management 
activity will enhance the explanatory power of models of public management as they relate to 
networked governance.  It is important to keep in mind that the generalizability of this 
contribution must be couched in the fact that my findings derived from data from a limited set of 
cases based in only two cities.  However, future study not paying closer attention to the 
relationship of politics and management at the local level will miss an important potential part of 
the management puzzle.  
Contributions to Brownfield Remediation and Redevelopment Theory.  My findings 
also provide theoretical contributions to scholars embedded in the study of brownfield projects 
and processes, particularly regarding the extent to which brownfield projects consist of a 
dynamic set of networked relationships that evolve over time.  This brownfield project model 
runs counter to prevailing notions these processes occur primarily through dyadic relationships 
between cities and developers commonly known as “public-private partnerships”.  While degree 
of engagement of private lenders, investors and developers is necessary for the types of projects I 
examined, each case provided clear evidence that relationships in these projects actually occur 
between city environmental, community development, public works, and economic development 
officials, federal and state environmental and health regulators, mayors, city council members, 
governors, citizens, consultants, subcontractors, lenders, developers, and future redevelopment 
users – all of whom play a role in shaping project processes and outcomes.   
Looking at these projects through a network lens across sequential project phases 
highlighted the usefulness of social network analysis techniques for measuring degrees of 
embeddedness of different brownfield project actors and their influence on project outcomes.  
Identifying who was most consistently active at the center of project processes across phases 
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provided information about the locus of project knowledge and the nature of project decision-
making.  It also allowed for analysis of other influences on policy use and project outcomes such 
as political pressures, resource exchanges, information sharing, and the entry and exit of project 
actors to and from the project network.   
In addition, social network analysis showed the extent to which positive, productive 
relationships between project actors internal to the city mattered for when the city engaged in 
negotiations with external actors – the Rochester community development manager’s “two 
octopuses.”  For example, the ability of city managers across departments during RPA to 
coordinate their actions internally led to positive perceptions of city performance from both 
citizens and home builders, increasing the willingness of these actors to collaborate with the city.  
In contrast, the disjointedness of actors across city agencies in BP2 incurred by poor 
communication structures and low citywide management capacities diminished lending and 
development partner confidence in city abilities to follow through despite the fact that these 
partners expressed support for individual efforts.  This lowered confidence contributed to a 
management environment where non-city actors were reluctant to participate, requiring that the 
OSP director had to leverage his political authority to compel processes forward.  
Examining brownfield project network structures over time also revealed the extent to 
which project actor turnover impacted knowledge sharing across project phases. The absence of 
consistent information diffusion from the center of the network across project phases diminished 
the abilities to achieve remediation and redevelopment outcomes, particularly in projects 
characterized by high degrees of environmental uncertainty such as BP1 and RPB.  My findings 
also suggest that brownfield scholars explore the role of private consulting firms and multi-
disciplinary public managers in enhancing project management efforts.  The environmental 
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manager in RPA showed a unique ability to retain his network-centric position across all project 
phases regardless of the expert orientation of that phase, providing a high level of information 
consistency and network stability.  His ability appeared to be enhanced by efforts made by the 
environmental consultant he retained to manage remediation and, subsequently, redevelopment 
processes. 
Brownfield researchers should follow the lead of this research and examine brownfield 
projects through a social network lens.  Doing so will reveal key phenomena that would 
otherwise be missed, such as the role of city-level internal coordination, the range of stakeholder 
influences on project outcomes, and the extent to which actors entering and exiting the project 
impact management processes. 
Lessons for Public Administrators and Policy Makers.  Several lessons for 
practitioners arise from these contributions to theory.  First, public managers tasked with leading 
networks comparable to those found in brownfield projects should be able to identify the 
presence of political power in the network.  This power may be found in diverse places such as 
elected officials, citizens, and coalitions of actors who control key political resources.  Then, 
these public managers should find ways to tap into these power sources to provide greater 
political legitimacy for their strategies and actions.  
Second, efforts should be made by city leaders to preserve institutional memory of 
network processes should turnover in central network actors occurs.  Doing so is particularly 
important for maintaining the internal and external relationships necessary to facilitate access to 
key resources and policy tools.  Maintaining this memory and momentum of relationships will 
minimize the disruptions observed when highly central public managers exited the project 
networks in BP2 and RPB.   
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Third, policy makers at the state and federal levels should consider the importance of 
sufficiently funded policy tool programs for enhancing local-level public management efforts.  
Neither of the municipalities examined in this study would have initiated these projects if it 
weren’t for some form of financial assistance, or at least promise of financial assistance, for the 
environmental portions of the project.  Accessing these policy tools, in turn, enabled the 
municipalities in this study to leverage investment from private redevelopment partners.  For 
example, the developer in RPB mentioned several times in his interview that, if the city had not 
completed the environmental assessment and remediation themselves, his firm would not have 
been interested in the property.  This sort of response is significant given the challenges 
municipalities face in converting marginally marketable brownfield properties into something 
more useful.  In addition, the study revealed that the influence of policy tools extends beyond 
their direct application to the task at hand.  Depending on the opportunities and constraints they 
create, the anticipation of policy tool selection and the ripple effect for downstream project 
decisions can prove to be significant for project outcomes.  Policy makers should consider both 
of these ideas when creating future policy tools. 
Finally, upper-level administrators in municipal governments that actively pursue 
municipality-led brownfield projects should build the capacities of their project managers to be 
equally adept with both the environmental and construction engineering portions of these 
projects.  My findings support this suggestion by revealing the extent to which network stability 
and information consistency mattered, particularly regarding stakeholder satisfaction with project 
processes.  In RPA, project actors frequently commented on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
information sharing by city actors while in BP2, where process satisfaction was low, non-city 
actors lamented the absence of such well-informed, centralized public managers. 
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Public administration educators may further enhance their pedagogical efforts by 
considering the network management findings presented in this study.  I encourage all faculty 
members and skills trainers to explore the teaching case included in the next chapter of this 
dissertation as one means by which to convey the complexity, and importance, of influencing 
network actors with an integrated relationship and institutional management approach. 
Implications for Future Research.  While my research contributes to public 
management theory regarding the integrated use of policy tool and relationship management 
strategies in network situations, much work remains to be done and many questions remain.  For 
example, if the location of political power relative to the public managers occupying network-
centric positions matters when determining the efficacy of management efforts by these 
managers, is it wise to continue to decouple political power from management practice in public 
management research?  In what ways should the political variable be incorporated into the 
modeling efforts undertaken by network scholars seeking to generalize network management 
findings to large population of cases?  If changes in network structures and composition over 
time shaped how outcomes occurred in brownfield projects, do they also shape outcomes in other 
types of public management networks?  Finally, if multi-disciplinary knowledge sharing matters 
in the relatively short-term management environments of brownfield projects, what happens to 
its important when the time horizon expands to the generation level as in the case of climate 
action planning and sustainable community development? 
Multiple avenues exist for addressing these questions.  First, new cases should be added 
to this research from across different policy, market and management contexts to assess the 
transferability of findings.  The more frequently the critical factors identified in these projects 
apply in explaining outcomes, the greater the external validity.  Second, the theoretical 
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framework integrating policy tools, public management, and networks should be applied to 
different network contexts such as those occurring in the more frequently studied social services 
domain.  Doing so will enable further exploration of how evolutionary processes impact 
management efforts to achieve outcomes. Third, and of great interest to my own immediate 
research agenda, researchers should examine the role of multi-disciplinary individuals in current 
municipal efforts to develop climate adaptation plans and obtain sustainable community funding 
to determine the extent to which these types of individuals, and they means by which they enter 
the project network, matter.  With increasing attention paid to local government action on wicked 
problems that combine the environmental, social, and economic domains as climate change and 
sustainability, such multi-disciplinary individuals may be key to planning and implementation 
successes.   
Concluding Thoughts.  Brownfield cleanup and redevelopment projects provide an 
important arena for examining how public managers leverage policy tools and network 
relationships to achieve project goals that span environmental, economic, and development 
domains. The ability to understand these interactions becomes extremely important as more and 
more local governments begin to tackle complex policy problems.  Hearkening back to the real 
estate manager from the city of Rochester who likened work on such projects as “two octopuses 
making love,” we can begin to hope that, by simultaneously focusing on networks, policy tools, 
and public management, we will learn to better organize the multiple arms supporting these 
complex project processes in a manner that truly serves the public interest.  
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CHAPTER TEN APPLYING RESEARCH TO TEACHING PRACTICE 
 
The following chapter serves as an example of how the findings generated by this research 
contribute to public administration education practice.  The teaching case and role play 
simulation that follows was developed for the E-PARCC Third Annual Teaching Case and 
Simulation Competition of the Program for the Advancement of Research on Conflict and 
Collaboration at the Maxwell School at Syracuse University.  Entitled “Addressing ELCA”, this 
teaching tool was loosely based upon the RPA case study and provides the educator the means to 
teach stakeholder meeting design and facilitation, interest-based negotiation, and skill sets 
associated with effective relationship building management behaviors. 
 
Addressing ELCA: An Exercise in Designing and Facilitating Stakeholder Processes 
 
Summary 
The ELCA street contracting company and their property in the middle of a working class 
neighborhood of the mid-sized older industrial city of Lansdale have become more than an out of 
place neighbor – they have become a noise nuisance, an environmental health hazard . . . as well 
as a political headache for city officials.  The City Council president asks two mid-level public 
managers to convene stakeholders for a brainstorming/relationship-building meeting to 
determine the best use of this property assuming that both the resources and the authority will be 
found to obtain, remediate, and redevelop the property.  These two managers decide to host the 
first of what they hope to be a series of stakeholder meetings that will guide the project. 
This simulation provides students with the experience of designing and facilitating a 
citizen/stakeholder meeting that occurs in the early stages of a long-term collaborative project 
process in which economic, environmental, and social interests converge.   
The activity is set up so that each student learns elements of stakeholder meeting design and 
implementation through readings, lecture, practice, and reflection.  Part A presents the 
stakeholder situation and instructs students to plan out their own process for facilitating the first 
stakeholder meeting.  Part B then contains role sheets to be used when pairs of students 
implement the process design they developed.  Part C includes the second half of the case study, 
telling how the collaborative network in the real life case evolved and produced a successful 
outcome.  Part D contains the general instructions for the instructor as well as content and 
resources about stakeholder processes, meeting design, facilitation, and brainstorming to be used 
in a pre-exercise lecture. 
After completing the activity, students will have a better understanding of the complexities 
behind stakeholder engagement in multi-actor environmental and land use planning processes. 
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Part A: Case Scenario and Process Design Instructions 
ELCA – A Brownfield in Our Midst 
“Brownfields” as barriers to community sustainability 
In the face of today’s economic crisis, many municipalities in the United States with strongly 
industrial pasts face difficult challenges in maintaining delivery of government services and 
ensuring the quality of life expected by taxpaying residents.  Once heralded as prominent centers 
of production and manufacturing up through the 1950s, these municipalities carry the burdens of 
decaying water, sewer, and street infrastructures, aging housing stock, and inadequate space for 
new commercial and industrial employers (Vey 2007; Goldman 2007).  
Embedded within the economic struggle of older industrial cities is the extensive soil and water 
contamination resulting from decades of unregulated commercial and production activity. 
Termed brownfields, properties containing this contamination lie underused because of fears, 
real or perceived, that they are contaminated with environmental pollutants25.   Some of these 
properties exist in prime locations where private investors willingly acquire and transform them 
into more productive spaces while others are contaminated enough to qualify for state and 
federal hazardous waste cleanup programs such as Superfund.  In between lies a third category 
(Area B in Figure 1) of weakly marketable properties for which market forces alone do not 
compel their cleanup but the regulatory hammers of Superfund laws do not reach (Davis 2002; 
Howland 2003; Silverstein 2003).  Brownfield public policy programs target these target 
properties by diminishing barriers for private and public investment in cleanup and 
redevelopment.  
Figure 1: Property Marketability and Brownfield Redevelopment (derived from Davis 
2002, and Howland 2003) 
 
                                                
25 http://www.epa.gov/brownfields accessed May 13, 2009 
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The following exercise is based upon a real story of such a brownfield cleanup and 
redevelopment project located in a mid-sized northeastern U.S. city.  The identities of the city 
and the individuals involved have been altered to uphold confidentiality agreements and a few 
details have been adjusted to raise the pedgogical usefulness of the case. 
A Neighborhood Unsettled 
In 1996, a group of neighbors in the city of Lansburg had had it.  For the past fifteen years, they 
had put up with a growing nuisance based in their backyard.  In the middle of their 1940’s 
working class neighborhood was a six-acre property owned and operated by two brothers as a 
staging site for their asphalt and construction contracting business.  Grandfathered into the 
neighborhood when the city first zoned the area residential, the property had a long history of 
light industrial and large vehicle use, but the neighbors had reached their limits.   
Roy Lagin, whose backyard ran right up to the fence surrounding the overgrown property noted 
an increase in what sounds like digging with a backhoe at around 3 o’clock in the morning, 
leading to suspicions that something illicit was being buried there.  Michelle Huggins, located on 
the other side of the property has been increasingly concerned about gunshots emanating from 
the middle of the ELCA property as well as the heavy petroleum smell that seems to fill her 
kitchen on warm summer days.  Several neighbors on the down slope, including Troy Schultz, 
started documenting shimmery run-off every time there was a substantial downpour.  After initial 
phone calls to the city did not elicit any response, neighbors brought their complaints to the 
property owner, only to be laughed at and, in some instances, threatened.  Small acts of 
vandalism started to occur on the properties of these most vocal residents.  Candace Jones, who 
had only recently moved to the neighborhood two years ago, was one such neighbor and she 
decided it was time to get organized. 
I got really involved with the two women sounding the call to action.  We called the 
committee neighborhood together and started meeting down at the library every month to 
review what little bit of information we had.  We wanted to figure out our next approach 
in going after the city to clean up the property and realized that we had to be recognized 
as a formal representation for the neighborhood.  We knew that once Councilwoman 
Suffolk started recognizing us as a formal neighborhood committee, we would get a little 
headway. 
Armed with photos, audio recordings, and petitions from neighbors about the various nuisances, 
Candace Jones and her increasingly organized Oceanic Neighborhood Association colleagues 
caught the attention of (City Council President, and, consequently, their representative) Dawn 
Suffolk, and brought her to witness things first hand.  Shocked at the conditions and concerned 
for political fall out, Suffolk was immediately convinced that the city had to address what was 
quickly becoming a politically explosive issue.  Suffolk, in consultation with Mayor Byron 
Jordan, enlisted City Environmental Manager Dmitri Brown and City Real Estate Manager Paula 
Rodriguez to look into possible options for acquiring this property and finding a better use for it.   
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An untested challenge 
In the past, Rodriguez’s office had always avoided acquiring properties with potential 
environmental contamination because of the possible liability headache, the politically sensitive 
issue of city land ownership and, last but not least, the unknown but likely large costs of 
remediating soil and groundwater contamination.  When properties were acquired for this 
purpose, either the property was determined to be so highly contaminated that it qualified for 
state and federal hazardous waste dollars or there was a private partner for whom the property 
held enough potential return on investment once redeveloped that they were willing to assume 
the cleanup and its costs.  However, with relatively moderate contamination likely and the 
location of the property amongst $40,000 single-family homes, the property in this case did not 
fall in either of these two categories.  Where, then, would money be found for remediation if the 
city went forward with some sort of property acquisition strategy? 
Fortunately, help appeared at the state level.  At around this time, Brown had been carefully 
watching a new policy program at the state level, the Municipal Brownfield Cleanup (MBC) 
program.  This program proposed to provide money for municipalities to clean up 
environmentally polluted properties they acquire that have potential positive reuses. If this 
legislation were to pass, there would be a program available through which municipalities could 
be reimbursed for up to 75% of total cleanup costs.  While this was promising, it still relied upon 
City Council to agree to the up front financial and political costs of acquiring the property.  If 
anything, it was worth a shot . . . 
Acquiring and assessing the property 
Having pitched the idea of applying to the new MBC to Councilwoman Suffolk and Mayor 
Jordan for covering cleanup costs, Brown and Rodriguez obtained the go-ahead to acquire the 
property and investigate the application further.  Coordinating with the city Real Estate office, 
the Mayor’s office, and the city police, Rodriguez began the process of buying out the brothers 
and relocating their asphalt business to a new location outside the city limits.  This freed up 
Brown and the environmental engineering consultant retained to run initial soil and water tests, 
Ted Pomeroy, to enter the property and create an initial assessment of the contamination (for 
extent of eventual materials removed, see Appendix).  Drawn from their report: 
“There were two dilapidated buildings in the central portion of the Site which were used 
for office space, warehouse storage and equipment repair and maintenance. There were 
also various above and below ground petroleum storage tanks and a construction and 
demolition debris landfill.  In addition, various metal drums lay exposed throughout.” 
There was clearly work to be done. 
An invitation to meet 
In reviewing the requirements and making an initial consultation with State Environmental 
management Department (EMD) representative, Dan Simmons, Brown and Rodriguez discerned 
that a required element of the application was as follows: 
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III. Contemplated Use 
The Municipality represents that the Site will be used for: ___________________ (the 
Contemplated Use), and Municipality agrees for itself and for its lessees and successors 
in title that any proposed change to the Contemplated Use shall be governed by the 
provisions of EML 35-3992 and any implementing regulations thereto. 
 
This stipulation, in combination with a requirement for public participation (see Appendix) in the 
grant application, meant that a proposed end use must be in place as part of the application 
process and that engaging the neighbors to be part of it would be an important next step.  
Knowing that the state would be looking for a slam-dunk application to kick off the new MBC 
reimbursement program, Brown and Rodriguez realize that a gathering of stakeholders would 
potentially help with application development and, if granted, subsequent remediation and 
redevelopment implementation.  This was not to be a standard public meeting the two public 
managers had become accustomed to where any and all attendees were brought together to 
provide data and input as part of a regulatory requirement . . . this was to be the start of what 
could be a long working relationship with a variety of actors on what could be an award-winning 
project for the City.  Therefore, determining who should attend was a key first step. 
 
The first list came from Councilwoman Suffolk who felt strongly that Candace Jones, three of 
her Oceanic Neighborhood Association leaders, and a representative from the Southwest 
Lansburg Neighborhood Association (SLNA) be there.  In addition to Jones, Suffolk’s list 
included Michelle Huggins, Troy Schultz, and Roy Lagin as well as Harry Frederickson from 
SLNA. 
 
From the city, and in addition to themselves and Councilwoman Suffolk, Brown and Rodriguez 
decide to invite their colleague from the City Housing office, Chen Kim.  Kim had been 
instrumental in the property acquisition process and would likely be helpful in thinking through 
the permitting issues of possible end uses.  Brown knew that Ted Pomeroy, whose environmental 
engineering consulting firm had been retained by the city for the remainder of this project, would 
need to be there as a contracted agent of the city.  Brown knew full well that he, as the 
environmental manager, would need an outside person like Pomeroy to help explain what would 
likely be complex technical data as remediation moved forward and to think through what the 
remediation plan might look like based upon the selected end use. 
 
Brown and Rodriguez also decided to invite Dan Simmons from the State EMD as the person 
who would likely be reviewing the initial application in hopes that he would have some ideas for 
the project and that he would be impressed by the extent to which the City was engaging with 
citizens so early in the application process. 
 
Finally, at the last minute, Maria Echevarria from Mayor Jordan’s office called saying that the 
Mayor would like Jeremy Baffin of the area Homebuilders Association to sit in.  Thinking that 
the Mayor’s office might already have some ideas for what to do with this property, Brown and 
Rodriguez send Baffin, as well as Echevarria, an invitation. 
 
Preparing for the meeting 
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Pushing back from his desk, Brown stretched and looked out the window towards the part of the 
city he knew contained the ELCA property.  This upcoming stakeholder meeting was both 
exciting and daunting.  Exciting in that it could be the beginning of a new set of tools and 
processes the city could use to address it’s significant contaminated property problem.  Daunting 
in that he knew that each individual invited, including himself, had a strong interest in a wide 
array of outcomes. Paula Rodriguez and he agreed to facilitate the meeting together, knowing 
that sharing responsibility for the meeting would enhance their efforts.  However, now that the 
meeting neared, Brown realized that they should have asked Councilwoman Suffolk for approval 
to hire an outside facilitator, but it was now too late to do so.  How, then, was he going to handle 
the meeting?  How could he insure that all voices would be heard in such a way that they would 
be willing and interested in working together in the long-run, assuming that the financial 
resources came through?  How would he balance the broader city and state level political 
interests with the narrow neighborhood interests?  In less than two days, he would know the 
answers to these questions. 
  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Your task is to design and facilitate an initial stakeholders meeting regarding the question “what 
should be done the ELCA property after it has been remediated?”  The purposes of this meeting 
are threefold: 
• To allow stakeholders to meet each other; 
• To generate a list of ideas for property use and their subsequent pros and cons from the 
perspective of each stakeholder; and 
• To earn their commitment to attend a follow-up meeting. 
Using what you know about facilitation and incorporating what you understand about this case, 
design a meeting process that a facilitator may implement with stakeholders in order to arrive at 
the other end with the desired deliverables listed above.  This meeting process must include the 
following components: 
a) An ice breaker 
b) The establishment of ground rules 
c) A structured process wherein participants have the opportunity to generate ideas for 
uses of the ELCA property while being consistent with the ground rules. 
d) A structured process wherein participants have the opportunity to list the pros and 
cons of each idea while being consistent with the ground rules. 
e) For advanced groups: A structured process wherein participants have the opportunity 
to brainstorm, evaluate, and decide the next steps in the collaborative process. 
Remember that this is the first meeting of potentially many for this group of stakeholders, so 
starting out on the right foot with minimal conflict will be very desirable.  Write out this process 
design in a scripted manner that a professional facilitator could pick up and use with minimal 
coaching.  Upon completing your process design, write up a rationale for the components you 
include and the order in which you include them.  Show how your process design meets both the 
short-term goals of the meeting and the longer-term goals of building trust and strengthening 
stakeholder relationships. 
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Part B: Roles and Role Play Instructions 
Notes to Instructor: The following thirteen characters represent the array of stakeholders most 
relevant to our case of remediating and redeveloping brownfields for residential end use.  While 
every role may be used, the intent of providing thirteen is to allow flexibility to meet your course 
needs.  If the primary focus of your course is on citizen engagement, then most role-play 
participants should assume one of the citizen roles.  If your primary focus is on 
interorganizational power dynamics or the complexities of political conflict, then more of the 
public agency, elected official, and private firm stakeholders should be incorporated.  Table D 
suggests two combinations of roles and possible processing questions that may accompany them.  
Caution: Role sheets are written to include interpersonal relationship histories.  It is 
important to address inconsistencies that will occur when certain roles are removed or added to 
the role play exercise.  
Table D: Two possible role combinations 
Roles Characters Affiliations Citizen-focused IOR-focused 
Dmitri Brown City Department of 
Environmental Quality 
X X 
Dawn Suffolk City Council X X 
Candace Jones Oceanic Neighborhood 
Association 
X X 
Chen Kim City Department of Housing X X 
Paula Rodriguez City Office of Real Estate X X 
Maria Echevarria Mayor’s Office X X 
Roy Lagin Oceanic neighborhood  X  
Troy Shultz Oceanic neighborhood X  
Michelle Huggins Oceanic neighborhood X  
Harry Frederickson Southwest Lansdale 
Neighborhood Association 
X X 
Dan Simmons State Environmental 
Management Department 
 X 
Ted Pomeroy Private Consulting Firm  X 
Jeremy Baffin Homebuilders Association  X 
Role-play activity: The purpose of having students take on the roles as described in this section 
is to create a case-context in which two of your students can implement their meeting process 
design.  Since the focus of the activity is on the act of facilitating, it is important that students 
taking on stakeholder roles do not hijack the activity.  Depending upon the maturity level of the 
students, it is possible for charismatic students to overwhelm quieter students, for students to not 
“let go” of their role when it is time to end the activity and begin processing, for role 
stereotyping to occur, and for students to be distracted by character conflicts and forget to 
respond to the facilitators actions26.  To avoid these events, it is important to instruct students 
                                                
26 http://serc.carleton.edu/introgeo/roleplaying/challeng.html (accessed 2/24/10) 
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to not only incorporate their character’s positions and interests in their actions but to also 
respond to the actions of the facilitators.  As help towards this goal, none of the character 
descriptions include information about direct conflict with the facilitators.   
Role-play alternate activity: In the primary version of this activity, two of the project 
stakeholders, Dmitri Brown and Paula Rodriguez, serve as the meeting facilitators.  If you have 
the time and interest in rotating facilitation duties amongst multiple pairs of students, you may 
assign students to act as facilitators without having an additional role to play.  In this instance, 
inform the students that, instead of assuming facilitation responsibilities themselves, Brown and 
Rodriguez obtained permission and funding from City Council to hire outside facilitators.  In this 
situation, multiple iterations of the meeting may occur by having students rotate characters.  
Non-role-play alternate activity: The roles may also be used as a case study without actually 
playing out the meeting.  Instead, you may have students read through a subset of roles and 
identify potential conflicts and issues that may exist between stakeholder positions and interests.  
Then, tell students to review their meeting process design and analyze how their design may or 
may not minimize, address, or ignore these conflicts. 
Role descriptions: Role descriptions are organized in alphabetical order.  Each role sheet 
contains: 
• A description of the personal positions and interests for each character;  
• The organizational positions and interests influencing them (if relevant); 
• Information about the project that that character may only know themselves; and,  
• Any relevant interpersonal relationship information. 
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Role-Play Instructions for All Participants 
 
Your role-play character sheets are confidential and should only be viewed by yourself.  Please 
take your time in reading through it and pay attention to your personal positions and interests, 
your organizational positions and interests, any project information you bring to the table, and 
the history of relationships you share with other stakeholders who will be attending. 
 
It is extremely important that, in performing your role, you enact these characteristics while you 
simultaneously respond to those around you, especially the facilitators.  The more realistically 
you respond to their efforts, the deeper and richer the post-activity conversation will be. 
 
 
 
YOU ARE INVITED! 
ELCA PROPERTY COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER MEETING 
7PM – OCEANIC COMMUNITY LIBRARY 
 
Dear Stakeholder: 
 
We are enthusiastic for you to participate in our upcoming stakeholder meeting addressing the 
future use of the property formerly occupied by the ELCA Corporation.  As you well know, this 
property has been acquired by the City of Lansdale for the purpose of environmental cleanup and 
redevelopment.  While action has already taken place regarding assessment of environmental 
contamination, no decisions have been made regarding how this property will be used.   
 
With your input and assistance, we hope to generate some concrete ideas that meet all of our 
interests.  To achieve this, have asked two facilitators to assist and have provided additional 
information that may help you think through the best use of this property embedded in the 
Oceanic Neighborhood. 
 
We look forward to seeing you at the Community Library. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Dawn Suffolk 
President, City Council 
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ELCA PROPERTY COMMUNITY STAKEHOLDER MEETING 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 
 
City of Lansdale Standard Brownfield Project Processes 
Phase Stage Description 
 
 
 
 
 
Cleanup 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Site Identification Potential developers (public and private) identify 
contaminated sties of interest with assistance from 
public brownfield directories or through marketing 
by current property owners. 
Initial Site 
Assessment – Phase 
I Investigation 
Assessing to determine whether contamination is 
present through historical records and examination of 
neighboring sites. 
Detailed Site 
Assessment – Phase 
II Investigation 
Remedial 
Assessment 
Environmental engineers sample and analyze 
chemical parameters of site if Phase I Investigation 
suggests potential for contamination. 
Economic 
Assessment and 
Planning 
Assessing for potential economic return vs. cost of 
restoring site to productive use.  Sites categorized 
into viable, threshold, and nonviable groups 
according to this potential/cost ratio.  End use 
plans generated. 
Redevelopment 
 
(Overlap) 
 
Cleanup 
Project 
Development and 
Financing 
Assuming financial feasibility studies are complete, 
developers arrange financing for clean up and 
redevelopment.  This is a likely stage for meetings 
between multiple stakeholders. 
Cleanup Planning 
and Execution 
Selecting and implementing a clean up plan in 
compliance with regulations. 
Redevelopment Redevelopment of 
Site 
Altering the site for suitability to its new use. 
 
 
State Contamination Limits for Residential Use of Property 
 
 
Total Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons   5 ppm in soil 
Mercury   1 ppm in soil 
Benzene   60 ppb in soil 
Benzene   1 ppb in groundwater 
Toluene, ethylbenzene and xylene   5 ppb in groundwater 
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LANSDALE HOUSING MARKET INFORMATION 
 
The following table summarizes the market potential for housing development within the City of 
Lansdale.  The capture rate is an estimate of the percentage of new units the market is likely to 
support each year.  The number of new units is the raw number based on this percentage. 
 
 
 
The following table describes the strategies utilized by the City of Lansdale Division of 
Community Development in assisting its neighborhoods.  The Oceanic Neighborhood is 
considered to be on the boundary of Transitional Low and Transitional High.  The Southwest 
Lansdale Neighborhood is considered to be on the boundary of Stable and Exceptional. 
 
Source: Interface Studio 
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THE ELCA PROPERTY IN THE CITY OF LANSDALE 
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Dmitri Brown (City Environmental Manager) 
 
Male, Age 45 
 
How did you get so involved in this project so quickly?  Part of the reason is that you always saw 
your position at the city as more than the environmental “cog” in the wheel that addresses past 
and present environmental problems.  Instead, you have always felt that your department should 
be more proactive in seeing the larger picture of environmental projects, extending services to 
the social and economic aspects of property remediation.  Therefore, you are happy to have the 
opportunity to engage with this stakeholder group so that you can use your interdisciplinary 
knowledge and skills to communicate across interests. 
 
Personal Background: You have spent your entire career working for the city of Lansdale in its 
Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) as both a budget analyst and an environmental 
project manager.  Your commitment to quality of service has grown over time and you have 
developed a reputation for fairness and thoroughness in your work.  While you are not 
specifically trained in negotiation or facilitation, you enjoy working with citizens and 
representatives of business and social interests and have many strong relationships built up over 
time, particularly with state EMD officials involved with funding contaminated property 
remediation. 
 
Organizational Background: The DEQ has positioned itself over the years as central in 
economic and community development efforts but would like to showcase their ability to play on 
a bigger stage.  The size of the ELCA property provides a great opportunity to do so, particularly 
with the introduction of the new EMD brownfield program.  Knowing that many eyes at the state 
level would be on them as the first project in this program, the DEQ would like to maximize 
cleanup efforts depending upon the selected end use.  Residential cleanup would require the 
greatest extent of cleanup with recreational a close second.  Commercial or industrial uses would 
require less extensive cleanup. 
 
Project Information:  At this point in time, most of the environmental information you have 
about the property comes from the private consultant the DEQ contracted to conduct the Phase I 
and Phase II Assessments, Ted Pomeroy.  
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: Through extensive project work within the city of 
Lansdale, you have developed strong relationships with Paula Rodriguez in the Office of Real 
Estate, Dan Simmons of the State EMD, and Ted Pomeroy with the private consulting firm you 
have retained. 
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Dawn Suffolk (City Council President) 
 
Female, Age 58 
 
Personal Background: With the ELCA property sitting smack in the middle of your district, 
you are very interested in seeing what is currently an eyesore and a popular joke in the media 
turn into a very successful project pleasing to all involved.  After twenty years serving on City 
Council, you plan to step down at the end of your current term (unknown to all but family).  
Therefore, you are more willing than usual to take political risks in moving this project forward.   
This means that you are more willing to back the citizen neighbors, in this process as much as 
possible, even if it will rule out ideas that may be more lucrative for the city.  These individuals 
had suffered long enough next to this property under your watch so you are more than willing to 
go to bat for them.  If it turns out that the Oceanic Neighborhood Association has no clear ideas, 
you would like to see housing for seniors in this neighborhood. 
 
You welcome the fact that the meeting will be facilitated and look forward to seeing how the 
facilitator has planned their meeting process.  If asked, you are interested in seeing strict ground 
rules set down that creates formal guidelines for who speaks when and how.  When you run your 
City Council meetings, you require all members to first ask you for permission to speak.  To you, 
this maintains order and respect. 
 
Organizational Background: City Council, as the budget watchdogs for the city, would like to 
see potential end uses include options that are low-cost to the city.  City Council trusts the 
abilities of city staff members to apply for and receive state and federal grants but would like to 
see more investment from the private sector in redevelopment projects.  At the same time, City 
Council would like to see some sort of end use that would benefit the city in the long run, 
preferably by generating new tax revenue. 
 
Project Information: City Council relies upon Dmitri Brown and Paula Rodriguez for project-
level information. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You are aware that members of the Oceanic 
Neighborhood Association do not have favorable views of you.  While politically, this is not as 
relevant to you, you have a personal desire to leave your office on a positive note.  In the past, 
you have butted heads with Candace Jones but are interested in making amends. 
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Jeremy Baffin (Home Builders Association Executive Vice-President) 
 
Male, Age 42 
 
Personal Background: Having caught wind of the ELCA property and the opportunities it 
presents from your friend the Deputy Mayor, you are attending this meeting to see if there is any 
hope that the city would be willing to figure out some way to turn it into market-rate housing.  
Personally, you think that there might be interesting ways to put suburban-style housing in the 
middle of a traditional, single family home city neighborhood. 
 
You hear that the meeting will be facilitated and are unsure as to what that means.  In your 
office, meetings seem to work best when the conversation guides itself without much formality 
or rules, but you are open to new experiences. 
 
Organizational Background: The Association has been exasperated in the past by Mayor 
Jordan making several off-hand public comments that the environmental problems of urban 
sprawl around his city are largely due to home builders building too much new housing stock on 
cheap land further and further from city limits.  No matter how many times it has been explained, 
the Association still could seem to get through to the Mayor homebuilders members largely do 
not work on projects within the city because ever single home building opportunity in the past 
fifteen years has been for single “in-fill” homes located in already existing neighborhoods – 
projects that do not attract most mid- to large-sized building firms.  The ELCA property may be 
an opportunity to prove the Mayor wrong. 
 
Project Information: Association members who have built infill housing in this neighborhood 
are familiar with the property values in the area of the ELCA property.  As a result, they would 
only get involved if it seemed like there was to be a return-on-investment for houses sold.  Based 
upon what you know about the neighborhood it is unlikely that, if homes were constructed on the 
ELCA property, they would fetch the prices necessary to turn a profit for Association members, 
especially if they were also responsible for street and sidewalk construction, as is the case in 
suburban developments.   
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: As inferred above, you have a good relationship with 
the Deputy Mayor but not so much with the Mayor and his assistant, Maria Echevarria.  
Echevarria has been known to lead the criticism of homebuilding as the cause of sprawl and you 
and she have sparred in the editorial section of the Lansdale Times.  While you have never met 
her, you are interested in introducing yourself and seeing if you can push a few of her buttons, 
just for fun.  In the big picture, you want to be on the Mayor’s good side in case the ELCA 
property provides profit opportunities for your members. 
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Candace Jones (Oceanic Neighborhood Association Leader) 
 
Female, Age 48 
 
You are looking forward to the upcoming meeting because you see the project as an opportunity 
to finally have the city put its money where its mouth is and do something significant with this 
property.  Having gotten to know neighbors who have fought with the city about this property for 
over fifteen years, you look forward to seeing some pay out. 
 
Personal Background: You are vaguely aware of the situation at the state level where potential 
funding for property remediation may come down the line to help move this project forward.  
Your job as a management consultant has shown you that state grant programs across the board 
like to see active citizen engagement in the applications that come to them.  When wearing your 
“neighbor” hat, you have a strong interest in seeing something quiet like a park or a senior living 
facility built on the property. 
 
In your profession as a project manager, you are familiar with facilitation practice and don’t like 
to experience what you consider to be “bad facilitation.”  If you feel that a facilitator is losing 
control of the group, you have no qualms about stepping in and taking over the process. 
 
Organizational Background: Your new position as the de facto leader of the Oceanic 
Neighborhood Association puts you in the position of representing overall neighborhood 
interests.  When wearing the “ONA” hat, you are compelled to put aside your personal interests.    
 
ONA’s interests are 1) to remove all contamination and potential health risks, 2) compensate any 
neighbors whose property has been compromised by the ELCA property, 3) find a non-nuisance 
use for the property once it is cleaned up, 4) find a use for the property that will stabilize 
property values, decrease crime, and enhance neighborhood aesthetics and, 5) obtain an apology 
from the City of Lansdale regarding the years of inaction prior to the meeting. 
 
Project Information:  You have no project information beyond a laundry list of past grievances 
of the ELCA owners compiled by neighbors that include: 
 
• Backhoe digging at 3AM 
• Mailbox sabotage of five neighbors who had called the police regarding disturbances 
• Yard damage from illegal dynamite blasting 
• Guard dogs barking all night long and escaping and terrorizing neighborhood pets 
• Loud parties on the property 
• Foul smelling run off killing flowerbeds 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information:  Needless to say, you do not fully trust City 
Councilwoman Suffolk or any city employee to do the right thing for the neighborhood based on 
past performance.  However, you are open to seeing what happens at this meeting.  Your instinct 
is to resist participation so that you can observe until you are certain that the city is, indeed, 
serious about their intent to make a difference.
 
 
196 
Ted Pomeroy (Consulting Engineer) 
 
Male, Age 52 
 
Personal Background: Having worked on a few projects before with Dmitri Brown and the City 
of Lansburg, you are familiar with the type of environmental assessment and remediation 
processes associated with city-owned properties and the technical nature of the data that ends up 
being generated and disseminated.  However, you are unsure as to the extent to which you think 
non-experts should be involved in project implementation.  While you have presented data at 
public meetings before it seems to you that anything beyond that setting would require a great 
deal of time and effort to keep citizens up to speed, especially on your behalf.  If at all possible, 
you would like limited neighbor involvement, especially during environmental processes.  
 
You are very familiar with what a facilitated meeting looks like and are appreciative that a 
facilitator will arrive with a meeting agenda. 
 
Organizational Background: Your consulting firm has worked with the city on a number of 
environmental remediation projects and has built up good rapport by doing so.  It is firm policy 
that field consultants show a good faith effort in working with citizens, but only as far as giving 
them information appeases them and quiets their complaints.   
 
Being a large firm whose expertise extends to construction project management, there is a 
broader interest in seeing an expensive project selected for the ELCA property.  The firm 
partners are certain that, if the field consultants do a good job on the environmentals, the firm 
would be in strong contention to pick up the lucrative construction sub-contract. 
 
Project Information: Being the consultant for the Phase I and Phase II Assessments, you have 
all of the environmental information about the property.  Based upon your work, you estimate 
that cleanup costs will approach $4 million based upon the findings in the table below: 
 
Environmental Problem Amount 
Impacted Soils 18,200 tons 
Construction and Demolition Debris 4,500 tons 
Asphalt 375 tons 
Asbestos Wastes 220 tons 
Scrap Metal 70 tons 
Municipal Solid Waste 27 tons 
Tires 230 cu. yds. 
Impacted Water 280,000 Gallons 
 
Assuming that this project will be accepted into the State MBC program, the state would 
reimburse 75%, or $3million of these costs, requiring the City of Lansdale to locate $1 million in 
cleanup funding. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You like working with Dmitri Brown and, as he is 
your client, you are prepared to do anything to support his efforts at the meeting.
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Chen Kim (City Housing Manager) 
 
Female, Age 33 
 
Personal Background: You are pleased to have been invited to this meeting, knowing that the 
probability a property this large would open up in a residential area is a once in many years 
event. However, you are unsure how it might look to the public at large to be putting housing on 
top of what sounds like quite the environmental nightmare.   Yet, you trust the skills of Dmitri 
Brown in handling environmental situations and envision a good space for filling crucial city 
housing needs once he and his consultant complete their work.  Your personal interest is in 
filling what you see as a great need for livable senior housing in the city.  This neighborhood is 
perfect for this housing type based upon its walkability to a range of services including a drug 
store, a diner, two churches, and a social services office. 
 
You have attended several facilitated citizen engagement meetings before and have not been 
impressed with the ability of facilitators to contain rowdy attendees.  You hope this meeting will 
be different. 
 
Organizational Background: For several months now, the Lansdale Housing Department has 
been trying to keep up with the demands of a recent U.S. Housing and Urban Development grant 
requiring that a certain number of affordable housing units be constructed within the city by the 
end of the year.  This property sounds like an ideal place to put up some of the newer 
condominium-style subsidized housing units preferred by HUD.  With the increasing role HUD 
has been playing in the shrinking economy, pleasing HUD would be in your department’s best 
interest. You are aware that this would likely mean that the City would remain owner and your 
office would help manage these properties, but the pressure of maintaining good graces with 
HUD is quite strong. 
 
Project Information: You do not have any addition information about the property or project to 
bring to the meeting. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information:  While you are aware that your office has been in 
conflict with the city Real Estate Office over the proper allocation of resources for housing or for 
economic development, you hold no ill will towards the representative from Real Estate you 
know will attend the upcoming ELCA property meeting, Paula Rodriguez.  However, you are not 
against arguing in opposition to her ideas of what the proper use of the property is. 
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Dan Simmons (State Environmental Management Department) 
 
Male, Age 38 
 
Personal Background: With 15 years of experience working at the EMD, you have become 
quite competent at working with local partners interested in remediating their contaminated 
properties.  However, you have never been in charge of piloting a new program before and want 
to make a mark with the opportunity to find the first project for the new Municipal Brownfield 
Cleanup (MBC).  For the upcoming meeting, you are very interested in listening and learning to 
see if this project might qualify.  
 
In your mind, a high quality project is one where the municipality has the resources and capacity 
for environmental remediation project management, a positive relationship with the private 
development community in its jurisdiction, and skills to reach out to affected citizens.  You have 
worked with the City of Lansburg before and have had positive experiences so are curious to see 
how they handle this brainstorming meeting.  If asked for input during the meeting, your interest 
is to see this property cleaned up in a manner appropriate to the designated end use.  If the end 
use is to be residential, the cleanup must be extensive and expensive.  If the end use is to be light 
industrial, the cleanup will be less extensive and will require less up front money from the city.   
 
Your only stipulation regarding end use is that the end use be agreeable to as many stakeholders 
as possible. 
 
You take it as a good sign that a facilitator will be running this meeting and look forward to the 
information you anticipate will become revealed in the facilitated process. 
 
Organizational Background: The EMD is traditionally neutral regarding local projects once 
projects have been accepted into an EMD policy program. Due to relations with the state 
assembly and the governor, the EMD feels pressure to accept projects likely to succeed and to 
provide maximum benefits to the community. 
 
Project Information: The EMD relies upon local applicants for project information so you do 
not bring anything new to the meeting. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You have a strong working relationship with Dmitri 
Brown but have not met any of the other stakeholders invited to the meeting.  While you will be 
friendly, your primary goal is to observe the group in action. 
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Paula Rodriguez (City Real Estate Manager) 
 
Female, Age 28 
 
Your work with the city of Lansdale over the past four years has been interesting at best as your 
office has struggled to keep pace with increasing foreclosures and pressure for the city to acquire 
and maintain a range of newly vacant properties.  Each day brings a new challenge that makes 
you feel like you are still learning your job as if starting anew. 
 
Personal Background: The ELCA property presents a different challenge that you welcome.  
Given the size of the property and what you perceive to be high political stakes, you know that 
the city will take a team approach, not leaving you in the lurch for handling the property 
yourself. When you have the opportunity to work on a team for this kind of project, you feel 
good about providing a service to neighbors who might be otherwise put upon by criminal, 
environmental, or other undesirable behaviors that seem to congregate around such derelict 
properties.   
 
However, from this point forward, you are skeptical about the ability to do anything with this 
property other than keeping it light industrial.  It is an odd shape, is still zoned industrial, and 
would require extensive street infrastructure if it were to be designated residential or retail-
commercial.  It is important to you that people who might promote those kinds of projects 
understand that road construction is no laughing matter and often comprises upwards of 40% of 
site preparation costs. 
 
You have had some exposure to facilitation and facilitation practice and feel confident that the 
meeting will go well. 
 
Organizational Background: In recent years, the Lansdale Real Estate department has been at 
odds with their counterparts in Housing in terms of best use for vacant properties.  Members of 
the Real Estate department feel that the challenges facing downtown Lansdale result from a loss 
of jobs, so emphasis on newly vacant properties should be on small to medium sized businesses.  
The Housing office, on the other hand, seems to think that the primary challenge is loss of 
workers living downtown and therefore key properties should be used for housing.  
 
Project Information:  City real estate statistics indicate that the ELCA property lies in a 
transition zone between small single family homes in the Oceanic neighborhood assessed on an 
average of $40,000 and large single family homes in the  
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: You have enjoyed working with your colleague, 
Dmitri Brown, on smaller properties in the past where you handle acquisition processes and he 
tackles the environmental impact requirements.  While this is new territory, you will rely upon 
this past goodwill to feel comfortable that your needs will become met. 
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Maria Echevarria (Aide to Mayor Jordan) 
 
Female, Age 30 
 
Personal Background: You have been working for Mayor Jordan for seven years as his primary 
aide on urban development issues, an issue that strikes you close to home.  Growing up in center 
city Lansdale, you see much potential in revitalizing cities from the urban core out.  As a citizen 
and urban development expert, you think the ELCA property is a great opportunity to do 
something special like a commercial/cultural marketplace.  However, your role as representative 
of the Mayor is a bit more complicated (see below). 
 
You understand that the meeting will be facilitated.  While you are fine with facilitated 
processes, you are wary of how power dynamics happen within them, particularly the tendency 
for men to dominate the process and to marginalize women.  If you feel this begins to happen, 
you will assert yourself and reveal what you think is a power imbalance.  
 
Organizational Background: Your presence at this meeting is to represent Mayor Jordan’s 
interest in establishing better relationships with area homebuilders with whom the Mayor had 
been arguing for several years regarding the cause of urban sprawl.  In the Mayor’s mind, the use 
of this property would coincide with the interests of Jeremy Baffin.  However, the project must 
also generate increased property taxes, so, while the Mayor does not want to be seen as visibly 
opposed to what the neighbors might want, if there is an opening to steer the conversation away 
from turning the property into a park, you should take it. 
 
Project Information:  Like City Council, the Mayor’s office relies upon the work of city 
employees in the housing, real estate, and environmental divisions as to the characteristics of the 
property.  However, sources close to the Mayor in the state capital indicate that the state EDM is 
very interested in funding a cleanup for this property. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: In the past, you have experienced conflict with 
Jeremy Baffin of the Homebuilders Association in the pages of the local newspaper over the 
causes of urban sprawl in the region – you believe it is the result of short-sighted developers 
while he pins the cause on decaying inner city cores causing residents to flee.  While you have 
never met him in person, you know it will be tough for you to find common ground and shared 
interests as directed by the Mayor.  Your strategy is to cautiously observe him before making 
attempts to work with him. 
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Roy Lagin (Neighbor) 
 
Male, Age 62 
 
Personal Background: You are so sick and tired of complaining to the city about the smells and 
peculiar run-off from the ELCA property entering your own that you were almost dumbstruck 
when you got the Oceanic Neighborhood Association email that the city had acquired the 
property and now wanted to obtain neighborhood input on the next use of the property.  As an 
owner of property immediately adjacent to ELCA, you would love to see the land divided such 
that existing neighbors have the opportunity to extend their current lots further back.  You think 
this would be a great way to enhance your property and ensure that you maintain privacy, peace, 
and maybe even a little bit of wildlife.  The remaining property should then be turned into a park. 
 
One of your primary concerns, and one that you are certain is shared by a number of your 
neighbors, is that the ELCA property may be turned into an expensive redevelopment that will 
rapidly increase your property value to a level you cannot afford.  As a retired plumber, you 
receive a pension, but not one significant enough to pay a significant increase in property taxes.  
You have no interest in leaving the neighborhood as your house was the one in which you and 
your wife raised your family. 
 
Someone told you that a “facilitator” will be running the meeting.  You are not sure what that 
means but hope that they won’t make you talk about “what you feel” and stuff like that.  If they 
do, your strategy is to sit back and pass on the activity. 
 
Organizational Background: While a member of the ONA, you have not been particularly 
active except when you see an upcoming event that directly pertains to you and your own 
property.  However, if push comes to shove, you will defend ONA interests against all others. 
 
Project Information:  You really don’t have any additional information about the property, but 
plenty of opinions. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: While you grudgingly respect the work that ONA de 
facto president Candace Jones has been doing as a liaison to the city, you are uncomfortable with 
being represented by a woman.  That is part of the reason that you do not attend ONA meetings 
regularly.  You are wary of Jones and need to test the waters to see if you trust she is open to 
your interests and ideas. 
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Troy Schultz (Neighbor) 
 
Male, Age 28 
 
Personal Background: Having been active in Oceanic Neighborhood Association meetings 
since they really got going the past few months, you are very enthusiastic not so much about 
what the ELCA property should become, but more about what it shouldn’t.  Based on 
conversations you have had with friends after Association meetings at the local dive bar, you are 
confident that most neighbors do not want to see anything that would attract loud kids or provide 
space for teenagers to congregate and get into trouble.  In addition, you are against anything that 
would increase traffic and parking problems on already congested streets.  This includes high-
rise apartment and condominium buildings regardless of who would live there.  You are 
especially against subsidized housing because your experience growing up near the north side of 
Chicago had led you to believe that public housing only generates crime and litter, especially 
when government is the landlord.   
 
To be honest, you really don’t care what goes on the ELCA property as long as it is not anything 
previously mentioned. 
 
You know what facilitation is due to team meetings you sit through at work and, in general, are 
OK with it.  However, if you feel there is a lull in the conversation, you fill the gaps with your 
own ideas and opinions.   
 
Organizational Background: As an avid supporter of ONA, you stand by the interests the 
group developed at your last meeting in preparation for this upcoming stakeholder meeting.  
ONA’s interests are 1) to remove all contamination and potential health risks, 2) compensate any 
neighbors whose property has been compromised by the ELCA property, 3) find a non-nuisance 
use for the property once it is cleaned up, 4) find a use for the property that will stabilize 
property values, decrease crime, and enhance neighborhood aesthetics and, 5) obtain an apology 
from the City of Lansdale regarding the years of inaction prior to the meeting. 
 
Project Information: You do not possess any information regarding the property that others do 
not know. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information:  You generally like your own neighbors who you 
know will be attending the meeting but you are not too happy that Harry Frederickson from the 
Southwest Lansdale Neighborhood Association has been invited.  You have met Harry at other 
city events and think he is an elitist know-it-all who likes to hear the sound of his own voice.  
You don’t trust that he has the best interests of the Oceanic Neighborhood in mind and intend to 
challenge his ideas for use of the ELCA property. 
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Michelle Huggins (Neighbor) 
 
Female, Age 55 
 
Personal Background: Having grown up in this neighborhood and living in the house once 
occupied by your parents, you have great pride and connection to the Oceanic area.  In addition, 
your work volunteering at your son’s school has gotten you involved with various environmental 
and beautification projects in and around the neighborhood.  As a result, you are very upset that 
the city has allowed such a significant property as the ELCA property become so polluted, or so 
you are led to think.   
 
It is extremely important to you that, regardless of what happens to the ELCA property, the city 
remains as transparent as possible with its environmental assessment data and redevelopment 
data.  At the same time, you want the future of the ELCA property to somehow acknowledge it’s 
dirty environmental past.   If the use is to be industrial, it should be for a company involved with 
alternative energy.  If the use is to be a public park, then it should include a public educational 
display about brownfields.  If the use is to be residential, then the houses should be LEED 
(Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design) certified for green building standards. 
 
Organizational Background:  You belong to numerous environmental and community 
development groups around the city, but find ONA to be the most useful regarding this property.  
Attending this last meeting, you learn that the group has prioritized a list of interests of which 
you care about only two: 1) to remove all contamination and potential health risks, and, 2) obtain 
an apology from the City of Lansdale regarding the years of inaction prior to the meeting.  
 
Project Information: You do not possess any additional information about the property. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information: While you have no strong opinion about anyone who 
will be present at this meeting, you are generally suspicious of city employees, especially elected 
officials like City Councilwoman Dawn Suffolk. 
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Harry Frederickson (Southwest Lansburg Neighborhood Association - SLNA) 
 
Male, Age 60 
 
Personal Background: Being a city resident whose house straddles two neighborhoods, you 
have been very interested in tracking the ongoing saga of the ELCA property, primarily because 
a high-investment development project would likely increase and stabilize the weakest side of 
the Southwest Lansburg (SL) neighborhood – the one closest to the Oceanic neighborhood in 
which your house sits. Therefore, you think that the Oceanic neighborhood should conform to 
the street design plans of the more affluent Southwest Lansburg neighborhood.  In addition, you 
know that the best use of the property is for an upscale grocery store, something you feel the SL 
neighborhood needs to make it the best neighborhood in the region. 
 
In addition, as a longtime board member of SLNA, you feel that you have a lot to offer the 
“newbies” when it comes to organizing and working with the city and would love to give lots of 
unsolicited advice. 
 
Organizational Background: SLNA has a long tradition of pushing the city to provide added 
value projects in their neighborhood, considered the wealthiest of all the city neighborhoods and 
the area with the best schools.  While the area has never had to deal with environmental 
contamination on the scale of what the ELCA property presents, SLNA has a strong record of 
advocating for better recycling services and more efficient storm water systems.  Proud of your 
status as a city neighborhood, SLNA has often been quite vocal about their disdain for the more 
suburban-style housing pressing up against the western edge of the neighborhood. 
 
Project Information:  While direct information regarding the ELCA property is not something 
you have had access to, you are able to testify to the increasing property values of the strip 
bordering the Southwest Lansburg Neighborhood and the Oceanic Neighborhood.  Based on 
estimates put together by a member of the SLNA board who works in the real estate industry, 
you are convinced that property values in ONA, with the introduction of the grocery store, will 
double. 
 
Interpersonal Relationship Information:  You are aware that there might be individuals 
present who might not be as passionate about the SL neighborhood as you, but you are confident 
that everyone will be welcoming to your advice. 
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Part C: Case Outcomes: From ELCA to Ontario Oaks 
In the real-life case upon which this exercise was based, the initial meetings between city 
managers, citizen stakeholders, and private homebuilders proved to be crucial in building 
positive relationships that contributed to an award-winning “new urbanism” market-rate housing 
development.  Key to this success was the role played by the environmental manager and the 
president of city council who took the time in the early stages to meet with neighborhood 
residents on multiple occasions prior to property acquisition just to listen.   
Involvement by the citizens of the neighborhood, however, was not an automatic 
occurrence.  As one leader of “ONA” revealed, once the city acquired the properties and began 
looking at possible uses, much chaos ensued.  Because of where the neighborhood lay, factions 
of two adjacent neighborhood associations who felt they had a stake in the property development 
attended initial meetings and asserted their opinions.  What “ONA” leaders quickly realized was 
that these factions only clouded the conversation and neighborhood meetings took on a 
combative tone with no one really listening to each other and city officials not able to fully 
understand neighborhood needs.  So, the de facto “ONA” leaders took stock of the situation and 
made the decision to exclude outside groups and rebuild their own capacity for engagement from 
within.  This entailed a formalization of the group and a lot of door-to-door visits by group 
leadership to build internal trust and commitment.  As a result, a core group of members began 
attending meetings regularly, committed to participate until the development was complete.  
When that happened, the group decided that they would disband, enabling them to focus on a 
single purpose. 
The first meeting between the city environmental manager and “ONA” representatives 
revealed a cultural divide.  On one hand was a city manager dressed in a coat and tie and on the 
other were blue-collar homeowners upset over city inaction to their complaints.  Told to “loosen 
your tie and take off the jacket”, the environmental manager quickly adapted and recognized that 
his early role was to provide complete transparency regarding any and all environmental 
information about the property.  With help from the environmental consultant retained by the 
city, this proved easy to do. 
What was more difficult was discerning the best use for the property once it was revealed 
that it would be cleaned up as the first municipally led brownfield funded under the state 
“MBC”.  The first neighborhood meeting on this topic revealed that there were many ideas on 
what could be done with the contaminated property, including cleaning up the site and turning it 
into a public park, but city council members were not interested in spending a large amount of 
money for something that they already had challenges maintaining.  So, the ideas quickly 
transformed into ones that would generate funding either from state and federal grants or from 
private investment.  Although market-rate housing was far from the norm for city-owned 
properties, several city government stakeholders saw the opportunity to pursue it and, given the 
probable addition to city tax rolls, the idea took off.  This was especially of interest to certain 
more affluent neighbors of the property who were not keen on having subsidized, low income 
housing appearing so close by.  “ONA” neighbors themselves were slower to jump on this idea 
mainly that they were concerned with increased traffic, the construction process itself, potential 
impact on property values, and the style of homes that were to be built.  Again, the city 
environmental manager, this time with the city housing manager, assuaged their concerns by 
including “ONA” leadership in all internal communications and decision-making regarding 
development design. 
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 During this phase of the project, “ONA” leaders served as proxies for the city, educating 
other neighbors about the unfolding of events, disseminating any new data that appeared, and 
helping convince neighbors to allow city employees to inspect their properties for ongoing 
concerns.  Proof of this role was found in the basement of one “ONA” leader who revealed that 
she had a more complete set of files about the project than what was subsequently made 
available to the general public. To help integrate neighborhood leadership into the role of 
information disseminator, the city, in turn, invested in their capacities, sending one leader to a 
brownfield-related conference in Colorado to talk about what became known as the Ontario Oaks 
development. 
 While these meetings ensued, members of the city housing manager began conversations 
with the regional homebuilders association about the possibility of building market-rate 
suburban-style homes on the properties assembled.  With the pre-existing interests of the 
association in getting involved with new housing in the city to show that it could be done, the 
groups soon generated a vision that brought several homebuilders on board.  This vision 
involved the city cleaning up the properties, obtaining liability releases, producing design 
standards and building up the surrounding infrastructure while the homebuilders committed to 
building demo homes, sponsoring a home show, and building houses for each buyer.  Homes 
were to be financed through individual mortgages acquired by the homebuyers and homebuilders 
were fronting the construction costs.  
 In retrospect, each stakeholder interviewed in this study felt that the Ontario Oaks project 
was very successful and that part of the success was due to the amount of time spent talking to 
each other, working through conflicts, asserting interests, and engaging in collaborative decision-
making.  Today, an innovative single family home subdivision exists in the center of the Oceanic 
Neighborhood that has added property taxes for the city, addressed environmental threats to 
neighbors, and provided profit, albeit small, to developers.  An additional legacy is the set of 
lessons learned by all involved: 
• Capacities and management cultures matter.  The first neighborhood meeting sponsored 
by the city was patterned after the typical “citizen engagement” meeting city managers 
were used to sponsoring.  This meeting had a typical agenda that was heavy on 
information provision and time for citizens to volunteer comments, but light on structured 
process.  While fulfilling state MBC requirements, these meetings did not produce much 
forward progress until the ONA leadership became organized.  At this point, one of these 
leaders stepped forward as an individual familiar with facilitated process design.  She, in 
conjunction with the environmental manager, proceeded to transform these meetings into 
more productive and efficient affairs and the collaboration took off.  
• Framing of initial problem matters. The first meetings where neighborhood activists and 
homebuilders were present together were successful due to the a common framing of the 
problem at hand – what designs best blend the suburban expertise with the neighborhood 
style and interest in moderate property value increases.  Framing the problem in this 
manner enabled citizens and homebuilders to quickly get to the idea generation stage. 
• TIME is needed. The city environmental manager spent a disproportionately large 
amount of time with neighborhood leaders compared to other projects of similar size and 
scope – a factor that contributed heavily to the amount of trust the neighborhood had in 
the city at the end of the project.  It is important to note that this investment in citizen 
relationships would not have occurred without support from the environmental manager’s 
boss, the Environmental Commissioner. 
 
 
207 
• Stability of collaboration membership matters.  Another key attribute mentioned by 
several project participants was the consistency of representation across city, 
homebuilder, and citizen actors.  By not having to restart relationships with a new set of 
city officials or new neighborhood leadership, the bonds between actors deepened to a 
point where, after meetings at the neighborhood library, the group would go across the 
street for a beer and socializing. 
• Collaborations exist in broader social contexts.  It is important to note that stakeholder 
collaborations are embedded within broader social, legal, market, and environmental 
contexts.  In this case, the project would not have happened if it were not for a strong 
market environment supporting the profit needs of both the homebuilders and the city.  
This condition was necessary for project success.  Without it, the strongest collaborative 
team possible likely would not have reached the same levels of success. 
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Part D: Teaching Note – Process Design, Collaboration, and Facilitation 
Introduction 
Much attention is placed upon collaborative processes as they pertain to citizen and 
stakeholder engagement but most experiential activities focus on conflict management during the 
process.  This exercise encourages students to consider how process design and before the 
process begins by requiring students to design an initial meeting with stakeholders of what could 
be a high-conflict brownfield cleanup and remediation project.  In addition, the exercise provides 
facilitation practice for two students at a time to implement and facilitate their meeting design 
while other students take on the stakeholder roles, enacting behaviors that may challenge, or 
enhance, the designed process. 
Intended Use 
This activity is intended for use with both undergraduate and graduate level public 
management and policy analysis courses, particularly as they pertain to stakeholder meeting 
design and process.  It complements coursework on neighborhood politics, economic 
development, and environmental issues and can easily be plugged into existing activities 
teaching conflict management and negotiation practice.  There are multiple ways in which to 
present this activity, depending upon the goals and time availability of the course.  Table A 
below compares the options: 
Time Frame Activity Components Take Home Assignments 
1 class session 
(1 hour) 
Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation Process Design 
2 class sessions 
(1 hour each) 
Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation  
Role Play and Role Play Discussion 
Process Design 
Role Play Reflection Paper 
3 class sessions 
(1 hour each) 
Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation  
Role Play and Role Play Discussion 
Case Discussion 
Process Design 
Role Play Reflection Paper 
Case Analysis 
Due to the situational nature of “effective facilitative practice”, instructors are 
encouraged to tap into resources on their campus and in their community to present the 
background content on process design and facilitation if their personal capacity to teach this 
topic is limited.  For example, many communities contain community mediation centers and 
private consulting groups that provide facilitation services and may provide educational outreach 
services.  In addition, the human resource departments of many large organizations, church 
groups, and local governments may have professionals trained in facilitative practice.  
The following sections provide the minimal content and resources needed to present the 
three activity components listed in Table A. 
 
Component #1: Lecture – Process Design and Facilitation 
 
Background 
 As public sector leaders and managers increasingly turn to interorganizational 
collaborations to solve complex problems, more attention has been paid to the mechanisms 
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through which these collaborations succeed.  Management research has determined the 
importance of building the trust, interdependence, and network governance mechanisms needed 
for effective collaborative function (Lundin 2007; Edelenbos and Klijn 2007; McKnight, 
Cummings, and Chervany 1998; Jones and George 1998). However, establishing the social 
relations and structural ties necessary for successful collaboration does not happen automatically. 
Instead, collaborative leaders must strategically build relationships over time to build group 
cohesion and then develop group capacities to perform at the highest levels. One skill that is 
essential in building these relationships and capacities is group facilitation.   
 “Facilitation” is the application of experiential techniques to empower groups to move 
through problem solving processes (Heron 1999).  A “facilitator” is therefore an individual 
trained to help move a group through a preset arrangement of experiential activities towards the 
group goals, ostensibly improving group decision-making effectiveness (Schwarz 2002).  
Facilitators exhibit skills that have been associated with positive interpersonal relationships such 
as conflict management, reflective listening, assertion, negotiation, and mediation (Elliott 1999).   
An integral part of facilitation is “process design”, or the strategic planning of group 
meetings towards a concrete set of goals.  In public sector stakeholder situations, process design 
often means laying out a sequence of activities that, when implemented, build social capital, 
gather data, elicit interests, and generate ideas. Recent studies of the impact of process planning 
on levels of stakeholder conflict and collaboration productivity indicate that effective process 
design and implementation directly relates to positive outcomes (Edelenbos and Klijn 2006; 
Thomas and Poister 2009).  This brief review examines what is known about group 
effectiveness, the role group facilitators play in enhancing it, and specific process design 
strategies facilitators use when playing this role.  
 
Basic Facilitation Theory 
 Understanding effective facilitation requires an understanding of effective groups and a 
brief tour through theories of group psychology and workgroup function.  Integrating past 
research, Schwarz (2002) offers a comprehensive group effectiveness model that has, at its core, 
group structure and group process when a group functions in a stable context. Group structure is 
comprised of a clear group mission and shared vision, clear goals, a motivating task, clearly 
defined roles, and sufficient time.  Group process pertains to problem solving, decision-making, 
conflict management, communication, and boundary management. Theory suggests that a proper 
balance between these components enhances group effectiveness (Elliott 1999).  When 
individuals in a group represent different organizations, as in the case of public sector 
stakeholder groups, these core elements of group function apply but are made more complex by 
the influence of the group cultures of each home organization, changing the group context 
component of effectiveness (Schwarz 2002). 
In order to empower groups within their own problem-solving processes, facilitators must 
understand how to mobilize without leading, how to control a process without controlling the 
outputs generated by process participants.  While complete neutrality is difficult to achieve and 
verify, facilitators can maintain this value by designing a process that ensures representation and 
participation, clarifies how decisions will be made, and is accountable and fair (Elliott 1999).   
Heron (1999) writes that facilitation occurs across six dimensions, summarized below in 
Table B.  In each of these dimensions, the key questions may be dealt with in a hierarchal mode 
where the facilitator directs the group by exercising power and controlling the process, a 
cooperative mode where power over the process is shared with the group, and an autonomous 
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mode where the facilitator allows the group to experience full self-determination.  In any given 
facilitative process at any given stage for any given group, facilitators must find a balance 
between these three modes to maximize effectiveness but, for newly formed groups, it is 
common that the early stages require that the facilitator operate in the hierarchal mode, the 
middle stages require a cooperative mode, and the latter stages the autonomous mode.  The rate 
in which a group incurs these facilitative shifts varies widely (Heron 1999).  Within group 
experiences, it is important to discern between content and process.  The content refers to the 
stated task or activity confronting the group at the moment while the process is the social 
phenomena that occur during implementation of that task (Schwarz 2002). 
 
Table B: Dimensions of Facilitation (Heron, 1999) 
Dimension Key Question 
The Planning Dimension How will the group determine its objectives? 
The Meaning Dimension How will meaning be found in group behaviors? 
The Confronting Dimension How will the group address barriers and difficult situations? 
The Feeling Dimension How will group emotions be handled? 
The Structuring Dimension How will group learning be structured? 
The Valuing Dimension How will a climate of respect be generated? 
Topics relevant to this role-play underlined. 
 
Facilitating a Problem-Solving Model 
Many group processes center upon problem solving (Table D).  Group problem solving 
processes follow a general model that starts with group members agreeing to work together and 
has the end goal of implementing agreed upon solutions.  The first step is defining the problem 
they have agreed to address.  Then, they develop the criteria for decision-making and the process 
by which decisions will be made.  After that, group members share information about positions 
and interests so that they can begin brainstorming possible solutions to the problem.  Next, the 
group applies decision criteria to the list of options to determine the course of action and seek 
agreement on a package of solutions.  Upon reaching this agreement, the group then proceeds to 
the implementation phase (Carpenter 1999; Schwarz 2002).  In reality, group problem solving 
processes are rarely as linear as this model makes them seem, with many instances of moving 
back and forth between phases as new information arises and interpersonal relationships evolve.  
Nevertheless, the use of a trained, skilled facilitator streamlines this process, particularly when 
defining the problem, establishing evaluation criteria, and brainstorming options.  
 
Table D: A Problem Solving Model (Schwarz, 2002) 
Problem Solving Steps 5. Evaluate alternative solutions 
1. Define the problem 6. Select the best solutions 
2. Establish evaluation criteria 7. Develop an action plan 
3. Identify root causes 8. Implement the action plan 
4. Generate alternative solutions (brainstorm) 9. Evaluate outcomes and the process 
 
Developing Activities for a Facilitated Problem Solving Process 
 In Heron’s (1999) framework, facilitators face two planning considerations. First, they 
must consider the objectives of the group. What will the group learn as a result of participating in 
the group process?  Then, the must determine the program within which objectives are to be 
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reached.  Program elements include the activities planned, their time allowance, the teaching 
methods involved, resources needed, and how they will be assessed (Heron 1999).   
 The structural dimension encompasses activity creation.  Heron (1999) suggests that 
activities developed for a process incorporate the experiential learning cycle.  In this cycle, 
facilitators first model the desired behavior and while providing activity instructions.  Then, 
participants practice the activity, obtain feedback, and engage in the activity again.  Once the 
activity is complete, participants reflect individually and then review their reflections as a group 
(Kolb 1984).  In designing a group activity, it is also important to pay attention to the space in 
which the activity is conducted and the composition of the group in terms of existing 
interpersonal dynamics or special needs.  A group sitting in a circle of chairs responds and reacts 
differently than a mix of people sitting and standing in rows.  Likewise, group attributes such as 
gender, age, race, and cultural background may all play a role in how a room is set up for a 
facilitated activity. 
 Similarly, an important piece of the structural dimension for facilitators is the 
establishment of ground rules.  These rules should be reasonable, fair, and relevant to the 
purpose of the meeting.  Common ground rules include paying attention to time, taking breaks 
by group agreement, paying full attention to others when they are speaking, eliminating 
distractions, respect for people and property, etc. (Heron 1999).  Schwarz (2002) writes that 
ground rules must, at the minimum, address issues of attendance, how decisions will be made, 
and confidentiality.  Ground rules may be determined ahead of the meeting and presented to the 
group or generated by the group itself as an activity, depending on the composition and purpose 
of the group.  Regardless, buy-in for these ground rules is important. 
 A common subset of activities includes icebreakers, which are activities serving to 
initiate relationship building by facilitating knowledge sharing.  These activities are often 
implemented at the start of group processes and designed to segue into more substantial activities 
at the core of a meeting.  For example, a facilitator may ask a group to introduce themselves by 
stating their name, their affiliated organization, and one goal they hope to accomplish by being at 
the meeting.  This information can then be used in a follow-up activity asking participants to 
develop a group mission. 
 Due to the wide variety of exercises that could be incorporated into a facilitated 
stakeholder meeting, it is often easier to state what exercises should NOT be.  Schwarts (2002) 
considers it inappropriate to use an exercise that requires withholding information or relying on 
deception, that has outcomes predetermined by the facilitator, that demands a level of risk not 
agreed to by the group, that requires more time for processing than is allowed, that is inconsistent 
with group objectives, and the outcomes of which the facilitator is not confident they can handle 
(p. 374.) 
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Brainstorming and Evaluation 
Brainstorming is a creative process in which groups generate unedited ideas about an 
answer to a question, the definition to a problem, or possible solutions (Schwarz 2002).  Schwarz 
(2002) lists four rules for conducting a brainstorm: do not evaluate ideas generated, include the 
wildest ideas possible, generate as many ideas as possible, and combine and build upon ideas 
already generated (p. 227).  Brainstorming may be conducted numerous ways, from group 
members stating ideas as they come to their head to giving each group member equal turn until 
no more ideas come forth, to working in small groups to create lists of ideas that are then 
combined as a whole group.  It is important that the ideas generated be presented visually to the 
entire group so that the next step, evaluation, may occur (see visual facilitation below).  Many 
resources exist that provide specific ways in which brainstorming can occur27. 
 Evaluating ideas generated relies upon the prior generation of decision-making criteria.  
Common criteria include efficiency, effectiveness, feasibility, and cost, but can vary based upon 
the group objectives and goals.  Once a list of options has been generated, the criteria may be 
applied to narrow down the list to a manageable number for decision-making.  Similar to 
brainstorming, there are many ways in which to apply criteria for evaluating a list.  One common 
way is to write the options in a single column, create subsequent columns with headings of the 
criteria to be used, and then to have each group member rate each option based on each criteria.  
Once this is complete, a visual list will remain that indicates which options are more popular 
than others.  For more information and ideas, see the Consensus Building Institute 
(www.cbuilding.org), the International Association of Facilitators (www.iaf-world.org), and the 
Policy Consensus Initiative (www.policyconsensus.org) in addition to a range of private 
consulting firms found on the internet. 
 
Visual Facilitation 
 Often times, and in the instructions for the role play presented above, facilitators work in 
teams of two, enabling one facilitator to work directly with the group while the other “scribes” or 
keeps track of group progress on charts visible to all group members.  Scribing, or visual 
facilitation, enables groups to see progress, obtain bearings on group process, and evaluate ideas.  
In specific activities, such as brainstorming, effective visual facilitation is essential for activity 
success.  An effective visual facilitator is able to listen to and summarize ideas, ask clarifying 
questions when unsure about idea summaries, and write clearly and efficiently.  Strong 
communication between the primary facilitator and the visual facilitator is also very important. 
 
Putting it All Together 
 For the purpose of this role-play simulation, it is important to make sure that students 
understand these basics of facilitation technique and the role facilitation can play in moving a 
stakeholder group towards positive collaboration.  It is also important to provide students with 
concrete ideas about creating activities for their process design as instructed in Part A.  If you are 
not comfortable with class comprehension of either of these components, consider the non-role-
play alternative for utilizing this activity. 
                                                
27 Many web and paper resources exist from commercial, academic, and non-profit resources.  
For example, http://www.mycoted.com/Brainstorming and 
www.tacoma.washington.edu/tlc/docs/Brainstorming%20Exercises.pdf (accessed 2/24/10) 
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Component #2 – Possible Role Play Processing Questions 
 
Questions for facilitators 
• What happened?  Describe the evolution of events. 
• As a facilitator, what were your greatest challenges?  How did you address them?  What 
would you do differently next time? 
 
Questions for stakeholders 
• From your stakeholder perspective, what did you hope to gain from the meeting?  Were 
your stakeholder goals met? 
• From your stakeholder perspective, evaluate the meeting using the following criteria: 
o Fairness 
o Inclusiveness 
o Order 
o Productivity 
o Effectiveness at achieving intended goals 
 
Questions for all about the activity 
• In what ways did the following barriers to positive collaboration development manifest 
during the role-play? 
o Power imbalances 
o Conflicting positions and interests 
o Personal biases (gender, age, race) 
o Pre-existing relationship problems 
• How did facilitator actions address/not address the following barriers to positive 
collaboration development? (see The Consensus Building Handbook, 1999, for additional 
content on this topic) 
o Power imbalances 
o Conflicting positions and interests 
o Personal biases (gender, age, race) 
o Pre-existing relationship problems  
• How did components of the process design address/not address the following barriers to 
positive collaboration development? 
o Power imbalances 
o Conflicting positions and interests 
o Personal biases (gender, age, race) 
o Pre-existing relationship problems 
• Based upon this meeting, do you think this collection of stakeholders could form a strong 
collaboration over time?  Why or why not? 
 
Questions for all about the use of facilitated processes in building collaborations 
• In what ways did the process design meet/not meet the objectives of the meeting? 
• Group development theory suggests that, early in a collaborative arrangement, facilitators 
need to take a more directive role and that, later in the collaboration, facilitators should 
step back and allow groups to guide themselves.  Based on this meeting experience, do 
you agree or disagree with this proposition?  
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Component #3 – Possible Case Analysis Questions 
 
These questions pertain to the use Parts A, B, and C as a case study rather than an experiential 
role-play. 
 
Part A: Students generate a meeting process design as if they will be facilitating 
• In what ways does your process design meet the following goals? 
o Stakeholder introductions 
o Generating a list of ideas for future property use 
o Generating commitment to meet again 
• Why might ground rules be important at the start of a collaborative problem solving 
process?  How do you propose establishing ground rules? 
• Given the prospect that the stakeholders attending this meeting will need to work together 
for a period of years, what are ways in which this first meeting might impact future ones? 
• What challenges do you think your process design might face if it were implemented? 
 
Part B: Students read through the stakeholder role sheets 
• What potential conflicts do you see between stakeholders?  Are these conflicts due to pre-
existing interpersonal relationships, individual personalities, or organizational missions? 
• Based upon these role sheets, what dynamic might you anticipate between elected 
officials and citizens at this meeting?  Elected officials and public managers? Public 
managers and citizens?  Explain. 
• Are there any power imbalances inherent to this group?  What are they? How might they 
impact the meeting process and outcomes?   
• Thinking about your process design and using the information in the role sheets, which 
activities do you think will work well?  Which activities will possibly fail?  Why? 
• Thinking about how a first meeting of this group might unfold, what are some 
generalizations you might make regarding the initial steps of forming any problem 
solving collaboration? 
 
Part C: Students read the “Case Outcomes: From ELCA to Ontario Oaks” follow-up 
• What constraints might local government managers face when engaging with citizens for 
long-term collaborative projects? 
• If you were the city environmental manager, how might you have approached initial 
meetings with citizen stakeholders differently? 
• Do you think that the amount of time invested by city officials in this project was 
realistic?  Why or why not?  Why do you think city officials made the investment? 
• Do you think strong collaborative relationships between the stakeholders in this case 
could overcome a downturn in the real estate market?  Why or why not? 
• What are management strategies that could be used in a collaboration to address turnover 
in collaboration membership? 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Protocol – Organized by Framework and Key Concepts 
Question 
Order 
Key 
Concept 
Addressed 
Question Framework 
1 Cognition - 
process 
When did (PROJECT NAME) begin and what key 
decisions were made over time? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
2 Cognition - 
goals Who initiated (PROJECT NAME) and why?  
Contextual 
Interaction 
3 
Motivation 
At what point did you become involved with 
(PROJECT NAME) and why? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
4 
Actors 
With whom did you interact over the course of 
(PROJECT NAME), why, and how? 
 
Network 
Structure 
5 
Actors 
Of these key actors, with whom do you interact the 
most and why? 
Network 
Structure 
6 
Management 
behaviors 
Describe the process of:  
• Establishing a contract?  
• Obtaining approvals? 
• What was your strategy to accomplish 
(SPECIFIC TASK)? 
Strategic 
Management 
7 
Cognition - 
problem 
What are/were the biggest challenges to the 
remediation and redevelopment of (PROJECT 
NAME)? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
8 
Policy tools 
What key incentives and arrangements were used 
to produce participation by other agencies and 
firms in (PROJECT NAME)?   
Institutional 
9 Cognition - 
problem 
What role does the brownfield status of the 
property play in redevelopment strategies? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
9 
Motivation 
In hindsight, would you have done anything 
differently? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
9 
Power 
Which of these key actors influenced project 
outcomes the most?   
Without whom the project would not have 
happened? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
9 
Power 
Where did money come from along the course of 
(PROJECT NAME)? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
9 
Power 
Was there any change in the project over mayoral 
transitions? 
Contextual 
Interaction 
9 Alternate 
explanations What ultimately affected project outcomes? 
Institutional 
9 Resource 
allocation 
How has the city allocated resources for brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment? 
Institutional 
9 Resource 
allocation 
In what ways is (CITY NAME) organized to 
address brownfields? 
Institutional 
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9 
Resource 
allocation 
What proportion of your time is dedicated to 
brownfield remediation and redevelopment 
compared to all other duties of your job? 
Institutional 
9 
Success 
What are the biggest challenges to brownfield 
remediation and redevelopment in the city? 
Institutional 
9 
Success 
How do you measure performance of brownfield 
redevelopment projects? 
Strategic 
Management 
 
Post-Interview Survey: Main Questions 
 
1) Based on data collected for this project so far, I have divided the APCO/Newcroft 
project into nine distinct project phases. Please indicate below all of the phases in 
which you were actively involved. 
 
Property identification and assembly 
Economic assessment 
Environmental assessment 
Cleanup financial planning 
Construction financial planning 
End use design 
Cleanup process 
Construction process 
End user sales 
 
2) For each individual that you worked with on APCO/Newcroft during the Property 
Identification and Assembly phase, please fill in the information to the right of their 
name.  Please do not answer for your own name.  Definitions of information types 
are listed below: 
 
Cleanup financing = grant, loan information regarding environmental cleanup 
Cleanup assessment = technical environmental information about property 
Cleanup action = cleanup process information 
Construction financing = lending, loan, grant, investment information regarding construction  
Construction action = construction processes information 
End use design = city planning and architectural design information 
Legal information = legal information - any type 
Political information = electoral politics, citizen engagement information 
Social/relationship building = personal information, "getting to know you" information 
 
a. What dominant information type was transferred with this person? 
b. What secondary information type was transferred with this person during this 
phase? 
c. How frequent were your information exchanges with this person during this 
project phase? 
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3) Using the list below, please verify which agencies and organizations your agency or 
organization worked with during this phase. 
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Brownfield Redevelopment Networks in the State of New York: Four Case Studies 
Dear _________________. 
I am a doctoral student under the direction of Professor Rosemary O’Leary in the Department of 
Public Administration in the Maxwell School of Syracuse University. I am conducting a 
research study to understand the implementation processes of brownfield redevelopment in 
the state of New York. 
Your participation will involve answering questions regarding your and your organization’s role 
in brownfield redevelopment processes.  These questions will be asked in the setting of either an 
in person or telephone interview and, if you agree, will be recorded for purposes of transcription 
and data analysis.  Your recording will be assigned a code for which only I will have a key.  All 
recordings will be destroyed after completion of the research study.  If you do not wish to be 
recorded, your responses will be recorded by hand.  Depending upon your role in the 
redevelopment project, you may be asked for a follow-up interview.  Each interview may last up 
to an hour in length.  Your participation in this study is voluntary.  If you choose not to 
participate or to withdraw from the study at any time, that decision will be kept confidential by 
the researcher. 
Your personal name will not be used in any of the writings stemming from this research and 
references to your agency and organization will be made generically.  Because of the case study 
format of this research, please be aware that it is possible for readers of the research who have 
detailed knowledge of the particular cases used may be able to infer your identity.  This risk will 
be minimized by the use of generic language when referring to interview subjects and their 
relationships.  The research will be published as a doctoral dissertation in addition to research 
articles in public administration and environmental management journals. 
Although there may be no direct benefit to you, your participation may benefit a greater 
understanding of brownfield redevelopment processes in the state of New York, potentially 
aiding future policy development. 
If you have any questions concerning this research study, please contact me at rwalexan@syr.edu 
or 303-818-0418 or Professor Rosemary O’Leary at roleary@syr.edu.  
Sincerely, 
Rob Alexander 
* * * * * * * 
___ I agree to be audio taped. 
___ I do not agree to be audio taped.  
___ I confirm that I am over 18 years of age. 
 
__________________________________   _______________   ____________________ 
Signature of participant                                    Date            Print name of participant            
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_________________________________________    _________________________ 
Signature of researcher (or witness)                               Date    
If you have any questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel 
you have been placed at risk, you can contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review 
Board at 315-443-3013. 
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APPENDIX B 
Historical Backgrounds to Management Capacities 
A key component to the research design for this study was the selection of two cities that 
matched along various economic and environmental variables but exhibited different levels of 
management capacities.  The logic behind this selection was to enable comparison of successful 
and less than successful brownfield projects under different management circumstances.  This 
comparison provided insight not only into the relevance of management capacities but also the 
ways in which management capacities related to project outcomes.  The measures used in city 
case selection are repeated in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Network Management Capacity Variables for City Case Selection 
  Rochester Buffalo 
Network 
management 
capacity – Personnel 
Capacity 
Number of FTE personnel 
committed to brownfield 
projects and average time 
on job 
2.5 0.5 
Network 
management 
capacity – Expert 
Capacity 
Type of agency housing 
brownfield operations  
Environmental 
project 
management office 
Planning office 
Network 
management 
capacity – Resource 
Capacity 
Per capita city 
expenditures 
$2,060/person $1,539/person 
 
While these initial measures were deemed sufficient for the selection of case cities, subsequent 
capacity data were collected as part of the explanatory model for project success.  These data 
relate to key capacities for network management including interpersonal skills, structures for 
information exchange, and qualities of the political and resource environment.  This section 
describes the broader story of these capacities as they pertain to both brownfield and residential 
development, laying the groundwork for integrating capacity data in the explanation of case 
outcomes. 
Capacities for Brownfield Management.  The City of Rochester became involved in 
contaminated property redevelopment before any significant brownfield-specific legislation 
existed at either the federal or state levels. The nearby example of Love Canal and an 
examination of contamination on city-owned properties compelled the city to engage in a few 
small projects in the mid-1980s.  However, it was not until a hazardous waste problem on 18 
acres at the regional fire-training academy reached the agenda in 1993 that the city of Rochester 
began to build its capacity to address brownfield problems. During this project, a team of city 
managers obtained $27 million of local, state and federal funding to remediate the property for a 
new, multi-government public safety aircraft rescue fire-fighting project.  The success of this 
project laid the foundation for steady development of the Division of Environmental Quality 
(DEQ) in the city’s Department of Environmental Services (DES).  
As assessments of city properties began to reveal the extent to which environmental 
problems constrained development, the DEQ quickly built upon this initial capacity for project 
management.  The DEQ’s original role focused on city compliance with state and federal 
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environmental regulations across its functions, but managing brownfield projects required more 
complex abilities.  Initially, the city contracted out much of the early project management work 
to private consulting firms, leading to hefty contract payments.  Drawing from his budget analyst 
roots when he began work with the city in 1986, the lead DEQ manager successfully argued to 
city leadership and the budget office that the city would save money in the long run by hiring in 
the technical capacity for contaminated property project management.  By 2010, seven 
environmental scientists, engineers, and geologists were employed as project managers with an 
average tenure in the Division of 10 years.  Together, this team developed strong working 
relationships with regulatory counterparts in the Monroe County Department of Health 
(MCDOH) and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) 
regarding brownfield projects, building a database of potential and real brownfield sites and  
developing a local revolving loan program for private firms to remediate properties supported by 
a grant from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  
Contrary to Rochester’s experience and while the City of Buffalo had more than enough 
brownfield properties within its jurisdiction, the capacities for managing them grew outside of 
City Hall.  One interview respondent described that there is “more expertise on the outside than 
on the inside”.  This lack of internal capacity can be attributed largely to an ongoing fiscal crisis 
within the city compounded by decades of diminishing tax revenues, decreasing numbers of city 
personnel and rigid unions battling contract changes.  By 2003, after multiple annual bailouts 
from the State Legislature, the Governor created the Buffalo Fiscal Stability Authority (BFSA).  
The BFSA, governed by five gubernatorial appointees, the mayor, the county executive, and an 
appointee from both the state comptroller and the legislature, held the authority to approve or 
deny the city’s annual four-year financial plan. In exchange, the city receives the ability to 
acquire loans from the state during its road to recovery (Staba 2003).  
Instead, much of the initial clean up and redevelopment activity occurred through federal, 
state, county, and regional government efforts.  For example, the Erie County Industrial 
Development Agency (ECIDA), a county-level quasi-governmental organization and its Buffalo 
Urban Development Corporation (BUDC) emerged as key facilitators for these larger, 
commercial and industrial development opportunities through an EPA pilot grant.  Meeting some 
success at turning these properties into viable sites for new industries and warehouse facilities, 
BUDC became the lead agency for the larger brownfield properties around the city. 
Internally, the City of Buffalo maintained few employees trained specifically in an 
environmental or earth science field.  Those that had some environmental knowledge worked 
mainly within the Public Works Department and the Buffalo Water Authority, assessing and 
implementing infrastructure projects around the city.  When city-owned properties were 
determined to have environmental concerns, the City Engineer handled the regulated procedures, 
but he did not have a strong environmental background.  Additional, but limited, environmental 
governance was provided by the Buffalo Environmental Management Commission, an advisory 
board comprised of appointed members serving two-year terms. 
The first specific environmental project manager was originally brought to the city 
through an EPA Brownfield Pilot Grant in 1996 to assess the extent of brownfield properties 
around the city.  When he arrived on the job, he quickly realized that the complex regulatory 
path dictated by the NYSDEC and the EPA would have to be learned on the job, as there was 
little institutional knowledge easily accessible.  This began what was a slow cultural shift within 
City Hall regarding the need for environmental professionals, or at least an infrastructure that can 
support the work of environmental professionals on brownfield projects.  However, a department 
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devoted to environmental services, as in Rochester, did not emerge.  In fact, what had existed as 
a four-person environmental management department working with the City Environmental 
Management Commission dwindled down to a single project manager.  As a result, brownfield 
projects with residential end uses became addressed by a set of ad hoc working teams comprised 
primarily of public managers in the Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency (BURA), its Office of 
Strategic Planning (OSP) and the Department of Public Works.  To a lesser extent, the Planning, 
Real Estate, Law, and Economic Development Departments have participated as well.  
While data suggest that both the cities of Rochester and Buffalo show signs of certain 
capacities for assessing, remediating, and redeveloping brownfields into residential end-use 
projects, these capacities manifest in different ways.  The City of Rochester has greater internal 
capacity for project management with its large environmental services staff and pre-existing 
structures for internal information exchange with other city agencies.  On the other hand, the 
City of Buffalo’s capacities rely upon a single environmental manager and his ability to work 
with the state DEC office and the ECIDA, a county-level quasi-governmental organization.   
Capacities of Key Governmental Partners.  With local government action towards 
brownfield redevelopment contingent upon compliance with local, state, and federal 
environmental and health-related regulation, it is relevant to briefly describe the capacities of 
these agencies in whose jurisdictions the cities of Rochester and Buffalo fall.  For the City of 
Rochester, the Monroe County Department of Health (MCDOH) and NYSDEC Region 8 are 
unique regulatory partners while the City of Buffalo relies upon the Erie County Department of 
Health (ECDOH) and NYSDEC Region 9.  Both Rochester and Buffalo fall into the Western 
Region of the NY State Department of health (NYSDOH), the auspices of the Central Office of 
the NYSDEC, and Region 2 of the EPA. 
 In Rochester, a regular meeting of a Waste Site Advisory Committee occurs 
approximately seven or eight times a year to exchange information regarding targeted properties.  
Meeting attendees include the MCDOH Director, the Rochester office member of the NY State 
Department of Health, the brownfield manager from Region 8 NYSDEC, a State University 
geologist, and the lead manager at the city DEQ and one of his staff members.  At each meeting, 
the NYSDEC shares information about new sites in their programs, the health departments share 
decisions made by the NYSDEC central office that may not have been known by the regional 
offices, and the city shares information regarding on the ground and citizen-oriented events.  
Through this Committee and the work it developed, a relationship solidified between the city of 
Rochester, the NYSDEC, and the County Health Department the streamlined the regulatory 
processes associated with brownfield projects. 
Managers in both Rochester and Buffalo reported positive and consistent relationships 
with their regional counterparts in the NYSDEC.  These relationships were enhanced by long 
tenures of NYSDEC staff and the resulting accumulated knowledge.  In addition, the regional 
NYSDEC managers interviewed for this research exhibited strong interpersonal skills and high 
motivation for the mission of their agency.  However, both city and NYSDEC regional officials 
reported frustration with the NYSDEC central office.  All parties found the central office highly 
bureaucratic and more susceptible to the political influence of the Governor’s office, leading to 
slow response rates during key decision-making points. 
Finally, at the federal level, both Rochester and Buffalo lie in Region 2 of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) whose brownfield office has a history of staff turnover.  
While both cities have received several brownfield assessment and cleanup grants from the EPA 
since the mid-1990s, individuals in both cities report that EPA technical support has waned with 
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increasing local experience.  Key local managers confirm that the EPA currently plays a minimal 
role in brownfield project implementation. 
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